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ABSTRACT 
 
The desire for EAC countries to attract MNCs with a view of obtaining tax has 
brought challenge in curbing transfer pricing manipulation arising out international 
transactions by associated MNCs. In the absence of aggressive tax legislation, human 
and financial resources, such countries are at high risk of losing substantial right 
share of tax due to this vice. This concern raises question as to what can be done by 
EAC countries to address the risk and hence prevent potential tax loss. This study 
addresses this concern. It focuses on the adequacy of existing international and 
domestic transfer pricing laws in curbing transfer pricing manipulation. The study 
examines interplay between transfer pricing and MNCs theories, international 
transfer pricing standards, aggressive tax planning and their impact to existing 
manipulation of transfer prices. The study brings out the failure of existing transfer 
pricing standards in particular arm‘s length principle to curb the vice and the need to 
supplement the same. In order to obtain desired results doctrinal legal research 
methodology is mainly employed and supplemented by empirical and comparative 
methods. This study has found that the existing transfer pricing law in EAC countries 
are not adequately curbing transfer pricing manipulation. The study recommends for 
amendment of existing laws by offering theoretical insight of important issues which 
can be taken in to account in crafting transfer pricing laws. 
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1 
 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background to the Problem 
In recent years, the East African Community (EAC) has witnessed an ongoing 
discovery of untapped natural resources such as gas, oil and minerals.
1
 Such 
resources have fueled foreign investments by multinational corporations (MNCs)
2
 in 
the sub-region.
3
 However, availability of natural resources and an increase in foreign 
investments do not seem to be translating into increased livelihoods for the citizens 
in the EAC countries. Critics of globalization have argued that MNCs‘ investments 
in the sub-region are not prompted by fair trade, which would benefit both the 
developing countries and the investors, but rather, increased presence of foreign 
investors that emanates from factors that seem to be benefiting the MNCs more than 
the African regions.
4
 Borkowski posits that increasingly, sophisticated and complex 
economical, political, technological and legal regulatory environments, especially in 
developing countries are major factors in the rise of cross border transactions by 
associated MNCs.
5
 Tax incentives including tax holidays given to MNCs by the 
EAC countries encompass another factor. In addition, globalization and introduction 
of free market economy in developing countries have equally influenced 
                                                          
1
 EAC was established in 1999. At present the EAC comprises the following countries: Kenya, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan.  
2
 Multinationals are corporations operating in several countries but managed by from one country.  
3
 United Nations Conference on Trade Development (UNCTAD), Global Value Chains: Investment 
and Trade for Development, World Investment Report, United Nations Publication, 2013, p.40.  
4
 Sikkaa P and   Willmott H.,   The Dark Side of Transfer Pricing: Its Role in Tax Avoidance and 
Wealth Retentiveness, Critical Perspectives on Accounting 21, 2010, 342–356 p. 342. 
5
  Borkowski S.C., The Transfer Pricing Concerns of Developed and Developing countries,  the 
International Journal of Accounting,1999 Vol. 32 No. 3 pp 321-336 at 321. 
 
 
2 
involvement of MNCs in the sub-region.
6
 In order to attract more foreign investors, 
the EAC partner countries formulated various laws to govern and regulate trade 
relations among themselves. Accordingly, the East African Community Treaty (EAC 
Treaty) requires partner states to take measures to ensure rationalization and 
harmonization of investment tax incentives with the view of promoting the 
community as a single investment area.
7
 In fulfilling this requirement, partner states 
established the East African Community Custom Union (EACCU) and East African 
Common Market (EACCM).
8
  The objective of EACCU and EACCM, among 
others, is to enhance foreign investment in the region.
9
 The rationale behind this is to 
attract many foreign investors so as to obtain revenues through taxes that will arise 
from international transactions by MNCs. This is because tax is a necessary 
precondition of a functioning state, which in itself is essential for economic growth.
10
  
The impact of the stated measures is an increase in cross-border cooperation in trade 
and investment thereby multiplying involvement of associated MNCs in the region.  
As cross border trade and investment are enhanced, integration of EAC in global 
economy is bolstered such that there will be exposure of countries to cross-border 
                                                          
6
 The globalization and removal of international trade barriers and the effort to harmonize sales law by 
Convention on International Sale of Goods (CISG) has increased number of companies involved in 
international transactions.  
7
 Article 80 (1) (d) and (f) of the EAC Treaty. 
8
 Ibid, Articles 2, 75 and 76 respectively. 
9
 Article 3(c) of the Protocol for the establishment of the EACCU 
10
 Action Aid., Calling Time: Why SABMiller Should Stop Dodging Taxes in Africa, Action Aid 
United Kingdom at p.6, www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/calling_time_on_tax_avoidance , accessed 
20th December, 2011.  It is worth noting that, tax is very important in running activities of the 
country. Over the years tax has been used by various governments in financing public services, 
stimulation of economic growth and redistribution of worth;
 
for example tax can be used as a tool to 
promote local industries which produce products which are similar to the imported products by 
imposing high tax for imported goods and reduce the price for the local products.  See also Kibuta 
O., Tax Compliance in Tanzania: Analysis of Law & Policy Affecting Voluntary Tax Compliance, 
Mkuki na Nyota, Dar es Salaam, 2011 p. 16;   Luoga  F.,  A Source Book  of  Income Tax Law in 
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam  University Press, 2000, P.5. Ring D.M., International Tax relations 
Theory and Implications, Tax Law Review, 2006.p.1.  
 
 
3 
problems, whose solution(s) might need a transnational approach.
11
  MNCs import 
(inbound investment) as well as export (outbound investment) capital and other 
resources in and outside the sub-region.
12
  For MNCs to be established and operate 
their activities efficiently, they require equity or debt capital.
13
 However, the most 
pertinent form of capital by associated MNCs is debt.
14
 A parent group of associated 
MNCs usually divides activities to its subsidiaries or to a permanent establishment. 
For example, services and intangible activities may be done in centers operating for 
the whole group or specific parts. A finance company may operate like internal 
banks, whereas production of parts and assembly of final products may take place in 
many different countries.
15
 In order to manage their intercompany transactions, 
MNCs usually sell and buy goods within associated entities or group of companies 
through transfer pricing. It has been estimated that two-thirds of the world‘s trade is 
done within MNCs and from which transfer pricing is practiced.
16
  
 
                                                          
11
 Amani H.K., Challenges of Regional Integration for Tanzania and the Role of Research, a Paper 
presented at the general convocation meeting of the Open University of Tanzania, 2005. 
12
 For details of inbound and outbound investments see Olivier L and Honiball M., ‗International Tax: 
A South African Perspective‘, fourth edition Ciber Ink Capetown, 2008 p.2; Arnold J.B et al.,  
International Tax Primer, Kluwer international, Second Edition, 2002, p.4. 
13
 According to Business dictionary,‖ Equity capital is investment money that in contrast to debt 
capital is not repaid to the investors in the normal course of business. It represents the risk capital 
staked by owners through purchase of a company‘s common stock ie ordinary shares. The value of 
equity capital is computed by estimating the current market value of everything owned by the 
company from which the total of all liabilities. It is also known as share capital. Debt capital is part 
of a firms‘ total capital which commonly comprises of loan capital and short term bank loans such 
as over draft.‖ available at www.businessdictionary.com/.../equity-capital.html Accessed  20th  
February,2013. 
14
 Adams C. and Coombes R., Global Transfer Pricing: Principal and Practice, Tottel Publishing Inc., 
Haywards Heath 2003 p.49. 
15
 United Nations, Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Tenth  
meeting Geneva, 10 - 14 September 2001, ST/SG/AC.8/2001/CRP.6,  p.2 
16
 Awasth R., Transfer Pricing Technical Assistance Global Tax Simplification Program, Global Tax 
Simplification Team, A paper presented in Brussels, 24 February 2011. 
 
 
4 
Therefore, transfer pricing is a set-up of price charged by one segment of an 
organization for goods or services that it renders to another segment of the same 
organization.
17
 Gareth extends that transfer pricing includes loan and intangible 
assets arranged between associated MNCs.
18
  However, transfer pricing has become 
a potential problem because it has been alleged as means of denying countries their 
right share of tax revenue.
19
 It is done by increasing or reducing profits superficially 
or creates losses with a view of concealing profit thereby lessening their tax 
burden.
20
 This is achieved by using interplay of differences of tax avoidance laws 
across countries through aggressive tax planning.
21
 The practice becomes rampant 
when a parent company operates from low tax countries, where tax policies made 
aim at diverting finances and capital from high to low tax countries.
22
  Thus, transfer 
pricing manipulation becomes an acute problem because MNCs contribute 
                                                          
17
 Horngren C.T. and Sundem G.L., ‗Introduction to Management Accounting,‘ 9th Edition Prentice 
Hall International Inc 1993 p.336. 
18
 Gareth, G., Transfer Pricing Manual, BNA international Inc., London 2008, p.5, See also Sikkaa P 
and   Willmott H.,   note 4 p. 342; UN Guidelines 2013 para 1.1.6. 
19
 The Global Financial Integrity report 2014 shows that, EAC lost $1.3 billion between 2001 and 
2010 due to manipulation of transfer pricing , led by Uganda $680, Tanzania $333, Kenya $112, 
Rwanda $158 and Burundi $ 49 million. See Kar D and Spanjers J., Global Financial Integrity, 
Illicit Financial Flows from Developing countries: 2003 to 2012, 2014. The Christian Aid, Death 
and Taxes: the True Toll of Tax Dodging, 2008 reports that poor countries loose $160 billion a year 
which is more than the aids they receive from donor countries. See also Curtis M., et al, The One 
Billion Dollar Question: How Can Tanzania Stop losing So Much Tax Revenue, a Report by 
Tanzania Episcopal Conference, National Muslim Council of Tanzania and Christian Council of 
Tanzania, First Ed. June 2012. This report points out that Tanzania is losing $150 million through 
mispricing; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Illicit Financial Flow: Why Africa 
Need to ―Track it, Stop it and Get it‖, High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, 
2014, p.3. The report shows that Africa is losing USD 50 billion per year due to transfer pricing 
manipulation.  Although the figures differ from various sources, all findings show that there is 
serious problem with regard to transfer pricing manipulation. 
20
 Oguttu A.W., ‗Curbing Offshore Tax Avoidance: The Case of South African Companies and 
Trusts, PhD thesis‘, PhD Thesis, University of South Africa, 2007 p. 48; See also,  Boldman N, 
International Tax Avoidance , 35 Bulletin for international fiscal Documentation,1981, p 443; 
Arnold, J.B et al , p.53, note 12. 
21
 This is achieved by concealing authentic documents on the actual costs and transactions between 
associated MNCs to tax authorities. 
22
 OECD Report, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, 1998 p.14. 
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substantially to revenue of the country.
23
 Therefore, any abuse of transfer pricing by 
MNCs may substantially affect revenue of countries.  Notably, international trade 
and investment have enhanced integration of the EAC countries in global economy 
and exposed such countries to international transfer pricing risks, whose solution(s) 
may need a transnational legal approach. 
 
The legal response to the rise of transfer pricing manipulation through tax avoidance 
schemes is the enactment of tax avoidance legislation. Transfer pricing and thin 
capitalization are some of tax avoidance rules aimed at deterring companies from 
shifting profits to associated companies through under- or over- pricing of cross 
border transactions.
24
 The rules are enshrined under international and regional 
instruments and in countries‘ domestic laws. Transfer pricing regulations require 
goods and services to be transferred at an arm‘s length price,25 a transaction in which 
buyers and sellers of a product act independently and have no relationship to each 
other. The arm‘s length price ensures that both parties in the deal act in their self-
interest and would not be subject to any pressure or undue influence from the other 
party. In this context, revenue authorities are empowered to make adjustments where 
                                                          
23
 For example in Kenya, it is estimated that MNEs account for a significant percentage of the large 
taxpayer population, which contributes to about 75% of total tax revenues; see PWC Report, 
Transfer Pricing and Developing Countries, A Project by European Aid Implementing the Tax and 
Development Policy Agenda, 2011at p. 19. 
 
24
 In United States for Example, the earliest transfer pricing was introduced in section 262 of Revenue 
Act, 1921. This provision permitted commissioner to prepare consolidated returns on behalf of 
controlled entities so as to enable them to reflect their true tax liability. In United Kingdom, the 
earliest transfer pricing regulations are provided under sections 770 to 773 of the Income and 
Cooperation Taxes Act, 1988. For more details see Desai N, Transfer Pricing Problems, Strategies 
and documentation: Recent Case Law on Transfer Pricing, 2002, p.4 - 5. In East Africa countries, 
transfer pricing rules were introduced in very recent years. 
25
 In Tanzania see for example section 33 of the Income Tax Act, Cap 332 RE2008, Section 18 
Income Tax Act, Cap 470 RE 2014 of the laws of Kenya, and Articles 9 of UN model and Article 9 
of OECD model respectively. 
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a special relationship seems to have influenced the determined price. Arguably, this 
requires aggressive tax laws and sophisticated revenue authorities including 
international cooperation to deal with transfer pricing intricacies.  
 
Internationally, OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (OECD 
model) and United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed 
and Developing Countries (UN Model) are used in regulating transfer pricing.
26
 
These models have served as a useful tool for revision of domestic transfer pricing 
rules. In practice, to date, EAC countries are referring to OECD model rather than 
local transfer pricing laws in dealing with intricacies of transfer pricing cases.
27
 
Arguably, EAC is lacking comprehensive and aggressive tax laws to deal with 
transfer pricing intricacies. In the absence of proper transfer pricing regulations, both 
revenue authorities and the MNCs have limited guidance to refer when dealing with 
transfer pricing issues. The OECD model, which is used by EAC and most 
developing countries, was developed from the view point of developed 
28
countries in 
preserving their revenue. Indeed, the model is not necessarily relevant to developing 
countries.
29
 Similarly, the UN model, which is made with the view of helping 
developing countries, is not very much used by such countries. While there are 
challenges in adopting such models, the risk of losing the right of revenues through 
                                                          
26
 The purpose of both OECD and the UN model conventions is a uniform basis for solving the 
problem of international juridical and economic double taxation primarily to encourage investment 
by preventing double taxation of profits. 
27
See for example decision in the case of Unilever Kenya Limited v The Commissioner of Income Tax, 
Tax appeal number 753 of 2003 High Court of Kenya where the High court applied the 
internationally accepted principles of OECD on ground that Kenyan law is not sufficiently 
addressing Transfer pricing issues.  
28
 The founding members are high income economies such as United Kingdom, United States of 
America, and Belgium, Netherlands, France, Germany to mention few.  
29
 See discussion on chapter three at 3.6. 
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transfer pricing manipulation by MNCs is growing and the transfer pricing laws in 
EAC are still lagging behind.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
This study addresses the growing potential of losing tax revenue through 
international transfer pricing manipulations by associated MNCs‘ transactions within 
EAC.  The risk is of three-fold: firstly, failure by legislator to address legal 
challenges that are caused by application of arms ‗length principle to arrive at arms‘ 
length price. Secondly, failure to make appropriate choices commensurate to the 
local context while taking into account international transfer pricing standards in 
crafting local laws.  Thirdly, failure to recognize and draw attention on growing 
challenges of international transfer pricing emerging from an increase in foreign 
associated MNCs‘ investments. The risk of losing tax is inherent in the MNCs‘ 
endeavour of maximizing their profits. For that reason, MNCs have discretion to sale 
goods and services with each other at specific arrangements. Although associated 
MNCs are controlled from one country, they do not pay tax as one company. Each 
company is a taxpayer in a country where it operates. The fact that MNCs operate in 
different countries, they are at liberty to benefit from different legal systems. 
However, tax regulations of a country differ from one country to another. They 
include differences between countries‘ tax rate, transfer pricing rules and their 
interpretation as well as policy, documentation requirements, standard of 
administration reporting and enforcement, confidentiality of financial including 
business transactions of tax payer and government attitude towards income derived 
from multinationals. Because of these differences, MNCs may not report the same 
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transfer pricing for a given transaction in all countries. As a result, MNCs may use 
tax avoidance rules to avoid tax beyond what is legally accepted by exploiting 
variations in law to transfer goods and services within the company.  
Given their international nature, multinational transactions between MNCs are made 
in different currencies other than EAC currencies. The differences on rules of 
conversion of the foreign currency can be used in manipulating transfer prices and 
shift profit from one country to another particularly in tax haven countries. Yet, there 
is potential for an intercompany loan, which has been regarded as service, to use 
interest payable on loan to shift profit from one country to another with the view of 
lessening tax liability. Notably, MNCs normally, earn a fixed rate of interest and are 
protected by contractual obligations with respect to their investments. Interest 
received by a foreign company granting the loan is normally subject to an exemption 
in the country where the receiving company is situated. However, contractual 
obligations offered to investors ordinarily do not reflect issues of transfer pricing but 
rather, they reflect tax incentive.  Likewise, MNCs normally hold valuable 
trademarks in countries from where they operate and not where they invest. For 
subsidiaries or a permanent establishment to use it, they must incur cost. If such 
transactions are not well regulated, they may lead to transfer pricing manipulation.   
The significant challenge in crafting transfer pricing laws commensurate with the 
local context is affected by desire of EAC countries to attract more foreign investors 
with a view of obtaining more tax among other things. As a result, such countries 
have been enacting laws and policies, which attract more foreign investors without 
taking into account risks that may be associated with such steps particularly transfer 
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pricing. Other factors include constant pressure from developed countries to 
developing countries like EAC to strengthen their economies by importing capitals 
through MNCs‘ investments. Equally important, requirement by multinational 
institutions to developing countries to follow international transfer pricing standards 
as benchmark in reforming local transfer pricing laws is another factor. There is 
consensus that such  standards as set in tax convention models to facilitate foreign 
investment as imposed by multilateral institutions have not been working well in 
developing countries like EAC. This is due to the fact that they were made without 
taking into account specific needs of these countries.
30
 Hence, standard norms of 
transfer pricing as set by tax convention models 
31
have tended to have adverse 
impact on EAC countries that have required embracing them. The adverse impact on 
such countries is mainly because application of such laws, in particular, arms‘ length 
principle has been benefiting MNCs more than host countries. 
 
Tanzania and Kenya to date, have different and incompatible provisions of law 
governing transfer pricing in their respective countries.
32
 Such laws are of wide 
variety ranging from lack of coordination to lack of clarity in some cases. Although 
the arm‘s principle has been enshrined in various countries‘ ant-avoidance 
legislation, its application is limited to certain areas and it leaves much to be desired. 
Furthermore, transfer pricing laws have not largely tested in the court of law
33
  to 
                                                          
30
 McGauran K., Should the Netherlands Sign Tax Treaties with Developing Countries?, SOMO, 2013 
p.13 – 15. 
31
 OEDC and UN models. 
32
 Each state through its investment laws appears to be competing with the others to attract more 
strategic investors to supply its internal market. 
33
 See for example Tanzania no transfer pricing cases has been taken to the court. It is only Kenya had 
opportunity to  test transfer pricing case  in court of law  in land mark case of Unilever  Kenya 
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establish their efficacy. Yet, these countries are largely referring OECD transfer 
pricing rules, which are not binding and may not necessarily be relevant in EAC 
countries.
34
 At regional level, the EAC investment code, which regulates investors, is 
also silent on matters of transfer pricing.
35
 In addition, the EAC Agreement on 
Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income 
Agreement, which provides for taxation of associated MNCs be done at arm‘s length 
price, its application is not uniform among member countries.  
 
Arguably, manipulation of transfer pricing within MNCs will continue to erode EAC 
tax base.  This would make EAC member states continue to be denied their right of 
tax from international transactions.  If manipulation of transfer pricing by MNCs is 
not properly governed by nation‘s legislation and international instrument, then 
MNCs will continue to shift profits from EAC countries to countries from which a 
parent company operates and to the low tax jurisdiction.  Hence, EAC will continue 
to suffer from deficient tax to the detriment of their national economies.  Thus, it was 
necessary to study concerns of transfer pricing rules and effectiveness of legislation 
and international instrument in curbing manipulation of transfer pricing by associated 
MNCs in EAC. 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
Several scholars have written on the subject of transfer pricing laws and their roles in 
tax revenue in a country or region. McClure posits that transfer pricing and tax 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Limited V. Commissioner of Income Tax, Income Tax Appeal No. 753 of 2003[2005]  of the High 
Court of Kenya. 
34
 If they are relevant, the OECD model treaty and guidelines may only solve problems caused by 
diverse of rules and regulation but not those caused by unsophisticated revenue authorities. 
35
  East Africa Investment Code 2011. 
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havens have adversely affected less developed countries‘ (LDCs) ability to raise tax 
revenues, primarily from avoidance of corporate taxes.
36
 He stresses that LDCs are 
adversely affected more by capital flight and untaxed foreign earnings than those of 
OECD countries. McClure provides four reasons LDCs are maimed by transfer 
pricing. Firstly, laws and regulations dealing with transfer pricing are inadequate to 
tackle transfer pricing problem.
37
 Secondly, lack of sound administrative capacity to 
deal with transfer pricing problem even where legal framework for monitoring 
transfer pricing exists.
38
 Thirdly, lack of comparable uncontrolled transactions and 
relevant evidence on profitability are even less likely to exist for tax administrators 
in LDCs than it is in developed countries.
39
 Fourthly, there are long period that 
elapses before transfer pricing cases are settled and uncertainty of unfavorable 
outcomes lead LDCs relatively uninterested in pursuing them.
40
  
 
The adverse effect is greatly felt by developing countries because of reliance on 
developed countries to assist them, either because they choose to do so or as a result 
of measures to protect their own tax bases. In this context, the LDCs have nothing to 
do individually or collectively to stanch outflow because most of the capital flows 
from poorer countries are invested in OECD countries, which control means to 
taxation reform. He concludes that tax reforms of the last several decades could not 
                                                          
36
 Mclure Jr C.E., Transfer Pricing and Tax Havens: Mending the Less Developed countries Revenue 
Net, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
37
  Cobham A et al., Transfer Pricing and the Taxing Rights for Developing Countries, Action aid, a 
paper presented at the Tax Justice Network Africa Research Conference, Nairobi on April 2010, 
p.9. available at www.christianaid.org.uk/images/CA_OP_Taxing_Rights.pdf; accessed 1
st
 May 
2013;  Monkam N., ATAF Regional Studies on Reform Priorities of Tax Administrations: African 
wide Report, November, 2012. 
38
 Ibid, see also, PWC., Transfer Pricing and Developing Countries, A Project by European Aid 
Implementing the Tax and Development Policy Agenda, 2011. 
39
 Ibid.  
40
 McClure Jr., p.12 note 36. 
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have been expected to deal adequately with revenue cracks created by tax havens and 
transfer pricing. Hence, whatever action has occurred seems more likely to benefit 
developed countries than to help LDCs patch holes in their revenue nets.
41
 Consistent 
with McClure‗s view, a report by Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) includes lack of 
documentation requirement or inability to enforce existing documents due to lack of 
capacity to process as well as evaluate such information, partly because of lack of 
technical expertise and necessary resources at their disposal to process the data as a 
problem to developing countries.
42
 A possible resolution is for the European 
Community (EU) to render support necessary in helping developing countries to 
reform their transfer pricing rules. Support must be offered to enable developing 
countries to adopt internationally accepted OECD Guidelines.
43
 However, support 
goes with preconditions that developing countries should improve economic growth 
in key sectors including legal services in accepting international tax laws of the 
OECD and improvement of both human resource and office facilities by tax 
authorities.
44
  It is argued that if developing countries decide to introduce transfer 
pricing regulations on their own, there is a danger that such endeavourr will lead to 
emergency of diversity in transfer pricing legislation in various countries in the 
globe.
45
 However, the argument does not hold water because the right to tax belongs 
to the country. Therefore, any country, whether developed or developing, has the 
right to establish tax laws, which are relevant to its interest.  In this context, this 
                                                          
41
 Ibid p. 30. 
42
 PWC. p. 9 note 38. 
43
 Ibid,  p. 5,  The report posit that the rationale behind this is to help developing countries to increase 
their domestic tax collection by processing tax information better and ensuring tax compliance for 
all economic actors, in line with international standards. 
44
 Ibid  p.20-21. 
45
 Ibid. 
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study intended to suggest appropriate choices relevant for EAC, which take into 
account international transfer pricing norms.  
Nyamori offers an analysis of effectiveness of Kenyan‘s transfer pricing regime. The 
author‘s analysis takes into account the decision of the court in Unilever case that 
applied OECD Guidelines in absence of Kenyan guidelines.
46
  Nyamori argues that 
Kenya is not a member of OECD and therefore, could not participate in drafting the 
Guidelines. He questioned the necessity for the court to rely on OECD Guidelines 
instead of resorting to foreign jurisprudence. He is of the opinion that ultimately, 
substantive laws of Kenya could be construed and applied. The author analyzes 
transfer pricing based on substantive laws, rules and international treaties. He finds 
that substantive law provisions are susceptible and insufficient guidelines on how to 
arrive at arm‘s length price.  Transfer pricing rules, which came to rescue the 
situation also, have problems because they fail to make mandatory documentation 
requirement and issues of cost arrangement among other things are not mentioned. In 
addition, some rules do not exist in the enabling Act. A problem with this is that 
rules are subsidiary legislation and cannot override the enabling Act.
47
 Moreover, the 
rules confer broad discretion powers to the Commissioner on imposing penalty and 
on estimating tax to be paid by a tax payer in case of default. He concludes that 
complexity of transfer pricing with scarcity of its experts and lack of comparable 
data for determining arm‘s length price are impediments to efforts of alleviating 
manipulation of transfer pricing by MNCs. 
                                                          
46
 Nyamori B., An Analysis of Kenya‟s Transfer pricing Regime, International Transfer pricing Journal 
, March/ April 2012. 
47
 Ibid, p.159. 
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Policy Forum argue that Tanzania is losing taxes due to mispricing by MNCs not 
trading at arm‘s length price as required by the law.48 They find that Tanzania loses 
billions of dollars each year due to tax evasion by MNCs through trade mispricing of 
profits to subsidiaries in tax haven countries like Canary Island and Cayman to avoid 
tax liability in Tanzania.
49
   Mispricing is done by inflating of deflating import or 
export of goods and services traded between associate MNCs. It is estimated that at 
least United States of America dollars (US$) 150 million a year are lost through 
mispricing.
50
 To date, transfer pricing laws are largely untested in the court of law.  
There are no cases and no procedures on how to investigate transfer pricing issues.
51
 
Thus, it remains a challenge for Tanzanian authorities to identify transfer pricing 
manipulations and combat the problem. Its revenue authority should also ensure that 
a standard ethical procurement principle for associated MNCs to implement their 
transactions at arm‘s length price is adhered to.52  Hans- George Petersen report 
analyses general tax system of EAC and found that one of the issues of concern is 
transfer pricing manipulation by MNCs.
53
  
The report views transfer pricing manipulation is caused by weaknesses of the 
existing transfer pricing laws in that only four member states, namely, Tanzania, 
Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have transfer pricing while Burundi has none. Yet, 
member states with transfer pricing laws have divergent approaches in their 
                                                          
48
 Policy Forum, How Much Revenue are we Losing, An Analysis of Tanzania‘s Budget Revenue 
Projections 2009/2010, Policy Briefing 2.09 p.3., See also  Monkam N.,  note 37. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Ibid, p. vii-viii. 
51
 Ibid, p.31. 
52
 Ibid, p.4. 
53
EAC/GTZ, Report of the EAC/GTZ programme, Tax System and Tax Harmonization in EAC: 
Hans-Georg Petersen, University of Potsdam, 2010. 
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application. Although arm‘s length principle enshrined in member state legislation 
are in line with OECD Guidelines, other rules consist of vague and general clauses 
such that their application is limited to certain transactions and companies.
54
 
Moreover, no specific directives for handling transfer pricing queries. Each case is 
handled according to circumstances of particular case and hence, they create 
arbitrariness on handling transfer pricing cases.
55
  
 
Borkowsk argues that serious economic consequences are caused by transfer pricing 
manipulation in both developed and developing countries.
56
  She argues that the 
problem of transfer pricing is caused by what constitutes an acceptable method to 
arrive at transfer price.
57
 She cited United Kingdom (UK) and United States of 
America (USA) as having their own perception on correct methods and willingness 
to challenge tax authorities including risk audits.
58
 Despite their having detailed and 
rigorous sets of transfer pricing regulations,
59
 the developed countries are also 
subject to transfer pricing manipulation. The problem is worse in developing 
countries for two main reasons. Firstly, for couple of years, some developing 
countries shunned transfer pricing controls for fear from discouraging foreign 
investment(s). Secondly, developing countries do not know the true extent of transfer 
pricing problem due to difficulties in obtaining physical evidence of transfer pricing 
manipulation. This is due to difficulties in ascertaining the true profit or loss of the 
                                                          
54
 Ibid, p. 81. 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Borkowski S., note 5. 
57
 Cobham A et al., note 37. 
58
  Ibid. 
59
 Ibid, p.9. 
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transnational companies‘ residents in their countries and hence, ascertainment tax 
liability becomes difficult.  
 
On the contrary, MNCs apply sufficient resources to deal with transfer pricing 
transactions using procedures that may be difficult to get exposed by tax authorities 
of the developing countries.
60
 All these create unequal bargaining power between 
developed and developing countries when dealing with transfer pricing. 
Consequently, developed countries and emerging economies can result in companies 
apportioning greater profits to their countries to avoid the risk of transfer pricing 
disputes.
61
The result is that transfer pricing problem in developed countries is lower 
than in developing countries.
62
 Hence, developed countries are in a better position to 
deal with transfer pricing than developing countries.
63
  
 
In this context, it is difficult for developing countries to alleviate manipulation of 
prices by using less aggressive transfer pricing laws than the case may be.  In solving 
such problems, scholars suggest various ways including establishment of global 
transfer pricing that will be accepted globally and that OECD and UN Guidelines 
may be adopted at government‘s discretion.64 Disclosure of financial statements is 
necessary to ensure transparence in order to reduce suspicion on income shifting.
65
 
Other measures include existence of qualified auditors in transfer pricing, 
                                                          
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Ibid, p. 2. 
63
 Ibid, see also OECD, Dealing effectively with the challenge of the Transfer pricing, OECD 
Publishing 2012, p.71. available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264169493-en accessed  29
th
 
October 2013,  p.71.  
64
 Borkowski S., note 5. 
65
 Ibid, see also Cobham A. et al., p.11 note 37.  
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amendment of regulations, cooperation among regional revenue authorities and 
effective exchange information.
66
 Agreeably, the stated solutions are viable. The 
researcher endeavoured to study, in detail the legal loop holes in existing transfer 
pricing  laws which enable MNCs to avoid tax  in  EAC context.  
 
Osei offers a comparative discussion and analyses of transfer pricing in the African 
context in reality of transfer pricing in Ghana.
67
 He found that the problem of abuse 
in transfer pricing is caused by the following; - uncertainties of Ghanaian tax 
litigations due to judges being overworked and underpaid; poor court facilities with 
lack of computer devices to record proceedings; lack of continuing legal education to 
judicial cadres; lack of effective record management as well as storage; and 
prevalence of corruption in judiciary system.
68
 Osei remarks that with such 
problems, no wonder Ghana was unable to produce case laws capable of guiding 
taxpayers on how they were expected to work in transfer pricing cases.
69
 
 
Another cause is inherent practical problem of establishing an arm‘s length price 
despite international acceptance of arm‘s length standards.  In his view, proper 
determination of arm‘s length price requires developed national case laws, for 
without it, it is difficult to determine arm‘s length price.70  Additionally, weak rule of 
law and problem of judiciary produce frequent violation of stare decisis; 
                                                          
66
 Ibid. 
67
 Osei E.K.,Transfer Pricing in Comparative Perspective and the need for Reforms in Ghana, 
Transnational law &Contemporary problems, NBr 19-2, 2010. 
68
 Ibid, p. 628 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid, p 627. 
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consequently, the arm‘s length standard connotation is largely unknown in Ghana.71 
Moreover, weak administrative enforcement of the tax code by Ghanaian revenue 
authority due to lack of relevant data to deal with transfer pricing issues enhanced the 
problem.
72
 The result is that the magnitude of transfer pricing in Africa is very high, 
for it is estimated that the world‘s poorest countries lose more than development aid 
they receive annually.
73
 To solve such problems, Ghana largely imported OECD and 
UN models where there are comparable items.
74
  
 
In absence of comparables, Ghana uses prices of goods and services in the 
international market to determine a tax rate.
75
 He concludes that many developing 
countries that include Ghana perceive OECD model highly appropriate for 
negotiations between poor countries but inappropriately suitable for capital 
importing countries.
76
  This is a contradictory argument such that if developing 
counties are capital importers, how can OECD model be appropriate for negotiation 
and irrelevant, on the other hand? Additionally, Osei did not explain extent OECD 
model will help developing countries to obtain the right share of tax arising from 
MNCs‘ transactions.  
 
While appreciating developing countries‘ awareness on risk posed by transfer 
pricing, the OECD report argues that many developing countries do not understand 
the number and type of MNCs operating in their countries together with type of 
                                                          
71
 Ibid. 
72
 Ibid.  
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Ibid, p. 622. 
75
 Ibid, p. 623. 
76
 Ibid, p. 620; see also UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review of Ghana, at iii, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/ MISC.14/Rev.1 (Feb. 2003), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipcmisc14rev1_en.pdf  Accessed 2
nd
  May 2013. 
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transfer pricing risks that are likely to arise.
77
 This translates into a difficulty of 
working out on how to think up transfer pricing rules. As such, countries do not have 
full knowledge of issues to be addressed and the problem that can rise from it.
78
 It is 
uncertain whether or not this is true. The assumption is that African countries do not 
have any regulation and procedure to govern foreign investment. In the contrary, 
there are law and institutions, which govern foreign investors, for example, Tanzania 
Investment Act
79
 and Tanzania Investment Centre that acts as one stop centre to co-
ordinate, encourage, promote and facilitate investment.
80
 The report further argues 
that developing countries lack legal requirements for companies to file accounts to be 
publically available.
81
  
In settling transfer pricing disputes, the report argues that disputes normally involve 
a significant amount of tax and there is no single right answer. Yet, most transfer 
pricing issues are settled through negotiations between tax authorities and MNCs 
making compromises.
82
 This is easily achieved in developed countries because they 
have experience in dealing with transfer pricing cases. To the contrary, developing 
countries lack experience in dealing with transfer pricing cases through negotiation.
83
  
One of reasons is that tax auditors may be easily corrupted because most of the 
transfer pricing queries involve a huge amount of tax and hence, they cannot give 
                                                          
77
 OECD note 63 p.68. 
78
 Ibid, p. 69. 
79
 1997. 
80
 See section 5 of the Act; See also, Kiunsi H.B., Tanzania Investment Act, 1997: Analysis of Law 
and practice.   A Research Submitted in partial fulfillment of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) of the Open 
University of Tanzania, 2005. 
81
 Ibid. 
82
 Ibid, p.75. 
83
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real results.
84
  Thus, tax administrators of developed countries can help developing 
countries in settling transfer pricing cases like it is done in South Africa.
85
 It is true 
that there is corruption in countries in various sectors.  
An overview of literature reveals various problems in relation to transfer pricing in 
Africa. First, African countries do not know the extent of transfer pricing problem 
and therefore, it is not easy to deal with transfer pricing problems. Second, 
inadequate transfer pricing rules and where there are adequate rules, there are no 
experts to deal with it. Third, African countries cannot make transfer pricing rules 
unless they are helped by developed countries; either they choose to do so or as a 
result of measure to protect their own bases. Fourth, uncertainty results from transfer 
pricing litigations and unfavorable judgment to many developing countries 
discouraged development of transfer pricing rules. Fifth, tax administrators lack 
resources, experience and capacity to deal with transfer pricing intricacies. Sixth, the 
solution for curbing tax evasion through transfer pricing is by adopting OECD Model 
with help from developed countries. 
 
Agreeably, many authors point out transfer pricing problems. However, most 
literature sources are based on general developing countries or Africa and nothing 
specific for EAC. Studies have been focused on a single country or for general report 
purposes, across continental or between developed and developing countries.  
Transfer pricing problems including identified and suggested solutions lack clarity as 
well as certainty such that in some instances, they contradict themselves.  
                                                          
84
 Ibid. 
85
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Moreover, EAC, at large, is not extensively covered and therefore, there is an 
apparent dearth of transfer pricing literature to appropriate solution. Therefore, this 
study endeavoured to explore appropriate and implementable approach in curbing 
transfer pricing manipulations. A legal solution will be suggested in solving transfer 
pricing problems, and where applicable, non-legal solutions will be suggested so as 
to fill the research gap.  
 
1.4  Objectives and Research Questions 
1.4.1  General Objective 
The main objective of this  study is to provide an  insight  into legal loop holes used 
by MNCs to avoid tax through transfer pricing  manipulation and suggest how might 
be plugged to protect  tax base of the EAC countries.  
1.4.2  Specific Objectives 
(i) To examine transfer pricing problems posed by foreign investors in particular 
associated MNCs. 
(ii) To analyze the adequacy, relevancy and appropriateness of the existing transfer 
pricing standards and regulations in dealing with transfer pricing problems in 
EAC. 
(iii) To suggest ways which could help EAC countries to devise and implement 
transfer pricing legislation suited to their strategic needs and environment, so 
as to enhance certainty, clarity and predictability in curbing  transfer pricing 
manipulation  by MNCs and protect its tax base. 
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1.4.3  Research Questions 
(i) Do existing transfer pricing rules and standards in EAC adequately curb 
transfer pricing manipulation?  
(ii) To what extent are the general principles and Guidelines of OECD and UN 
model  relevant in curbing transfer pricing manipulation in EAC countries?  
(iii) What strategies should be considered and employed in formulating an 
effective transfer pricing regime for EAC? 
 
1.5  Research Methodology  
This study mainly used a doctrinal research method supplemented by empirical and 
comparative methods. Doctrinal method was used to review literature on transfer 
pricing and evaluate transfer pricing legislation.
86
 There are two reasons for selecting 
doctrinal method. First, primary data for the study were obtained from legislation 
through reading the relevant sources. Doctrinal research is the main methodology of 
legal research because it primarily focuses on what the law is as opposed to what the 
law ought to be.
87
 Under doctrinal methodology, a researcher‘s main goal is to 
locate, collect the law (legislation or case law) and apply it to specific set of material 
facts in view of solving legal problem.
88
  In examining various laws, the researcher 
employed historical, analytical and applied perspective approach. Under historical 
perspective, the researcher looked into history of the transfer pricing legislation. The 
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main questions included the following: ―What were issues of the day when 
legislation was enacted? What were material conditions of the day? What was 
mischief to be cured by particular law?‖ The rationale behind is to establish whether 
or not issues, mischief and material conditions of that particular time are still relevant 
to the contemporary transfer pricing problems.  
 
Under analytical level, the researcher analyzed whether or not existing transfer 
pricing rules give relevant answer(s) to existing transfer pricing problems. Then 
under applied level, the researcher critically examined the manner and extent the 
existing transfer regulations are sufficient enough to solve existing transfer pricing 
problem. Documentary review and analysis were included but not limited to 
legislation, policies international instrument such as treaties, conventions, cases, 
articles, reports, books, journals, parliamentary hansards, dissertations, thesis; bills, 
court decisions and commentaries by various scholars on transfer pricing. As for 
documentary review, the researcher used various libraries such as Open University of 
Tanzania and University of Dar es Salaam. Websites were also used to access 
information from various sources in the world, which are relevant to the current 
work. Legislation were used as a primary source of information by analyzing how 
they are effective in regulating transfer pricing issues. 
 
To complement doctrinal research, empirical method was employed to establish 
external factors that actually affect operation of the law. This method is important in 
revealing and explaining practices of legal, regulatory redress and dispute resolution 
together with impact of legal phenomenon on a range of institutions, businesses as 
 
 
24 
well as citizens.
89
 During field work, the researcher contacted key persons dealing 
with or closely connected to transfer pricing laws and policies in government 
institutions such as Ministry of Finance Tanzania,  In addition, Tanzania and Kenya 
Investment Centers, statistics bureaus, and revenue authorities were visited. The 
researcher also visited few MNCs such as Geita Gold mine and Vodacom Tanzania 
limited.  Other visited places included law firms dealing with transfer pricing and 
accounting firms responsible for tax planning, like  KPMG  and Paulclem and 
Associates as well as tax tribunals.   
 
The field research intended to establish how the government institutions 
administered and implemented the existing transfer pricing legislation in curbing 
transfer pricing manipulation by MNCs. Likewise, the study was effected in order to 
establish the manner MNCs were affected by application of different transfer pricing 
laws in the EAC as a single investment area, on one hand and on the other, to 
establish how they comply with existing tax regulations. The field research also 
served as a tool to establish factors that contributed the most appropriate means for 
government to obtain right share of revenues from MNCs. In data collection, the 
researcher used interviews to get insight into institutions‘ experiences in dealing with 
transfer pricing problems.  In addition to interviews, well crafted questionnaires were 
administered to seek for meaningful responses from various institutions. The 
questionnaire was administered to government institutions, while interviews were 
administered to MNCs and other private sectors entities.
90
 Comparative analysis was 
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also employed in conducting the research. In particular, the researcher was interested 
to make comparison among status of laws and policies in the partner states so as to 
detect any positive trends towards complying with the EAC Treaty requirement of 
removing trade barrier within EAC. This is because the extent of the problem may 
not be the same among all member states because some might have put initiatives 
worth being followed by others.  
 
1.6  Scope of the Study 
This study was limited to EAC countries only and Tanzania as well as Kenya was 
used as case studies. The choice of Kenya was based on her comprehensive transfer 
pricing rules and case law. In addition, Kenya is highly experienced in transfer 
pricing matters and therefore, it was necessary to examine in answering research 
questions. Tanzania was selected because it lacks both comprehensive transfer 
pricing legislation and case law and yet, it has more foreign investors than Kenya.
91
 
Uganda was left out because its position in transfer pricing is equivalent to Kenya. 
Burundi was left out due to the fact that it lacks comprehensive transfer pricing 
legislation, which could have been worth to study. Use of French in Burundi created 
language barrier thereby made it difficult to access legal documents and other 
literature sources. In addition, Burundi is using civil legal system unlike other EAC 
member states, which are practicing common law.  Although Rwanda is having 
various provisions of transfer pricing, it was not selected because it has same 
limitations like Burundi. However, Rwanda is in transition from civil legal system to 
common law.  
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1.7  Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis organized in eight chapters. Chapter one provides the Problem and its 
Context. Chapter two presents concept and theories for international transfer pricing. 
In the chapter, relevant transfer pricing concepts and theories for existence of 
transfer pricing are explained. Since transfer pricing is practiced in associated 
MNCs, the concept and theories of existence of MNCs are also explained and 
discussed. The rationale is to show how transfer pricing plays a significant role in 
fulfilling objectives of existence of associated MNCs. Problem and issues involved 
in international transfer pricing are explained.  
 
Chapter three presents international transfer pricing under auspices of international 
tax. The chapter documents source and resident as basis upon, which taxes with 
foreign elements can be executed. It also shows standards of international transfer 
pricing as enshrined in international tax treaty models. It explains and discusses that 
the pivot arm‘s length principle as corner stone to transfer pricing methods to arrive 
at arm‘s length price.  
  
Chapter four explains transfer pricing legislation in EAC.  It shows how facilitation 
of foreign investment enhanced involvement of associated MNCs‘ transfer pricing 
practices in the region. Such challenges have forced EAC countries to adjust their 
policies and laws to adopt transfer pricing standards including principles to attract 
further foreign investors.  
Chapter five examines aggressive tax planning strategies and their linkage to transfer 
pricing manipulation by associated MNCs. Use of international transfer pricing 
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standards and principles through aggressive tax planning to facilitate manipulation of 
transfer pricing are discussed. The BEPS Action, which came to rescue failure from 
existing transfer pricing standards and its efficiency in curbing manipulation in EAC 
context is also explained as well as discussed. In addition, alternatives to arm‘s 
length principle is discussed explained. 
 
Chapters six review existing transfer pricing laws of Tanzania. It focuses on 
examination of Tanzania‘s tax regime in particular Income Tax Act and its adequacy 
in curbing transfer pricing manipulation by associated MNCs in the country. The 
chapter also makes comparison with Kenya‘s tax regime. It also analyses whether or 
not aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation principle is enshrined in 
Tanzanian‘s law. 
 
Chapter seven reviews existing transfer pricing laws of Kenya. It focuses on 
Kenyan‘s tax regime, in particular, Income Tax Acts and their efficiency in curbing 
transfer pricing manipulation by associated MNCs in the country. The chapter also 
makes comparison with Tanzanian tax regime. It also analyses whether or not 
aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation principle is enshrined in 
Kenyan‗s law Chapter eight provides key findings, conclusion and 
recommendations.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPT AND THEORIES OF TRANSFER PRICING 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Transfer pricing is corner stone for operations of associated MNCs operating in 
various countries. For transfer pricing to be performed or implemented, various 
issues need to be considered in arriving at actual transfer price. This chapter presents 
relevant concepts and theories for existence of transfer pricing and its role in MNCs. 
The rationale is to show the manner transfer pricing plays significant role in fulfilling 
objectives of existence of associated MNCs and problems as well as issues involved 
in international transfer pricing.  
 
2.2  Transfer Pricing Concepts 
2.2.1  Transfer Pricing 
In a modern economy where volume of associated MNCs is increasing with 
globalization, transfer pricing is corner stone of all transactions. Traditionally, it 
describes a setting of prices of goods, services and intangibles between associated 
MNCs.
92
 However, scholars have assigned different meanings. There are those who 
view transfer pricing as proper means for MNCs to maximize profit through 
manipulations while others view it as proper means for obtaining government 
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revenue through arm‘s length price. In some instances, there are mixed feelings 
about transfer pricing between MNCs and governments under their revenue 
authorities on what constitutes a real transfer pricing. Additionally, there are scholars 
who try to demarcate from realm of transfer pricing by giving both positions as to 
when it is a tool of maximizing profit and reduce tax burden, and when it is an 
important source of income tax to governments. The problem of defining transfer 
pricing is based on its ambiguous character of being capable to give different results 
when applied.
93
 The first group of scholars views transfer pricing as a tool of MNCs 
to shift profit so as to minimize overall company tax liability with a view of 
maximizing profit.
94
 This is sought to be achieved by using financial engineers to 
manipulate various transactions including business restructuring so as to retain 
wealth. In this context, taxation of profit by MNCs is targeted as a cost and that 
needs to be avoided.
95
 Thus, MNCs have freedom to move capital and other 
resources to their associates in other countries where they can save cost.  Sikka and 
Willmott point out that;- 
 “Reducing or eliminating taxes is attractive to corporations as it 
boosts shareholder values, it also increases company dividends and 
executive rewards as these are linked to reported earnings. Since 
the amount of tax payable is dependent on costs and income, 
                                                          
93
 It may either give countries involved right share of tax and right share of profit to MNCs or  MNCs 
will benefit more than government and vice versa 
94
 UN,Transfer Pricing: History, State of the Art, Perspectives, Ad Hoc Group of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Tenth Meeting, Geneva, 10-14 September 2001, Sikka  
and Willmott note 17  See also Urguidi A.J., An Introduction to Transfer Pricing, New school 
Economic Review, Volume 3(1), 2008,27-45 p.1; Plasschaert S.R., Transfer pricing and 
Multinational Corporations: An Overview of Concepts, Mechanisms and Regulations,1979, p.19, 
describes transfer pricing as a leeway of MNCs to manipulate the prices on intra firm and services 
flow for the purpose of making profit; Curtis, M., et al, note 4 p.16. Christian Aid, False Profits: 
Robbing the Poor to Keep the Rich Tax-free, A Christian Aid Report, March, 2009 p.4 ;  Hearson 
M. and  Brook, note10; Hasset K. and Newmark, K.,  Taxation of and Business Behaviour: A 
Review of Recent Literature, In Diamond J., Zodrow G., (eds), Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, 
Choices and Implications, MIT Press, Cambridge 2008, 191-2 14.  
95
 Sikka and Willmott, note 17. 
 
 
30 
corporate attention becomes more intently focused on transfer 
pricing strategies.”96 
 
As most of investments are from developed countries, MNCs‘ parent companies 
operate from such countries where there have aggressive transfer pricing laws.  Since 
their economies are based on long run private investments, they have control over 
their associates and companies are benefiting from profits by reducing their overall 
tax liability.  Accordingly, policies and laws of the investor countries are devised to 
stimulate as well as sustain economies through expansion of the economy, and 
corporations are legally bound to increase profits as well as dividends for the benefit 
of their share holders.
97
  Therefore, it is becoming difficult to avoid effects of 
transfer pricing across countries. This is partly attributed by an increase in associated 
MNCs as a result of desire to maximize profit and minimize cost and partly, 
implementation of multilateral institutions‘98 policies that require developed 
countries to invest in developing countries so as to boost economies of such 
countries.
99
 The effect of losing tax through transfer pricing manipulation is higher in 
developing countries including EAC than developed countries. This is because EAC 
is capital importer and lacks capacity to invest in the developed world. Due to 
differences in economy levels between developed and developing countries, the 
returns arising from investment through MNCs are more likely to benefit the 
investors‘ countries.  
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It is interesting to note that developed countries also view transfer pricing as means 
for MNCs to maximize profit and reduce tax liability. For example, in a transfer 
pricing dispute between GlaxoSmithKline and United States Government,
100
 the 
Internal Revenue service clearly stated that, ―We have consistently said that transfer 
pricing is one of the most significant challenges for US in the area of corporate 
administration. Transfer pricing is a practice meant to minimize United States 
taxable profits by overpaying foreign subsidiaries for product supplies.‖101 The 
same view was given by Sir David Varney when he said that, ―Transfer pricing is 
the practice where profits of United Kingdom (UK) based foreign multinationals are 
channeled through a Northern Ireland Office without actually bringing any 
additional economic activity in the province.‖102 
 
From legal point of view, transfer pricing is described as a system of setting up 
prices of goods and services between associated parties at a market price, as if the 
parties are operating independently. This is sought to be achieved by applying arm‘s 
length principle.
103
 The principle requires that transfer of goods and services 
between associated MNCs should be similar to those made between independent 
parties operating in a market.
104
 Where a special relationship seems to have 
influenced transfer price between associated MNCs, revenue authorities are 
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empowered to make adjustment.
105
 The principle seeks to ensure that a country 
where associated MNCs operate obtains the right share of tax arising from 
associated MNCs‘ transactions.  
  
From government perspective, arm‘s length provides legal basis for revenue 
authorities to have right share of taxes and right share of profit to associated 
MNCs.
106
  Courts also have been of the same opinion. In Hicklin v SIR, 
107
the court 
held that, ―dealing at ‗arm‘s length‟ was a useful and often easily determinable 
premise from which to start the inquiry. It connoted that each party was independent 
of the other and, in so dealing, would strive to get the uttermost possible advantage 
out of the transaction for him or herself.‖108  In this context, most countries‘ transfer 
pricing laws require goods and services to be transferred at arms‘ length price.109 
Consequently, revenue authorities see transfer pricing as a target with potential of 
producing very large government revenue through transactions by MNCs.
110
  
Therefore, transfer pricing laws are devised to obtain the stated objective.  
 
However, it is unlikely the objective can be achieved in EAC because the very nature 
of transfer pricing laws has been threefold. First, as condition to attract more foreign 
investment required by multilateral institutions, tax laws do not necessarily take into 
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account the real desire of EAC to raise tax. Second, the laws are imposed from 
developed countries where they were intended to be used between them. Third, the 
original purpose of transfer pricing laws was to avoid double taxation.
111
 
Additionally, given complexities involved in applying the arm‘s length principle, the 
said principle may not be effectively implemented in EAC. Complexities of transfer 
pricing, which are attributed by absence of universal rule for determining right 
transfer price have put MNCs at risk of disagreement with tax authorities on taxable 
amount reported to tax authorities. Consequently, revenue authorities do not agree 
that there are different outcomes to any transfer pricing, as PWC pointed out that, 
“There are many different possible outcomes to any transfer pricing 
analysis, a number of which may be acceptable and some of which may 
not, with the accountants need for a single number to include in 
reported earnings and you have what many commentators have termed 
the „perfect storm‟. This perfect storm threatens:-  the risk of very 
large local tax reassessments,  the potential for double taxation 
because income has already been taxed elsewhere and relief under tax 
treaties is not available,  significant penalties and interest on overdue 
tax,  the potential for carry forward of the impact of unfavorable 
revenue determinations, creating further liabilities in future periods, 
secondary tax consequences adding further cost – for example the levy 
of withholding taxes on adjusted amounts treated as constructive 
dividends, uncertainty as to the group‟s worldwide tax burden, leading 
to the risk of earnings restatements and investor lawsuits.”112 
 
Despite general view that transfer pricing is a tool of maximizing profit and 
minimizing tax, some scholars demarcate from that realm. Pogan shows his concern 
while reviewing OECD tax force report that, 
“The disappointing of Tax force is that it sends a strong signals that 
the issue of transfer pricing is still dominated in government circles 
by outdated and incorrect view that, it is mainly about 
counteracting tax avoidance by MNEs…the order in which issues 
are dealt with and the shades of emphasis throughout leave no 
doubt that the spectre of tax avoidance looms disproportionately 
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large. Thus the tax force report provides continuing encouragement 
for the incorrect use of the term transfer pricing to mean, in a 
pejorative sense, pricing decision by an MNE to deliberately shift 
income from one member of the group to another to reduce the tax 
liability in the first member country.”113 
 
Other scholars argue that government efforts to minimize transfer pricing risks, 
through increasing aggressive transfer pricing laws, increasing expert human 
resources and other resources have affected minimization of transfer pricing by 
MNCs.
114
 Not all MNCs are likely to adopt tax minimization. Non-manufacturing 
firms are more likely to adopt tax minimization while manufacturing firms and less 
internationalized MNCs are focused on tax compliance goal.
115
 MNCs which focus 
on tax minimization goal incur high cost on their tax planning because they require 
highly experienced expert personnel in international transfer pricing and more 
resources in their departments. To the contrary, the MNCs which focus on tax 
compliance do not incur extra expenses. They conclude that most MNCs assess 
their transfer pricing practices on compliance based rather than tax minimization 
measures, a pattern, which is contrary to the stereotype of being a tool to reduce 
MNCs‘ tax burden.116Notwithstanding the foregoing view they agree that transfer 
pricing is material tax minimization tool.
117
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In additional, revenue authorities see transfer pricing as a soft target with potential of 
producing very large government revenue through transactions by MNCs.
118
  
Therefore, transfer pricing laws are devised to obtain this objective. Absence of 
universal rule for determining right transfer pricing have put MNCs at risk of 
disagreement with revenue authorities on taxable amounts reported to authorities. 
Because of desire to obtain revenues from international transactions, revenue 
authorities disagree that there are different outcomes to any transfer pricing, as PWC 
pointed out that, 
 
 ―There are many different possible outcomes to any transfer 
pricing analysis, a number of which may be acceptable and some of 
which may not), with the accountants need for a single number to 
include in reported earnings and you have what many 
commentators have termed the „perfect storm‟. This perfect storm 
threatens:-  the risk of very large local tax reassessments,  the 
potential for double taxation because income has already been 
taxed elsewhere and relief under tax treaties is not available,  
significant penalties and interest on overdue tax,  the potential for 
carry forward of the impact of unfavourable revenue 
determinations, creating further liabilities in future periods, 
secondary tax consequences adding further cost – for example the 
levy of withholding taxes on adjusted amounts treated as 
constructive dividends, uncertainty as to the group‟s worldwide tax 
burden, leading to the risk of earnings restatements and investor 
lawsuits,”.119  
 
Consequently, governments, through revenue authorities, have created uncertainty 
to MNCs‘ business operations. It is further argued that tax is not a sole issue 
considered by MNCs.  Other transaction costs such as resource allocation, supply 
chain and management compensation, among other costs, are taken into account 
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while planning tax.
120
 Likewise, economic rationale for MNCs to charge transfer 
prices is for evaluation of performance of the associated MNCs concerned. This, in 
turn, enables MNCs to decide whether to sell or buy goods and services within 
MNC or to the open market.
121
  Hence, most MNCs comply with tax authorities and 
the taxable amounts arising out of international transaction are certain and well 
documented as required by the law.
122
 In line with this view, the OECD report states 
that, "The consideration of transfer pricing problems should not be confused with 
the consideration of problems of tax fraud or tax avoidance, even though transfer 
pricing policies may be used for such purposes."
123
  
 
An overview of understanding of transfer pricing concept reveals the following 
conclusions. First, transfer pricing is not defined in laws and therefore, it is deemed 
to be not a legal term.  However, the terms, which are used between associated 
MNCs, affect any transfer of goods and services if they are not set according to the 
arm‘s length principle as a requirement of the law. Second, different perceptions of 
transfer pricing lay on the fact that when used, they are capable of giving two 
different results. It can either give countries‘ right share of tax and associated MNCs‘ 
right share of profit when prices are set according to the requirement of the law or it 
can deny countries‘ right share of taxes when requirement of the law is not followed. 
The former entails that when prices between associated MNCs are made at arm‘s 
length principle, then the government will get its right share of tax while the MNCs 
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will be only taxed over the required amount and maintain their profit. The latter 
entails that when prices between associated MNCs are set without taking into 
account the principle of arms‘ length, MNCs are likely to benefit more and countries 
involved lose the right share of tax.  
 
It is in this context that transfer pricing is perceived to be a tool of maximizing 
profit and minimizing tax. This is achieved under the auspices of tax planning 
whereby MNCs manipulate prices within law parameters in such a way that it is not 
easy for a revenue authority to detect that the law is actually infringed. In McDowell 
& Co. v CTO,
124
 the court observed that ―tax planning may be legitimate provided it 
is within the framework of the law. Colourable devices cannot be part of tax 
planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that it is honorable to 
avoid payment of tax by resorting to dubious methods.‖ For these reasons, both 
MNCs and revenue authorities are required to comply with tax laws when dealing 
with transfer pricing.   
 
2.2.2  Transfer Price 
Once price set-up is made, the question that follows is, ‗which should be actual 
transfer price for a particular transaction?‘  From an economic point of view, transfer 
price is "the amount charged by one segment of an organization for a product or 
service that it supplied to another segment of the same organization."
125
 Arguably, 
transfer price between associated MNCs does not necessarily reflect the arm‘s length 
price.  From a legal point of view and for the purpose of tax, transfer price is the 
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arm‘s length price obtained by using arm‘s length principle.126 To arrive at transfer 
price or arm‘s length price, specific methods need to be followed. The methods are 
provided under international Guidelines of the OECD and UN models.  
 
They are comparable uncontrolled price method, resale price method, cost plus 
method; transactional profit split method and transactional net margin method.
127
 In 
practice, for a tax payer to rely on any method, functional analysis is required to 
establish all activities performed for a particular product in a particular transaction. 
In most cases, functional analysis includes functions performed such as design, 
assembling, manufacturing, sales activities, inventory, after sale service and any 
other relevant function performed.
128
  Other factors considered include risk assumed 
such as financial, market, regulatory, technology and product.  Accordingly, assets 
used and contributed must be identified, whether they are tangible or intangible 
assets.
129
 The whole process of determining transfer price is based on comparability 
to independent parties‘ transactions so as to bring both parties on an equal footing. 
Thus, functional analysis is important to identify and understand intra-group 
transactions, basis for comparability, points of adjustments in compared transaction, 
and to have materials for transfer pricing documentation.  
An overview of transfer price definition provides the following conclusion: First, 
transfer price is the amount set by applying arm‘s length principle. Second, it is not 
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easy to arrive at arm‘s length price such that special and long procedures must be 
followed. Functional analysis and comparability are key factors for any chosen 
method.  Third, there is no right answer for any method used to arrive at transfer 
price as per arm‘s length principle. Because such methods are not really legal but 
rather, economic mathematical oriented. However, each used method depends on 
circumstances of each transaction.  Nevertheless, a price determined by using arm‘s 
length principle is real transfer price between associate MNCs.  
 
2.2.3  Multinational Corporations (MNC) 
An MNC is another concept, which acts as a key player in international transfer 
pricing.  Traditionally, it refers to corporations operating in various jurisdictions but 
controlled from one country.
130
 Internationally, MNCs are defined as all enterprises, 
which control assets, factories, mines, sales, having 10 percent control of voting 
stock or 25 percent of assets or sales in more than one country.
131
  This is equated 
with foreign direct investment (FDI). In many jurisdictions, MNCs, for tax purposes, 
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refer to related or associated entities including corporations which can be either 
affiliated,
132
 branch, subsidiary,
133
 controlled foreign company or intermediary.  
 
In addition, associated MNCs, by using organizational structure, diversify their 
investment geographically through special purpose entities.
134
 To establish whether 
an individual or legal entity is an associate, domestic law provides for test either 
through voting right, capital share or benefit rights. For example, in Tanzania, a 
person other than natural person is said to be associate if directly or through one or 
more interposed entities, controls or may benefit from 50 percent or more of the 
rights to income or capital or voting power of the entity.
135
  Scholars have extended 
the meaning of MNCs to include franchise, management contracts and leasing, 
which provides for value added activities of which a parent corporation receives 
income from such activities.
136
 To this extent, the MNC is defined as a firm, which 
has more than 10 percent of equity or contractual involvement like management 
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contracts, franchising, and leasing agreements in more than one country.
137
 The 
international character of MNCs of having either branch, affiliate, subsidiary or 
controlled foreign company or any other relation capable of being recognized by law 
are established in country other than where the parent corporation operates. Thus, 
associated entities once established for purpose of conducting business, and actually 
carryout business, they become permanent establishliment (PE).They may be a 
branch, an office, a factory, a workshop, a mine, oil or gas well, a quarry or any other 
place of extraction of natural resources,
138
 and they become tax payers in countries 
where they operate. In taxing the business profit of such establishments, the concept 
of PE is used to determine whether or not a country has right to tax business profit of 
a nonresident tax payer. However, only business profits of a non-resident that may be 
taxed by a country are those attributable to a permanent establishment.  
 
The rationale behind this is that the PE is incorporated and situated  in that other 
country  and therefore, it obtains residence of that country as well as becomes a 
taxpayer in that particular country. In this context, the PE provides evidence that a 
foreign country conducted significant business within the host country and therefore, 
the host country should benefit for taxing PE.
139
  Oguttu and Tladi point out that PE 
provided incentive for resident and source to cooperate in reducing international 
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double taxation thereby promoting international trade.
140
  It is important to study 
MNCs‘ concept in EAC because of the volume of foreign investment investing in 
EAC. Thus, when the government encourages foreign investment, it should know the 
kind of entities it is going to deal with. 
 
2.2.4  Tax Havens 
The main purposes of MNCs are to maximize profit and minimize tax. For that 
reason, most of them have been investing in low tax countries commonly known as 
tax havens. There is no precise definition of tax havens. However, tax haven 
generary refers to a country, which has a lower rate of taxation than that prevails 
over other countries.
141
 OECD describes tax haven as the country, which is able to 
finance its public services with no or nominal income taxes that actively makes itself 
available to non-residents for tax avoidance that would otherwise be paid relatively 
under high tax rate.
142
 The OECD provides the following four elements in 
identifying the tax haven jurisdiction: there is no or nominal taxes on income, lack of 
effective exchange information about tax payer benefiting from low tax jurisdiction, 
lack of transparence in operation of legislation, legal or administrative provisions and 
absence of a requirement that a qualifying activity needs to be substantiated.
143
  
 
It is important to note that there are variations regarding tax haven from one country 
to another. Others call low tax jurisdiction or offshore finance centres.
144
 Gravelle 
points out that even elements identified by OECD exclude low tax jurisdiction like 
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Ireland and Switzerland, which are also OECD members.
145
 Zorome defines offshore 
finance centre as a country or jurisdiction that provides financial services to 
nonresidents on a scale that is incommensurate with the size and financing of its 
domestic economy.
146
 He describes key elements of offshore finance centres that 
they are specialized in supply of financial services on a scale far exceeding needs and 
size of their economies.
147
 
 
Various reasons have been advanced for MNCs‘ investments in tax haven countries. 
First, laws of tax haven countries and other measures are used to evade as well as 
avoid tax laws or regulations of other jurisdictions. Second, presence of 
minimization of tax liability gives advantage to MNCs in profit making. Third, 
secrecy in banking and finance business face low regulatory supervision.
148
 
Consequently, tax haven countries have been used by tax planners as an important 
tool for generating more profits of associated MNCs. Findings by Christian Aid 
reveal that in tax haven countries, there are no substantial economic activities that are 
carried on such that the associated corporations in tax haven jurisdiction are there for 
purposes of avoiding and evading tax.
149
 In line with these findings, OECD points 
out that profit shifting issues arise when MNCs use existing loopholes, gaps, frictions 
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or mismatch in interaction of countries‘ domestic tax laws.150 Such situation, in 
particular, is happening in tax haven countries because the laws are always made to 
contrast other countries‘ tax laws. Thus tax haven countries play significant role in 
transfer pricing by allowing profits be made in such countries. 
 
2.2.5 International Agreement 
When MNCs sell and buy goods from associates, there must be an international 
agreement for transfer pricing purpose. The international agreement is an agreement 
entered between associated MNCs operating in various jurisdictions indicating terms 
and conditions upon which goods and services will be supplied between them. Some 
jurisdictions clearly provide for international agreement for transfer pricing 
purposes; see, for example Section 31(2) of South Africa Income Tax Act. However, 
scholars argue that international agreements under electronic commerce (e-
commerce) are affected because they are vulnerable such that they can be easily 
deleted at any time if a data controller wishes to do so for the purpose of tax 
evasion.
151
 Under e-commerce, terms and conditions can be easily altered without 
being detected. Moreover, assumed functions and risk(s) may be split by the data 
controller, an aspect, which makes difficult to obtain relevant data for comparables to 
arrive at arm‘s length price.152 The understanding of international agreement is 
important as it plays significant role in transfer pricing adjustment and corresponding 
adjustment including avoiding double taxations.
153
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2.2.6  Transfer Pricing Manipulation 
Transfer pricing manipulation is a process of setting unarms‘ length prices of 
transaction between associated parties with a view of maximizing profit of the 
corporation and minimizing tax liability. This is achieved by over or under invoicing 
of such transactions in order to avoid government tax regulations or to exploit cross 
border differences in tax rates, for example, shifting deductable expenses to the high 
tax country and revenue to the low tax country in order to reduce overall tax 
payment.
154
 Motivation for manipulation of transfer pricing originates from theories 
of MNCs and transfer pricing. The former requires MNCs to establish their 
businesses where there is ownership specific advantage, location and internalization 
advantage and where the operation cost is low. In this context, management of 
MNCs may arrange their structure to take advantage of various laws, incentives and 
local market features offered by a particular country. The latter is based on profit 
maximization and gives potentials for concealment of relevant information between 
associates and parent company. In such circumstances, it easy for MNCs to 
manipulate prices so as to reflect their objective of minimization of tax liability as a 
whole. This is possible because MNCs take advantage of complicated and long 
procedures to setting-up prices, which do not reflect arm‘s length principle.155 In this 
context, there is potential for revenue authorities not to discover such manipulation. 
Accordingly, where revenue authorities have doubt in whether the price was arm‘s 
length price or not, sometimes it may be hard for them to prove. The reasons are 
simple. In auditing MNCs, revenue authorities have to rely on bulk documents 
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prepared solely by taxpayers in making reassessment for additional tax. All these 
take time and sometimes revenue with less aggressive administrative capacity may 
not manage. 
 
Transfer pricing concepts as discussed in this study have direct impact on setting 
transfer pricing between associated MNCs. Consequently, in counteracting 
manipulation of prices, such concepts ought to be taken into account. Notably, 
transfer pricing concept is predominantly used in this thesis in two perspectives. 
Firstly, it explains transfer pricing in context of arm‘s length principle in which host 
countries may obtain the right share of tax. Secondly, it explains transfer pricing in 
context of unarm‘s length price indicating transfer pricing manipulation. Likewise, 
transfer price is also used to indicate arm‘s length price between associated MNCs. 
Other concepts such as international agreements, tax havens and MNCs   provide an 
insight of important issues that countries under the study have to consider when 
dealing with transfer pricing issues.  
2.3  Theories for Existence of Transfer Pricing 
Generally, transfer pricing is referred to be a byproduct of decentralization by an 
organization, whose study requires integration of various disciplines.
156
 In order to 
understand the role of transfer pricing in MNCs, it is important to understand 
theories for existence of transfer pricing.  At this point, it is important to note that 
transfer pricing is of multi- disciplinary nature involving accounting, marketing, 
economic, law and taxation. Thus, the study of transfer pricing theories may not 
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necessarily reflect a legal argument or point of view, but rather, other disciplines, in 
particular, accounting and economic disciplines. However, principles developed in 
these theories form an important part in determining the relevant arm‘s length price 
applicable to transfer of goods and services between associated MNCs. The 
following are theories of transfer pricing as developed by various scholars, namely, 
economic, accounting, mathematical programming, and organization theories.  
 
2.3.1  Economic Theory  
Economic theory provides two assumptions. First, transfer price between associated 
MNCs should be one that will lead the corporation to profit maximization. Second, 
the central managers from where the parent company operates impose transfer prices 
to its associates. Economic theory of transfer pricing was first developed by 
Hirshleifer.
157
 He was concerned with problems of pricing goods and services 
between interdependencies of corporations while influencing such divisions to 
maximize the profit of corporation as a whole.
158
 The theory assumed two divisions, 
one, manufacturing with no external market for its products and second, distribution 
or buying division with competitive external market for its products.
159
 While taking 
into account technology and demand condition, Hirshleifer concluded that transfer of 
goods and services between associated MNCs should be made at a market price only 
                                                          
157
 Hirshleifer J., On the Economics of Transfer Pricing. Journal of Business, 1956, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 
172-184, p.172. 
158
 Ibid, p. 172. 
159
 Ibid, p.173. See also Myers J.K. and Collins M.K., Historical Review of Transfer Pricing: A 
dressing Goal Congruence within the Organization, Proceeding of ASBBS Annual Conference, 
February 2011, Vol.18 Number 1, p.2. 
 
 
48 
if a perfectly competitive market exists.
160
 The assumption is that where there is no 
perfect competitive market, the price of goods and services between associates is 
marginal cost of producing such goods and services.
161
  It means that goods and 
services between two divisions of the same company must be transferred at a 
specified price in order to attain profit as required by the parent corporation while 
maintaining their autonomies. 
 
The requirement that divisions should yield profit forms basis for evaluation of 
managers‘ performance. In due regard, when divisional managers are evaluated 
based on their divisional profits, as it is often the case, the temptation frequently 
would exist not to supply truthful, relevant information.
162
 Kanodia, on basis of 
Hirshleifer‘s argument, extended theory by taking external market to a mathematical 
programming approach and employed uncertainty conditions. In this context, 
Kanodia posits that central management sets transfer price by using linear 
programme on the basis of true reports of manufacturing and distribution 
divisions.
163
 The price set by central management is then imposed to divisions of 
associated MNCs. The fact that prices are set by central management provides room 
not to report honestly because the whole procedure is done by central 
management.
164
 Because of this, Kanodia changed the model for uncertainty with 
distribution division facing varied market prices and probabilities for the final 
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product.
165
 Together with the uncertainty, central management provided divisional 
managers with certain percentage of profit generated at the division as an 
incentive.
166
  
 
Consequently, risk was only reflected to distribution division and hence, allocation 
of rewards would not be Pareto optimal
167
 and maximization of the overall objective 
of the firm was not guaranteed. In order to balance, Kanodia introduced risk sharing 
scheme between manufacturing and distribution divisions situated within the country 
and at international level by imposing a vector of values for transfer price and 
making it conditional on the final price.
168
  At international risk sharing scheme, 
Kanodia posits that transfer price is determined by equating corporate objectives 
with division manager‘s risk aversions. To that extent, linear programme solves total 
corporation desires of maximizing profit. Kanodia concludes that both international 
and local sharing schemes motivate management to increase profit.
169
Critics of 
economic theory assert that it ignores the autonomy power of division managers in 
setting-up the transfer price and yet, the managers are evaluated as if they have 
autonomy.
170
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Accordingly, the theory highly concentrates on maximization of profit and ignoring 
the manager‘s position.171 Moreover, it ignores business strategy because it does not 
address the manner the corporation will compete with each other. Despite the critics 
raised against economic theory, it can be argued that it is directly applicable to issues 
raised today by countries on manipulation of transfer pricing on the view of profit 
maximization. This is because manipulation of transfer pricing originates from 
concealment of information on part of managers who are afraid of being evaluated 
on the basis of their profit performance. The theory also harmonizes fairly with 
transaction cost or internalization theory for establishment of MNCs on minimizing 
cost and profit maximization.  
 
 2.3.2  Mathematical Programming Theory  
Mathematical Programming Theory explains that transfer price should be an 
opportunity cost of producing goods.
172
 The theory views profit maximization by 
MNCs‘ division as the main constraint, which can be solved by linear programming. 
The approach introduced a pricing mechanism that determines allocation of 
resources when constraint on operation capacity exists or when multiple buying 
divisions exist.
173
  The division is assumed to be operating under capacity constraints 
when there is no competitive external market for the product and thus, mathematical 
programming should be used to solve the situation.
174
 In addition, since goods are 
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transferred from one division to another, the buying division is forced to source 
internally.
175
  
 
Like economic theory, mathematical programming theory aims at profit 
maximization and transfer prices are set by central management and  imposed to 
divisions. The theory also has an element of misrepresentation of information when 
division managers are evaluated on basis of their profit performance.
176
 However, the 
mathematical programming theory has been criticized on grounds that it ignores 
division autonomy of division managers by imposing transfer pricing.
177
 Yet, it 
provides an incentive on concealment of truthful information.
178
 In addition, the 
theory has been criticized on ground that it is difficult to apply in practice.
179
 Despite 
the criticism of mathematical programming theory, it remains an important tool for 
allocation of resources within MNCs. 
 
2.3.3  Accounting Theory   
Accounting Theory is based on an assumption that transfer pricing is one that 
motivates division managers to make decisions that benefit the corporation as a 
whole. Accounting theorists agree with economists that market price should be used 
to transfer goods and services when there is a competitive external market. In its 
absence, goods should be transferred at marginal costs.
180
 Where there is no outside 
competitive market and transfers are not a major portion of the distribution division, 
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Solomon suggests two–part tariff price to be used. First, a charge per unit equal to 
marginal cost and annual lamp-sum for fixed costs and profit.
181
 Second, where there 
is no outside competitive intermediate market, transfers are significant but the selling 
division has capacity constraints and cannot meet all requirements and thus, 
programming method should be used to arrive at transfer price.
182
 Although Solomon 
recognized the effect of transfer pricing on performance evaluation, to him, transfer 
price was a method of resource allocation.
183
 
Kaplan agrees on use of marginal cost in absence of competitive perfect market. He 
is of the view that marginal cost limits profit performance, which makes supplying 
division to lack incentive. In this context, negotiated market price can be used in 
absence of competitive perfect external market to solve performance evaluation 
problem of division managers.
184
 Benke and Edward, while forfeiting objective of 
profit maximization as key for performance evaluation, established a rule that 
transfer pricing should prescribe standard variable cost plus lost margin.
185
 The price 
should be applicable in both situations when there is perfect competitive external 
market and in absence of external markets. Antony and Deardon, departing from 
relying on marginal cost in absence of competitive market, they suggested transfer 
price to be based on three cost methods. First, standard variable cost plus a monthly 
charge for fixed costs.  Second, standard variable cost plus a portion of contribution 
earned. Third, dual pricing where the selling division receives an approximation of 
outside sales price minus a discount and the buying division pays standard variable 
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cost.
186
 Critics of accounting assert that the theory ignores division‘s strategic 
situation that may cause it to operate under different objectives and constrains.
187
  
2.3.4  Organization Strategy Theory  
Organization Strategy Theory has its roots in the work by Swieringa and Waterhouse 
who analyzed how an organization should handle transfer pricing problem. They 
looked into four organization models, namely, behavior model,
188
 the garbage can 
model,
189
 the organizing model
190
 and markets hierarchies‘ model.191 Under 
organization model, a firm was seen as a coalition of participants with different 
goals, expectations and choices. Goals were seen as constraints. In this context, 
transfer pricing was seen a result of bargaining processes to solve such constraints.
192
 
In their analysis, Swieringa and Waterhouse argued that transfer pricing rules of 
organization are those resulted from goals of cost savings and strengthened 
decentralized system.
193
 Garbage model explains that organization facilitates in 
solving problems and conflict resolution through bargaining. In this model, available 
choices are seen as a constraint, which depends on available solution. To this extent, 
transfer pricing process must reflect these problems altogether. In these models, 
Swieringa and Waterhouse argue that resultant transfer price is one that would reflect 
problems worked on in the context of choice.
194
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Organization model saw processes of organization as cyclical and members of 
organization were seen as creating an environment to which they adopt.
195
 This is 
because retained interpretations largely determined what actions are responded to 
and what meanings are given to those actions.
196
  Thus, transfer price is one that will 
be used as means to legitimize members‘ past actions, which shaped their choices.197  
The market and hierarchal were the last models reviewed by Swieringa and 
Waterhouse.  Market model explains exchange of goods and services achieved by 
negotiating as well as contracting individuals who are bound rationally and 
precluded from foreseeing all possible courses of their contract implications.
198
 
William was of the view that an individual may create problem(s) due to self-interest 
and make false claim(s) just like in economic as well as mathematical programming 
theories.
199
 Thus, determination of transfer price by using market model is costly and 
time consuming.
200
  Hierarchal model explains that series of market contracts should 
be replaced with single employment contract and common resource ownership. Thus, 
the transfer price will be one that will reflect the best results of the organization.
201
 
The authors concluded that all models could be used to view transfer pricing problem 
because they complement each other. Consequently, the choice and process of choice 
cannot be conveniently abstracted from complications of the context.
202
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Spicer while considering transfer pricing in organization, considers uncertainty as a 
constraint, which causes firms‘ differences and integrations. He argues that, ―an 
organization theory of transfer pricing process requires a wider consideration of 
relationships among firm‘s diversification strategy, its intra firm transactions, 
organization structure, management accounting and control system.‖203 Thus, 
internal transfer of goods and services is related to an organization‘s strategic choice 
of whether to buy or make them.
204
 Spicer developed three assumptions that lead to 
genuine organization‘s transfer pricing by asserting that, 
―Where standardized intermediate products are the subject of 
transfer involves product per which the degree of customization 
is minor, market prices will be the primary basis for setting 
internal transfer prices and for profit centre managers choosing 
between internal and external supplies and customers.”205  
“Where the internally transferred intermediate product involves 
a moderate degree of customization and a material transaction-
specific investment, internal manufacturing costs will play a 
greater role in the initial negotiations to set transfer prices and 
in ex-post proposal to adjust them.”206  
―where the internally transferred intermediate product is 
idiosyncratic, and involves a large investment in transaction 
specific human and or physical capital, internal manufacturing 
cost will be the primary bases for setting transfer prices; and 
there will be central control over the make or buy decision. 
Whether internal transfers are made at simulated market prices 
(cost plus), or simply at measure of cost, is a function of the 
degree of uncertainty associated with the intermediate product 
and the control strategy adopted by the firm.”207  
From the foregoing, transfer pricing theories developed different transfer prices in 
context of organization. Such transfer prices purely take interest of the organization 
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and countries where they operated are not taken in to account. All along, the transfer 
prices    suggest maximization of profit and minimization of cost. In addition, such 
theories clearly demonstrate potentials of price manipulations for transactions 
between associated MNCs. Accordingly, transfer prices suggested focuses on solving 
organization‘s problem such as evaluation performance and resource allocation 
within the organization. Consequently, the transfer prices developed seem to be more 
advantageous to MNCs than countries where they operate.  
 
The fact that suggested transfer prices were developed from MNCs perspective, 
countries where MNCs operate would need transfer price which will take in to 
account their interest. In this context, market price should be used to transfer goods 
and services between associated MNCs.  Ordinarily everyone is free to enter in to 
market and there may be no possibility of arranging prices in a special manner that 
could affect market. In this context, prices of goods and services will be determined 
by market forces. If associated MNCs sells at market price whether within or across 
borders both countries and MNCs will get their right share of income.
208
 However, 
such endeavor must be governed by the law. It is in this context that arms‘ length 
principle comes in to pray to regulate the transaction between associated parties.  The 
application of arm‘s length is justifiable for two reasons is capable of counteracting 
transfer pricing theories and it takes into account interest of countries where MNCs 
operates.  The former takes into account relevant issues from transfer pricing theories 
and counteract by regulate them.
209
 First, it explains transfer price in context of 
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market price where competitive perfect market exists. The market context of transfer 
price fits well with transfer pricing laws, which lay down arm‘s length principle 
under such that any transaction between associates made at a market price is 
considered to be in compliance with the law. Second, arms‘ length principle, takes in 
to account separate entity principle which requires entities to be treated separately 
when determining transfer price between them as enshrined in various laws and 
international instruments. Third, it takes in to account functional analysis in 
determining transfer price because the principle is based on comparison of different 
situations in the market, functions performed and risk assumed as enshrined in 
international as well as domestic guidelines. Fourth, the theory provides a leeway to 
transfer pricing in absence of a competitive market for comparison purposes. In this 
context, associated parties are obliged by arm‘s length principle to transfer goods and 
services at market price while following special methods and procedures. It is thus 
submitted that transfer price for transfer of goods and services between associated 
parties is arms‘ length price.210  
 
2.4 Theories for Existence of MNCs 
The philosophical foundation of MNCs can be traced back from MNCs‘ theories, 
which explain reasons for their existence, take different forms; operate across 
borders and the manner they manage intercompany transactions. Traditionally, there 
are two theories in existence of MNCs, namely, Dunning‘s eclectic paradigm and 
transaction cost theory also known as internalization theory.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
price. Thus, the approach does not take into account other theories that, to a large extent, aim at 
profit maximization and tax minimization as costs. In this study, economic theory was preferred 
despite its limitation due to the following reasons 
210
  For more details of arms‘ length price see para 2.2.2. 
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2.4.1  The Eclectic Paradigm Theory  
This theory explains a pattern, which determines the degree to which MNCs engage 
into foreign direct investments. The theory explains reasons for firms to conduct 
foreign production in a foreign country rather than producing at the home country 
and export. This theory includes a number of integrated economic theories such as 
international capital theory, which explains reasons a firm moves capital outside the 
country.
211
 Industrial organization theory explains why international firms take place 
based on ownership advantage. Location theory explains why the firm produces in a 
particular country and theory of firm operates in an imperfect market.
212
   
 
However, scholars argue that Dunning theories focus on one aspect and have 
weaknesses that cannot sufficiently explain theoretical existence of the MNCs. Elliot, 
for example, argues that industrial organization theory does not explain the manner a 
foreign firm can compete with domestic firms.
213
  To overcome such weakness, the 
firm engaged in foreign production must rely on a set of advantages that are 
unavailable in the domestic country. In combining these theories, Dunning came up 
with three specific advantages, which a corporation producing across borders should 
have, namely, ownership specific advantage (O), location specific advantage (L) and 
internalization advantage (OLI). He argued that; 
“Firms with headquarters in one country will set up and/or expand 
value adding activities outside their national boundaries whenever: 
a) They perceive that, due to their nationality of ownership or 
degree of multinationality, they possess some kind of competitive 
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advantage over indigenous firms (actual or potential) in the host 
country; 
b) They find it economic to exploit these advantages themselves, i.e., 
to internalize their use, rather than sell the rights to do so to host 
country firms, via an arm‟s length transaction (e.g., a technical 
service agreement or management contract); 
c) They believe that it is in their global interests to produce at least 
part of the value added from a foreign rather than a home 
location.”214  
 
Under ownership specific advantage, normally, MNCs consider issues, which have 
ownership advantage over local corporations and other MNCs operating in a host 
country. They include, but not limited to, technology, trademarks and an 
organization‘s skills. Thus, capital is moved across countries preferably in countries 
where there is low interest rate. For that reason, associated MNCs expand where the 
return of investment is higher.
215
 The MNCs then transfer technology, management, 
and organization skills within MNCs and control the same. Under location 
advantage, MNCs prefer production and distribution of goods as well as services to 
take place where production costs are relatively lower from where the parent 
company operates and where its markets are situated.
216
 In line with Location 
Theory, Burkely reiterates that MNCs venture across borders where there is raw 
materials, cheap labour, protection and untapped markets.
217
 
 
Furthermore, location advantage theory may be used as means to overcome trade 
barriers in countries where a parent corporation exist. For example, government 
restrictions of trade rules within the country where the parent company operates. 
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Under this perspective, economists view that strict rules affect MNCs‘ decision to 
establish associates outside their countries due to strict rules imposed in the country 
where they operate.
218
 For example, the regulation of imported goods, levy on taxes 
and profit regulations.  Another reason was advanced by Aliber that corporations 
from strong currency economies establish associates in weak countries so as to 
obtain advantage over a weak currency of the host country.
219
 Although the 
argument was criticized by Hennart on ground that MNCs raise their funds where 
the parent companies operate, it is not where the investment takes place and capital 
is not the most important component of the MNCs.
220
 The theory is still relevant in 
developing countries like East Africa where the shilling is weak to USA dollar and 
most investments are rated in terms of the USA dollar. Some scholars argue that 
MNCs exist as a supplement to international trade, since each country has 
specialization of a product or resources that can be obtained at a relatively lower 
cost.   Similarly, demands differ from one country to another. In some cases, 
countries may have resources and cheap labour but they are unable to produce 
because of lack of technology know how.
221
 For one country to obtain its demand, 
MNCs come to play. As Samuelson and Nordhaus pointed out that,  
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"Each country will specialize in the production and export of those 
goods that it can produce at relatively lower cost in which it is 
relatively more efficient than other countries, conversely, each 
country will import goods which it produces at relatively high cost in 
which it is relatively less efficient than other countries.”222 
 
However, Dunning eclectic‘s theory was criticized on ground that only location and 
internalization advantage are sufficient to explain existence of MNCs. Ownership 
advantage is highly pertinent to survival of MNCs and cannot sufficiently explain 
existence of MNCs.
223
 From the foregoing, Dunning‘s theory provides the following 
conclusions with reasons   multinationals invest out of their parent countries. First, 
ownership advantages such that most MNCs are large firms with annual worth 
millions of USA dollars. They are having technology or they have widely recognized 
market that other competitors cannot use. Second, is localization advantage whereby 
normally, MNCs furnish stock to the nearby market and where raw materials are 
available. Third, internalization benefits such that MNCs benefit from owning 
technology, brand and expertise. However, most of the MNCs are from developed 
countries and EAC countries are mere sources of providing such advantages. As 
such, the potential risk that may be caused by volume of foreign investments through 
MNCs, in particular, transfer pricing manipulation would be high. This is mainly 
because EAC countries are less developed lacking capacity to invest largely outside 
the region and, in particular, in developed countries. 
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2.4.2  Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction Cost Theory, also known as internalization theory
224
 explains that 
corporations expand or source activities outside the country to minimize cost by 
exchanging resources with the environment.
225
 The theory insists on cost 
minimization for all transactions done within the corporation. Coase rightly pointed 
out that,  ―every company has to carry out his functions at less cost within the 
company than outsourcing the activities to external providers in the market.‖226 The 
theory argues that MNCs is a result of organized individuals with similar or different 
interdependencies who pulled together their capabilities to generate income and 
become social institutions that endeavor to organize economic activities. When 
social institutions become efficient to organize, interdependencies become firm. 
Hence, when a firm grows well, it becomes more efficient than external markets and 
organizes interdependence with agents across borders hence development of 
MNCs.
227
 Hennart further points out three things for the firm to expand. First, an 
interdependency agent must be in a different country. Second, the firm must be the 
most efficient way to organize interdependencies. Third, costs incurred by the firm in 
organizing interdependencies are lower than benefits of so doing.
228
 
 
The problem of trading interdependently within the nation poses less serious 
problems. Serious problems arise when MNCs operate across countries facing 
different legal problems, tax rate, currency, registration requirement(s), and work 
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permit for their experts, risk of repatriation, exchange risks and other legal 
requirements that increase costs of operation to the MNCs. These are known as 
transaction costs that are organized through price and hierarchy.
229
 Hence, the cost of 
each transaction differs, depending on the chosen method.
230
 The firm‘s 
interdependence presupposes that both countries are aware of the firm or 
corporation‘s profit to be gained by agreeing on sharing of resources and avoid any 
chances that will lead to lose profit by MNC.
231
 The theory argues further that firms 
and markets are instrument used to organize as well as coordinate economic 
activities performed within the company.  Hennart points out such that markets rely 
on decentralized autonomous adjustment by economic agents where price is the key 
actor.
232
 Thus, a decision-maker must be in a position to foresee, correctly, future 
prices for goods and services of a firm supplied or offered.
233
 To this extent, MNCs 
normally opt for the least cost location for each activity with other profit and growth 
based on continuous processes of innovation of technology, new products, business 
methods and commercial applications of new knowledge.
234
 From legal point of 
view, international trade exchange taking place between related parties should be 
trading at arm‘s length price at international markets where traders react to market 
prices. To the contrary, part of international trade between related MNCs results 
from the manager‘s decision and not trading at arm‘s length price. The rationale 
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behind is to minimize cost and therefore, all internal policies including rules are 
made with intention of reducing cost in the corporation against the market.  
 
From foregoing overview, it can be submitted that the main purpose of MNCs to 
expand across countries is to maximize profit and minimize cost. MNCs are very 
keen to see the cost of any transaction across border is minimized as much as 
possible. Hence, for MNCs, while setting up prices they focus on profit 
maximization by making sure that transfer of goods and services between them are 
reasonably cheaper than the open market. MNCs always view tax as a cost of doing 
business that needs to be avoided whenever possible. To them, tax increases cost not 
only from the country where MNCs operate but also the whole group of companies is 
affected. This is because transaction of one segment of a corporation is not stand 
alone and it affects the whole company. For that reason, MNCs normally invest 
heavily on accounting firms and tax advisers to save the tax cost through aggressive 
tax planning. The fact that MNCs have sufficient resources to deal with transfer 
pricing transactions and procedures may not be easily traced by tax authorities. Thus, 
MNCs‘ theories reveal a true colour of MNCs‘ desire such countries under study 
ought to take into account when crafting transfer pricing laws. 
 
2.5  Conclusion 
Transfer pricing concepts and theories have direct impact on setting transfer prices 
between associated MNCs. Accordingly, there are agreements and disagreements 
with regard to meaning, scope and approach of such concepts including theories, 
depending on context of interpretation. While one approach is seen in favour of 
MNCs and from perspective of developed countries for profit maximizing, it was not 
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seen fovourable to governments unless they are construed in context of arm‘s length 
so as to ensure that governments obtain their right share of tax.  
 
These circumstances seem to justify countries to strengthen transfer pricing laws so 
as to counter transfer pricing manipulations. Thus, it is important that transfer pricing 
theories and concepts should be understood from legal point of view so as to avoid 
uncertainty that may occur while determining transfer price. In this context any 
transaction between associated parties are to be transferred at arm‘s length price. 
Nevertheless, concepts expose true colour of transfer pricing. This might be useful to 
be considered when developing laws and other measures to counter manipulation of 
transfer pricing in EAC countries.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
TRANSFER PRICING UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The shift of profit by MNCs through transfer pricing manipulation has led to a 
serious concern to both developed and developing countries. The desire for countries 
to tax profit on investments by MNCs on either source or resident basis has 
necessitated countries to harmonize national laws so as to facilitate investment by 
MNCs. In order to promote investment through MNCs, countries have found that it 
is necessary to eliminate any barrier that impedes cross border trade.  
 
Among barriers they include double taxation on MNCs‘ profits by governments and 
profit shifting by MNCs. For taxation of profit by MNCs to be effective and 
efficient, substantive laws should be harmonized or unified. This need has facilitated 
development of international transfer pricing standards under the umbrella of tax 
conventions initiated by multilateral institutions. It is within this context that 
attention has been given to transfer pricing standardization so as to regulate 
transaction between associated MNCs. 
 
Thus, tax conventions provide standards for transfer pricing laws and serve as a 
benchmark upon which countries consider when crafting domestic laws. However, 
transfer pricing standards that have emerged as benchmarks for standardising 
establishment of domestic transfer pricing laws originate from developed countries 
such that they may have some limitations to developing countries like EAC. This 
chapter highlights transfer pricing laws as manifested in international law. It starts by 
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looking briefly about international tax with a view of providing the basis for 
international transfer pricing. The principles of international tax as a base for 
taxation under international tax are highlighted. Raising and elimination of double 
taxation in relation to transfer pricing as enshrined under tax treaties are explained. 
The desire to have international transfer pricing standards and overview of tax 
models in whereby standards are enshrined is given.  Specific transfer pricing 
standards are discussed followed by methods to arrive at arms‘ length price. In 
addition, international transfer pricing documentation requirements and dispute 
mechanisms as enshrined under tax treaties are analysed.  
 
3.2  International Transfer Pricing under Auspices of International Tax Law 
It is the fact that MNCs operate across countries becomes the subject of international 
tax. International tax is concerned with problems arising when an individual or a 
corporation is taxed in more than one country. However, there have been different 
opinions on whether or not there is international tax. One group of scholars argues 
that no international tax exists. Olivier and Honiball argue that international tax is a 
misnomer because no tax laws exist that are applicable to all countries and that right 
to tax forms part of a state‘s sovereign powers.235 Similarly, Ring argues that there is 
no formal or specific definition of international tax, but it refers to income of a 
resident earned outside the country and income of nonresidents earning inside the 
country.
236
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Scholars on another group argue that international tax exists and it is part of 
international law. Arnold and McIntyre posit that international tax encompasses all 
tax issues arising under a country‘s income tax laws, which include some foreign 
elements such as income tax of cross–border trade in goods and services; 
investments; manufacturing by MNCs; and taxation of individuals who work or do 
business outside the country where they usually reside.
237
 Other international issues 
are recognition of MNCs with foreign subsidiaries in several countries.
238
  Avi-
Yonah, for example, provides four reasons for existence of international tax. First, a 
country can tax nonresidents that have connection to it on foreign income. Second, 
non-discrimination norm means that nonresidents from a treaty country should not be 
treated worse than residents embodied in all tax treaties. Third, the arm‘s length 
standard applies in all tax treaties in determining proper allocation of profits between 
related entities. Fourth, there is prevention of double taxation through credit or 
exemption methods.
239
 He further argues that where international national legislation 
exists, it overrides customary international law and treaties.
240
 But in the absence of 
legislation, customary international law can be used.  
 
However, Avi-Yonah was criticized on grounds that not all international tax issues 
can be answered by using international law, in particular, issues of domicile and 
nationality. This is because international law involves an interaction between two 
domestic legal systems as opposed to application of legal principles generally 
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accepted internationally.
241
 However, whether or not international tax exists, both 
scholars demonstrate magnitude of the problem in dealing with tax issues involving 
foreign element. Hence, international transfer pricing plays as an important part of 
international tax as it involves taxation of profit by MNCs operating across countries.  
 
3.3  Source and Residence as Basis for International Taxation 
Under international tax law, all income that arises from international transactions can 
be taxed either at source or residence basis.
242
 The work of taxation at source or 
residence basis can be traced back from the 1920s. This happened when the 
International Chamber of Commerce, under the auspices of League of Nations, 
adopted a resolution on prompt agreement between governments of allied countries 
to prevent individuals from being compelled to pay tax on the same income in more 
than one country.
243
 The first resolution to solve double taxation was that an 
individual or companies should be taxed on both residence and source.
244
 In 1923, 
there was a remarkable development when it was decided that in classifying and 
assigning specific categories of incomes to source or resident, the objective test of 
economic allegiance must be used. The test entails to weigh various contributions 
made by different countries to production and enjoyment of income.
245
 In this 
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context, the two issues had to be considered, namely, where the wealth originated, 
that is, source and where the wealth was spent, that is, residence.
246
 The source of 
production of wealth involved stages up to the point where wealth reached fruition 
that may be shared in by different countries on residence basis.
247
 
 
The rationale for taxation on bases of source and residence was stated in the case of 
Karguelen Sealing & Whaling Co ltd v CIR 
248
that, 
 “In some countries, residence (or domicile) is made the test of 
liability for the reason, presumably, that a resident, for the privilege 
and protection of residence, can justly be called upon to contribute 
towards the cost of good order and government of the country that 
shelters him. In others (as in ours) the principle of liability adopted 
is „source of income,‟ again, presumably, the equity of the levy rests 
on the assumption that a country that produces wealth by reason of 
its natural resources or the activities of its inhabitants is entitled to 
a share of that wealth, wherever the recipient of it may live. In both 
systems there is, of course, the assumption that the country adopting 
the one or the other has effective means to enforce the levy." 
249
 
 
Since MNCs operate in more than one country, tax may be charged on resident or on 
source basis.  Under source principal, the country has the right to tax any income 
arising within its boundaries, regardless of physical or legal residence of income 
recipient.
250
 The rationale behind is that tax payers are expected to share cost of 
infrastructure, which makes possible production of income, its maintenance, 
investment and use through consumption.
251
  Some jurisdiction defines the term 
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source
252
 and some do not.  However, case law describes source as not a legal 
concept but rather, something, which a practical person would regard as a real 
source.
253
 The court also establishes a test upon, which a source can be determined. 
First, determinations of original cause and second, location of the cause once 
determined.
254
  The former explains activities that gave rise to taxable income and 
the latter explains where activities were actually carried out. However, determination 
of source of income depends on nature of the transaction carried out.  
 
Sometimes it is not easy to establish where the source of income originated if 
activities that gave rise to such income were partly carried out in both countries. For 
example, a corporation, which is situated in Germany has permanent establishment 
(PE) in Tanzania. The PE in Tanzania enters a three years contract with the 
government to construct roads.  The design and capital are from Germany but 
services are rendered in Tanzania. Tanzania has the right to tax on source basis 
because activities were carried out in Tanzania. Similarly, Germany will tax because 
the design and capital, which gave rise to that income, are from Germany.  In 
determining true source of income, case law laid principle that a true source of 
income is the place where activities, which gave rise to such income were carried out 
including royalties accrued to investors from patents and similar assets.
255
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Where for any reason it seems that taxable income arises from more originating 
cause, the distinction between dominant and incidental cause must be made. In this 
context, countries may agree to apportion their incomes.
256
  In Transvaal Associated 
Hide and Skin Merchants v Collector of Taxes Botswana,
257
 the fact of the case was 
that a Transvaal company purchased hides and skins and other livestock by-products 
at Botswana where the animals were slaughtered and then disposed in South Africa. 
Before skins were transported to South Africa, they were salted and cured. The initial 
preparation of treating skins did not change the essential character of the skins. The 
issue was whether curing of skins in Botswana amounts to dominant or incidental 
original cause of the derived income. The Court of Appeal held that, ―the dominant 
factor in deriving income from the disposal of the skins was the curing that had taken 
place in Botswana.‖258  It is necessary to establish the source of income because it 
affects rules of calculating taxable income derived from source and foreign country. 
 
Residence is another principle in determining the taxable income involving a foreign 
element. It entails taxation of residents on their worldwide income without taking 
into account sources of such income.
259
 For a country to tax on resident basis, 
various tests are employed in establishing residents of an individual or legal 
person.
260
 First, a corporation is deemed a residence of a particular country if it is 
incorporated, established or formed in the particular country even if management and 
control of the corporation are not in the country. Second, it entails if management 
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and control of corporation are exercised in that country under particular year of 
assessment. Third, there has to be a declaration by the Minister of Finance that the 
particular corporation is residence for tax purposes.
261
 Likewise, countries also have 
rights to tax controlled foreign corporation on resident‘s basis. The general rule is 
that so long as the company is incorporated in a particular jurisdiction according to 
the company‘s law of that country, it is liable for tax in that country and in its 
worldwide receipts.  
 
3.4  Rise and Elimination of Double Taxation 
The fact that each country wishes to tax incomes of investment by MNCs operating 
across countries on source or resident bases, it causes complex problems not only to 
countries involved but also to MNCs. Countries are competing to obtain their right 
share of tax arising from cross border transactions, while MNCs are at risk of being 
taxed in both countries. Consequently, double taxation may arise. There are various 
reasons for double taxation.  
 
First, dual residence whereby a corporation is deemed to have dual residence if it is 
incorporated and situated in one country, while its effective management is in 
another country where the parent corporation operates.  In this context, both 
countries feel to have sufficient connection with the tax payer and therefore, they 
have the right to tax the profit. Second, source to source conflict may ensue whereby 
two or more countries may institute taxes on source basis.  Third, residence to source 
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conflict whereby one country claims rights to tax income on source basis and  the 
other on residence basis.
262
  
In order to avoid double taxation, tax avoidance rules are employed. However, there 
is no hard and fast term of tax avoidance.  Fuest and Riebel explain tax avoidance as 
an activity that a person or a business may undertake to reduce their tax in a way that 
runs counter to the spirit and purpose of the law without being strictly illegal.
263
 
Krishna defines tax avoidance as use of perfect legal methods of arranging one‘s 
affairs so as to pay less tax.
264
 On the other hand, tax avoidance is essentially a 
misuse or abuse of the law driven by exploitation of structural loopholes in the law to 
achieve tax outcomes that are not intended by the parliament.
265
  A court also has 
been in the same opinion. In CIR v Challenge Cooperation Limited,
266
 the court held 
that, 
“Income is avoided and a tax advantage is derived from an 
arrangement when the tax payer reduces his liability to tax without 
involving him in the loss or expenditure which entitles him that 
reduction. The taxpayer engaged in tax avoidance does not reduce 
his income or suffer a loss or incur expenditure but nevertheless 
obtains a reduction in his liability to tax as if he had.” 
 
This is achieved by artificial arrangement with little or no economic impact upon the 
tax payer that is usually designed to manipulate tax laws in order to achieve results 
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75 
that conflict with or defeat the intention of the parliament.
267
  Manipulation of tax 
laws through artificial schemes that have little economic substance undermines the 
ability of national government to set and implement economic as well as social 
policies of the country.
268
 From the foregoing, it is clear that tax avoidance is divided 
in two, first, tax avoidance, which is done according to what the law requires and 
second, tax avoidance, which is not done according to the requirement of the law but 
uses same rules to avoid tax illegally.  
The legal response to rise of double taxation for MNCs with respect to avoiding 
double taxation is enactment of tax avoidance legislation. Internationally, double 
taxation elimination is done through double tax treaties.
269
 These are agreements 
made between countries with a view of capturing taxes arising from international 
trade and investment, which cannot be captured by using domestic laws only. Once 
countries have signed double tax treaty, invariably, give up some taxing rights, 
which are subject to negotiation with another country whereby mutual investments 
take place.  Double  tax treaties  set-up standards upon which taxing rights between 
contracting states are allocated and avoid double taxation by granting exemption, 
credit or tax sparing. Thus, tax treaties regulate types of income, which the source 
country is entitled to tax and when residence country is obliged to grant tax relief to 
                                                          
267
 South Africa Revenue Authority, Discussion paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the 
Income Tax Act, 1962, 2005, P.4. 
268
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avoid double taxation. In this context, one country‘s tax gain is another country‘s tax 
loss ―zero sum game‖ of international taxation.270 
 
As for MNCs, double taxation arises when the same income is taxed to two different 
tax payers as a result of adjustment. From MNCs‘ perspective, double taxation 
increases cost and it reduces profits.  In order to avoid double taxations, MNCs tend 
to permanent establishments in countries where there are low taxes or in tax haven 
countries so as to maximize profit or where there are ownership, location and 
internalization advantages.
271
  Transactions between parent corporations and the 
permanent establishment are normally done through transfer pricing under the 
auspices of tax planning. To this extent, MNCs may take advantage of loopholes of 
law and treaties to avoid tax beyond law requirements and shift profit through 
transfer pricing manipulation. Transfer pricing rules are some of tax avoidance rules 
aiming at avoiding double taxation at the same time deterring companies from 
transfer pricing manipulation. These rules are enshrined under multilateral and 
bilateral tax treaties as discussed in the next section. 
 
3.5  Desire for International Transfer Pricing Legal Regime 
The need for MNCs to invest outside home countries has linked economies across 
the globe. Growth of technology where communication and transportation are 
enhanced has facilitated expansion of MNCs‘ operations. This is achieved by 
establishing associated legal entities in various countries but controlled from parent 
                                                          
270
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company. Consequently, MNCs are pursuing many activities, which link production 
and distribution of goods as well as services in corporations through transfer pricing. 
As noted before, theoretical aspect for existence of MNCs is maximization of profit 
and minimization of transaction cost in particular tax.  Thus, transactions within 
corporation may be driven by common interests of the entity rather than market 
forces. In this context, MNCs may manipulate prices and shift profit thereby leading 
to non-double taxation or shift taxable income from high tax to low tax country.
272
 . 
Such developments have led enormous policy challenges with regard to allocation of 
income and legal loopholes that may be used by MNCs to avoid tax on their world 
wide income beyond legal requirements. From financial perspective, transfer pricing 
is currently a serious concern on tax worldwide because it puts tax of countries at 
stake.
273
   
The fact that MNCs are tax liable in each country where they operate, each country 
obtains the right to tax profit and interest arising out of MNCs transactions to the 
extent of its contribution. However, if transfer price by MNCs is not set at arm‘s 
length price, one of the countries is at risk of losing its right share of tax from such 
transactions. In this context, competing interests may arise. First, the country, which 
exports capital (the investor), requires a system that will ensure certainty in business 
with the view of obtaining profit. Second, the importing capital country may require 
protection of its tax base at the same time attract more foreign investors. It is from 
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these concerns that countries are obliged to harmonize domestic transfer pricing laws 
in order to capture their right share of tax and protect tax base. 
 
Transfer pricing standards are reflected in tax convention   models as initiated by 
multinational institutions.
274
 The rationale behind is that transfer pricing is one of 
avoidance rules and it is not really a standalone issue. Yet, transfer pricing may not 
necessarily involve tax avoidance issue but rather, means, which enable associated 
MNCs to transfer goods and services. It is within this ambit attention has been given 
to international transfer pricing treatment, standardization and indeed, led to debate 
on efficacy of transfer pricing laws, in particular, arm‘s length principle.  However, 
development of transfer pricing standards under the auspices of tax avoidance is 
based on the best practices and specific needs of developed countries. 
 
In order to achieve international standards of transfer pricing, model tax conventions 
were published by international organization such as United Nations (UN) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, (OECD). These are 
United Nations Model Double tax Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries (UN model) and the Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital 
(OECD) model.
275
 It is in these instruments that transfer pricing principles, standards 
and rules have been enshrined. Objectives of these models are to provide full 
protection of taxpayer against direct or indirect double taxation and to encourage free 
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flow of international trade including investment as well as transfer of technology.
276
 
Such models also aim at preventing discrimination between taxpayers in the 
international field, and to provide a reasonable element of legal together with fiscal 
certainty as a framework within which international operations can be carried out.
277
 
In this context, model conventions  are believed to contribute substantially to 
development aims of developing countries.
278
 
 
3.6  An Overview of UN and OECD Models  
As indicated before, existing international transfer pricing standards emanate from 
multinational institutions, namely, the United Nations (UN) and Organization 
Economic Cooperation Development (OECD). The OECD model is the first 
international instrument introduced at an international level to deal with issues of 
transfer pricing. The OECD Model was established by developed countries to 
regulate, among other things, transfer pricing issues specifically addressing concerns 
of OECD member countries.
279
 It should be noted that although OECD model is a 
regional instrument, it is highly accepted internationally and it has been applied 
across in both developed and developing countries. 
 
The UN model was the first international double taxation convention, which 
enshrined standards of transfer pricing. It was established by the United Nations with 
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a view of helping developing countries in dealing with transfer prices.
280
  The UN 
model was preceded by OECD model and consequently, most of its provisions are 
derived from OECD model.
281
 It is important to note that the UN model was 
preceded by the League of Nations Draft Convection of allocation of profits and 
property of international enterprises of 1935.
282
 Although the Draft model was not 
officially adopted, it came up with principles, which form the basis of current 
transfer pricing laws as enshrined in UN and the OECD models.  League of Nations 
Draft Convection firstly, defined business income for the purpose of taxation.
283
 
Secondly, it provided principle of income attributable to a permanent establishment 
(PE) based on the separate account.
284
  
 
Thirdly, it provided methods to be followed based on percentage turn over and 
fractional apportionment under which net business income was determined by 
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 In mid 1960‘s there was an increase of foreign 
investment from developed to developing countries. In this context UN saw the foreign need to 
revive its interest in dealing with problem of double taxation. This was partly a UN desire to 
promote investment in developing countries to complement economic development processes.
281
 
Hence, it was necessary to have an instrument to regulate economic relation in particular issues of 
double taxation, as a consequence the UN Model 2001 was established.  
282
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various factors.
285
 The most important was formulation of arm‘s length 
principle.
286
Nevertheless, both tax models provide standards, guidelines and 
commentaries upon, which transfer pricing issues, may be handled as discussed 
below. The fact that UN model borrowed a lot from OECD model and discussion of 
such models is presented together. However, difference will be made in terms of 
scope of such principles. 
3.6.1 Transfer Pricing Standards as Set by Tax Convention Models 
3.6.1.1 Arms’ Length Principle  
The arm‘s length principle is found under Article 9 of OECD model and Article 9 of 
UN model, respectively. Notably, the principle was first introduced in OECD model 
and reproduced word to world in the UN model. However, the scope of application 
of arm‘s length principle differs between the two models because arm‘s length 
principle is subject to some limitations under UN model.  The principle provides 
that, 
“(a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or 
indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise of 
the other Contracting State, or 
(b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of a Contracting 
State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State,  
 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ 
from those which would be made between independent enterprises, 
then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued 
to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not 
so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and 
taxed accordingly.” 287 
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The arm‘s length principle regulates profits of associated MNCs that for tax purposes 
are not made at arm‘s length terms.288 The principle embodies two criteria at a time, 
namely, associated enterprises and arm‘s length. The enterprise is regarded as 
associate of another if it participates directly or indirectly in either management or 
control or capital of an enterprise of another contracting state and should be taxed 
accordingly.
289
 Arm‘s length principle explains requirements that transfer of goods 
and services between associated enterprises should be made at a market price.
290
 
 
Generally, the scope of application of UN and OECD models is on taxation of 
income and capital, whose residence of business is in contracting or one of the 
contracting countries.
291
 Consequently, arm‘s length principle applies to taxation of 
income and capital of associated MNCs, whose residence of business is in 
contracting or one of the contracting countries. This means that for arm‘s length to 
apply, the associated corporations must be in different states.
292
   
 
Accordingly, it applies only when taxable amount by associated MNCs is not 
obtained under arm‘s length but rather, influenced by special conditions that exist 
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 OECD, ―Commentary on Article 9: Concerning the taxation of associated enterprises‖, In Model 
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed version 2014, OECD Publishing para 1. The 
arms‘ length principle was first established by the League of Nations‘ 1933 Draft Convention on the 
Allocation of Business Profits between States. The Fiscal Committee of the OEEC (predecessor to 
the OECD) drafted articles 5, 7 and 9 of the 1963 Draft convention.  
289
 Article 9(1) (a) of the OECD  2010 model and Article 9(1) (a) UN model2011. 
290
  Article 9(1) para 1 of OECD model and Article (9) para 1of UN model. 
291
 Article 1 and 2 (1) of the UN model 2011 and Article 1 and 2 of OECD model 2010.  It is 
important to note that, the term persons are defined under article 3 (a) to include company and 
individuals. For the purpose of this work, the word corporation will be used to mean company.  
292
 The UN model excludes the taxation of associated parties operating within the country.  Similarly, 
partnership is excluded in the ambit of UN model.  The liability of taxation of associated 
corporation is limited to profit obtained under arms‘ length rate. The provision also excludes 
foreign held companies exempted from tax on their income by privileges tailored to attract conduit 
companies. See UN commentary on scope of UN model para 4 and commentary on Article 4 of 
UN model para 8. 2. 
 
 
83 
between them. In case it is established that the taxable profit is obtained under arm‗s 
length, then the provision is not applicable. It is also applicable to inter-loans of 
associated MNCs in determining the arm‘s length interest. The principle extends to 
determine prema facie whether inter loan between associated MNCs should be 
regarded as loan for transfer pricing purposes or amounts to other kinds of 
payment.
293
 Additionally, the arm‘s length is also applicable to royalties294 and 
dividends.
295
  The purpose of Article 9(1) of both OECD and UN models is to ensure 
that transactions between associated MNCs are treated as if they had been carried out 
between two independent enterprises.
296
 
 
Where it is established that the transfer price between associated is not made at arm‘s 
length price, tax authorities of contracting countries are empowered to adjust transfer 
prices to be in line with arm‘s length.  Where the transfer price is below arm‘s length 
price, income or expenses may be imputed and where price is higher than arm‘s 
length price, then the expenses and income may be reduced. The increase in income 
is called primary adjustment. When adjustment is made between contracting 
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 Articles 11 (4) of UN model 2011 and Article 11 (4) of OECD model 2010. See also Commentary 
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countries under conditions stated in Article 9(1) of both models, the results are two-
fold. Firstly, both countries and MNCs obtain their right share of tax arising out of 
transactions by associated MNCs. Secondly, associated MNCs may be taxed twice in 
the same income if one of the contracting countries made adjustment on taxes 
already taxed in another contracting country.
297
  In avoiding double taxation, both 
OECD and UN models provide for corresponding adjustment rule.
298
   
 
However, adjustment allowed under Article 9 (2) of both models is the one which 
considered being exactly profit that could have been obtained under arms length rate. 
Thus, any amount of profit obtained, which exceeds actual amounts that could have 
been obtained should not be adjusted.
299
 Notably, Article 9 (2) of OECD and UN 
model is silent on methods of adjustment and time limit for procedures on 
corresponding adjustment.  Contracting countries are left to decide.
300
  Unlike the 
OECD model, the UN model clearly excludes application of the arm‘s length 
adjustment if there is a final decision by court in relation to a penalty for fraud, gross 
negligence or willful default, to one of the enterprises.
301
  
 
Thus, the purpose of Article 9(2) of both models is to compensate adjustment of 
contracting country by an appropriate adjustment by the other contracting country. 
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Countries are required to make correspondence adjustment while avoiding double 
taxation.
302
 This is achieved by using exemption and credit methods.
303
 However, the 
OECD model clearly provides that corresponding adjustment is not mandatory.
304
 
Therefore, Article 9(2) applies to profit adjustments, which are not made at arm‘s 
length principle.
305
 Furthermore, no secondary adjustment is allowed under both 
models except if domestic laws allow.
306
 Accordingly, Article 9(2) is silent on period 
as to when corresponding adjustment should be made. Consequently, countries are 
left to decide on time.
307
 In case of dispute between countries involved over amount 
and appropriateness of the adjustment, Article 25 should be invoked.
308
 Accordingly, 
both models are silent on burden of proof. However, scholars argue that the country 
which makes adjustment bears the burden of justifying.
309
 Yet, adjustments are done 
according to domestic law because Article 9(1) of OECD model and UN model is 
not self-executing. From the foregoing, it is submitted that allocation norm of both 
models is a separate entity approach with arm‘s length principle for transaction 
between associated MNCs.
310
 The role of Article 9(1) of OECD and UN models is to 
allocate taxing rights between associated MNCs as well as avoid double tax, which 
may arise out of adjustment. Accordingly, it makes sure that transactions between 
associated MNCs are made at arm‘s length price. Although Article 9(1) of OECD 
and Article 9 (1) of UN model provides for restriction of taxing rights, it does not 
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create taxing rights
311
 because the same are imposed by domestic laws. In this 
context, Article 9(1) of both models ensures that domestic transfer pricing law for 
income adjustment complies with arm‘s length principle.   
 
Article 9(1) of OECD and Article 9(1) UN model is silent on methods to arrive at 
arm‘s length price. However, it provides for the basis upon which comparability 
conditions are imposed between associated and independent enterprises for the 
purpose of calculating arms length price. In this context, it helps to find out whether 
transfer pricing adjustment can be made to reflect arm‘s length rate or not. This 
provision is in line with UN and OECD Guidelines for tax payers and tax authorities 
on comparability of functions performed and risk assumed. It is from Article 9(1) 
such that methods of determining arm‘s length price are developed.312 From the 
foregoing, it can be argued that originally, the purpose of Article 9 is to allocate 
taxing rights and avoid double taxation. 
 
3.6.1.2 Resident Principle  
Article 4 of OECD and Article 4 of UN model set resident principle as criteria to tax 
MNCs operating across countries.  The scope of application of both models is the 
same because Article 4 of UN model is reproduced from OECD model without any 
modification. In both models, a corporation is regarded a resident of contracting state 
for tax purpose if it is incorporated according to law of that state or if it has a place 
                                                          
311
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of management in that state or any other criterion of similar nature.
313
  Where the 
corporation has dual residence, the residence of the corporation will be in a state 
where effective management is situated.
314
  Both models do not provide for meaning 
of effective management. However, a commentary on Article 4 of UN model posits 
that in establishing place of effective management, the following must be taken into 
account, 
 
―The place where a company is actually managed and controlled, 
the place where the decision-making at the highest level on the 
important policies essential for the management of the company 
takes place, the place that plays a leading part in the management 
of a company from an economic and functional point of view and 
the place where the most important accounting books are kept.”315 
 
In due regard, competent authority of contracting states are empowered to determine 
residence of corporation by mutual agreement.
316
 It should be noted that the purpose 
of Article 4 is to determine persons covered under models for tax convention 
benefits. 
 
3.6.1.3 Permanent Establishment 
Article 5 of OECD model and Article 5 of UN model provide principle of permanent 
establishment. Although the UN model provision is largely reproduced from OECD, 
the scope of its application is limited in terms of duration and context of meaning.   
Ordinarily, when a corporation establishes a business in another state, essentially it 
operates in two countries. In this context, the residence state wishes to tax on resident 
worldwide profit and the host state taxes the same corporation on source basis. In 
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these circumstances, tax disputes may arise between two countries as to extent one 
country should tax profit of the corporation operating in both countries. It is in this 
context that permanent establishment concept becomes pivotal in allocating taxing 
rights between two countries. The rationale for existence of permanent establishment 
is that host and investor country agrees not to tax profits arising out of transactions 
between associated MNCs unless those profits are attributable to permanent 
establishment within their nations.  Thus, permanent establishment determines the 
extent of contribution for each country involved.  
  
Articles 5(1) and (2) of OECD model and Articles 5(1) and (2) of UN model define 
permanent establishment to mean a fixed place of business through which the 
business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on a place of management; a 
branch; an office; a factory; a workshop; a mine; an oil or gas well; a quarry or any 
other place of extraction of natural resources.
317
  From this   definition, three 
elements can be established, namely, ‗place of business,‘ ‗fixed place‘ and ‗carried 
businesses.‘  The places of business presuppose to have physical existence in the host 
country in form of premise, equipment or machinery to which a foreign company has 
access to it.
318
 The fixed place of business presupposes a specific geographical fixed 
spot and degree of permanence.
319
 This entails that there must be a connection 
between a business place and specific point but not necessarily connected to the 
                                                          
317
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ground.
320
 In München Finanzgericht, the court held that, ―Commercial agents 
involved in different affairs were not deemed to form a permanent establishment in 
respect of their foreign employers.‖321  On degree of permanence, scholars and court 
agree that there must be a certain durability of permanent establishment and that the 
business must actually be carried out regularly.
322
 In essence, if activities are 
movable and lack degree of permanence, they cannot constitute permanent 
establishment for purpose of both models. The final element ‗through which the 
business is carried‘ presupposes that MNCs‘ business is carried out at a fixed place 
either partly or wholly at disposal of that enterprise.
323
 
 
Both models extend definition of permanent establishment to include a building site, 
construction or installation project or supervisory activities.
324
 However, under UN 
model, such items are considered permanent establishment if they last for more than 
six months.
325
 Additionally, consultancy services of enterprise by an employee or 
personnel engaged by enterprises constitute a permanent establishment if such 
activities continue for some or connected project for more than aggregated 183 days 
in any twelve months.
326
 Although the UN model recognizes that construction, 
installation and consultancy may constitute permanent establishment, it is silent on 
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business size and equipment required to constitute a permanent establishment.
327
  
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that the notion of permanence presupposes to be 
linked between fixed place and certain time frame of the particular for which the 
establishment is at the control of the enterprise. However, commentary on Article 5 
argues that size and equipment to constitute a business place depend on nature of 
business.
328
 Hence, it is unnecessary for the business place to be attached on earth. 
Similarly, in pipeline case, 
329
the court held that it is not a requirement that the 
business place should be attached to the earth surface or that it is visible on the 
ground. The UN model also recognizes a deemed permanent establishment where an 
independent agent is acting on behalf of enterprises and habitually exercises as well 
as concludes contracts in the name of enterprises in respect of all undertaken 
activities.
330
   
Additionally, the deemed permanent establishment may exist if an agent maintains 
goods or merchandise from which delivers and merchandize goods regularly.
331
 
Notwithstanding the provisions, the UN model requires that an enterprise, which 
deals with insurance business, is deemed to have permanent establishment in the 
state where it collects its premium.
332
 The rationale behind it is that insurance 
enterprises do large scale businesses in the state without being taxed because 
sometimes they do not qualify for characteristics offered under Article 5.
333
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The UN model expressly excludes enterprises, which carry on business in 
contracting state through broker, general commission agent or any other agent of 
independent nature provided they are acting on their ordinary course of their 
business.
334
 However, this rule does not apply when agents devoted wholly or almost 
wholly on behalf of enterprises and condition are made between enterprise and agent, 
which differ from those would have been made between independent enterprises.
335
 
Moreover, the UN model excludes a controlled foreign company to constitute the 
permanent establishment for the purpose of enjoying benefits of the convention.
336
 
 
Unlike the UN model, the OECD model extends permanent establishment definition 
to include a building site, construction or installation project if it lasts for twelve 
months.
337
 To the contrary, the OECD does not extend supervisory activities to 
constitute permanent establishment. However, in context of OECD model, 
permanent establishment exists even where an independent agent is acting on behalf 
of enterprises and habitually exercises as well as concludes contracts in the name of 
enterprises undertaken, except those excluded under OECD model.
338
 Despite 
extensive details of what constitutes permanent establishment, both models are silent 
on whether or not Article 5 can be applicable on electronic commerce. However, 
OECD commentary on Article 5 states that it is applicable.
339
  In OECD commentary 
context, enterprises carrying out electronic commerce may constitute permanent 
establishment if, 
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―The enterprise carrying on business through a web site has the 
server at its own disposal, for example it owns (or leases) and 
operates the server on which the web site is stored and used, the 
place where that server is located could constitute a permanent 
establishment of the enterprise if the other requirements of the 
Article are met.”340 
 
Computer equipment at a given location may only constitute a permanent 
establishment if it meets the requirement of being fixed.
341
 In order to constitute a 
fixed business place, a server will need to be located at a certain place for a sufficient 
period of time so as to become fixed within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the OECD 
model.  In establishing whether or not a business was actually carried on may be 
examined according to circumstances of a particular case, keeping in mind that the 
websites are in control of the enterprise.
342
 Commentary on Article 5 points out that, 
―Where an enterprise operates computer equipment at a particular 
location, a permanent establishment may exist even though no 
personnel of that enterprise are required at that location for the 
operation of the equipment. The presence of personnel is not 
necessary to consider that an enterprise wholly or partly carries on 
its business at a location when no personnel are in fact required to 
carry on business activities at that location. This conclusion applies 
to electronic commerce to the same extent that it applies with 
respect to other activities in which equipment operates 
automatically, e.g. automatic pumping equipment used in the 
exploitation of natural resources.‖343 
 
To the contrary, no permanent establishment is deemed to exist if business conducted 
electronically is of preparatory or auxiliary nature such as communication link and 
advertisement for goods.
344
 
 
                                                          
340
 OECD commentary on Article 5 para 42.3. 
341
 Ibid, para 42.4. 
342
 Ibid, para 42.5. 
343
 Ibid, para 42.6.  
344
 Ibid, para 42.7. 
 
 
93 
3.6.1.4 Business Profit  
Article 7 (1) of OECD and Article 7 of UN model provide for business profit as the 
income to be taxed for transfer pricing purposes.
345
 Accordingly, both models set a 
general rule that profit of enterprises should be taxed only in the state where it is 
incorporated or formed.
346
 However, an enterprise may be taxed in another 
contracting country through permanent establishment situated in another contracting 
country.
347
 The principle embodies two criteria at a time, taxation of profit where the 
enterprise is situated and taxation of only attributable profit where permanent 
establishment is situated. Thus, the concept of permanent establishment is an 
important determinant factor in establishing the right of a country to tax business 
profit.  However, there are differences in approach between these two models as 
discussed below. 
 
In terms of the UN model, business profit of an enterprise is taxed not only on profit 
attributable to permanent establishment but also to sales, merchandize sold and other 
activities carried out through permanent establishment.
348
 Accordingly, the UN 
model requires each permanent establishment situated in contracting countries to be 
taxed on attributable profit and other profits obtained under arm‘s length rate.349 The 
provision applies to any profit obtained by permanent establishment relied on an 
internal agreement and becomes subject to adjustment by revenue authorities in 
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accordance with arm‘s length principle.350 Application of arm‘s length extends to 
turnkey contracts whereby permanent establishment is established by construction of 
a facility in one state done by a contractor who is a resident in another state if the 
construction lasts for six months.
351
 In addition, arm‘s length principle is also 
applicable to profit arising out of finance transactions between associated MNCs.  
The role of Article 7(2) is to make sure that attributable profits and other profits 
obtained through permanent establishment are made at arm‘s length rate.352  The 
purpose is to ensure that profits between associated MNCs obtained through 
permanent establishment are treated as if they had been carried out between 
independent entities.
353
 In determining attributable profit of permanent 
establishment, the UN model sets a general rule that expenses incurred for business 
purpose, executive and general administrative cost should be deducted in the state 
where the permanent establishment is situated or somewhere else.
354
  The deduction 
allowed under this rule is actual cost without adding any element of profit.
355
  
However, there is exception to this rule that,  
“No such deduction shall be allowed in respect of amounts, if any, 
paid (otherwise than towards reimbursement of actual expenses) by 
the permanent establishment to the head office of the enterprise or 
any of its other offices, by way of royalties, fees or other similar 
payments in return for the use of patents or other rights, or by way 
of commission, for specific services performed or for management, 
or, except in the case of a banking enterprise, by way of interest on 
moneys lent to the permanent establishment. Likewise, no account 
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shall be taken, in the determination of the profits of a permanent 
establishment, for amounts charged (otherwise than towards 
reimbursement of actual expenses), by the permanent establishment 
to the head office of the enterprise or any of its other offices, by way 
of royalties, fees or other similar payments in return for the use of 
patents or other rights, or by way of commission for specific 
services performed or for management, or, except in the case of a 
banking enterprise, by way of interest on moneys lent to the head 
office of the enterprise or any of its other offices.”356 
 
It follows out that all exceptions should be included in determining attributable profit 
of the permanent establishment. However, the UN model is silent on deduction of 
expenses once attribution is made by permanent establishment. The situation gives 
room for contracting states to apply domestic laws if such deduction arises.
357
  In 
establishing true cost incurred by permanent establishment for purpose of 
determining attributable amount, arms‘ length principle is employed.358 Thus, it is 
agreed that only initial cost incurred by permanent establishment for purpose of 
setting the business is considered for deductions. Hence, any expenses or cost, which 
seems to minimize overall cost with the view of profit maximization it should not be 
considered for deductions.
359
  
 
In establishing the cost of intangibles, the cost for creation of intangible rights is 
regarded attributable to all associates of enterprise, which makes use of them. The 
actual cost of creation or acquisition of intangible will then be allocated to all 
associated parties without adding any profit margin.
360
  The rationale behind is that it 
is not easy to establish ownership of intangible rights. In establishing the cost of 
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service rendered, a comment provides that the cost of service rendered should be one 
charged to outside customers.
361
 However, there is uncertainty in establishing cost of 
services for the purpose of deduction or attribution of profit of permanent 
establishment. Therefore, it is resolved that it should be decided on case to case 
basis. Although the UN model relies heavily on principle of arm‘s length for 
transactions between associated MNCs it compromises.  Article 7(4)
362
 departs from 
arms length principle by allowing apportionment method to be applicable in 
determining an attributable profit to permanent establishment.  However, this method 
is applicable only if domestic laws of the contracting states provide so.
363
 Thus, 
apportionment is used even if the result may differ to some extent if the arm‘s length 
could have been used. However, the UN model is silent on methods of 
apportionment and contracting states are left with discretion to decide according to 
their domestic laws.
364
 In maintaining consistence, the UN model requires that 
methods used in establishing attributable profit to PE should be used on yearly 
basis.
365
 The rationale behind is to create certainty about tax treatment to tax payer(s) 
in both contracting states. It is worth noting that the UN model clearly states that 
whether or not profits should be attributed to a permanent establishment by reason of 
mere purchase of goods and merchandise for the enterprise that was not resolved. 
Countries may resolve it through bilateral negotiations.
366
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In terms of OECD, business profit liable for taxation is limited to profit attributable 
to permanent establishment only.
367
 In this context, any other profits generated by 
other activities through permanent establishment are not business profit for transfer 
pricing purposes. It means that a tax authority is not required to tax business profits 
that derived from separate sources of the permanent establishment derived from their 
country.
368
 Thus, the tax authority is required to tax on basis of other provisions of 
the convention. Article 7(1) of OECD model is applicable to taxation of business 
profits, which are only attributed to permanent establishment. The role of Article 
7(1) of OECD model is two-fold, first, to grant taxing rights to the country where the 
permanent establishment is situated to the extent of its contribution. Second, strive to 
prevent the country, which permanent establishment is situated from taxing the 
enterprises of the other contracting country on profits not attributable to permanent 
establishment.
369
  
The purpose is to limit the right of source country to tax profits of enterprises of 
another contracting country. The OECD model sets principle that permanent 
establishment situated in a contracting state should be taxed on attributable profit 
obtained under arm‘s length rate.370  Arm‘s length enshrined in Article 7(2) of the 
OECD model applies to attributable profits, which are not obtained under arm‘s 
length rate. The rationale is to make sure that attributable profits of permanent 
establishment are obtained under arm‘s length rate. This is to ensure that attributable 
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profits of associated MNCs obtained through permanent establishment are treated 
separately as if had been carried out between unrelated  entities.
371
  
 
In determining attributable profit of permanent establishment, the OECD model sets 
a rule that the profit of permanent establishment should be treated as a separate entity 
and independent from a corporation, which it is a part.
372
 It follows that profit may 
be attributed to the permanent establishment even though the corporation as a whole 
did not made profits. Conversely, in terms of Article 7(2), it may result in no profit 
even though the corporation as a whole made profits.
373
 In determining the 
attributable profit, due regard must be given to elimination of double tax either by 
exemption or credit.
374
 The OECD model is silent on inclusion and exclusions of 
deductions in calculating attributable profit to permanent establishment.  
However, according to commentaries deductions allowed are only those incurred for 
purpose of activities performed by permanent establishment
375
 and modalities of 
deductions are to be determined by domestic laws.
376
 In so doing, both contracting 
countries are required to adhere to non-discrimination rule as provided in the 
convention models.
377
 Article 7(3) of OECD model applies to the extent necessary to 
eliminate double tax that results from adjustment.
378
 It also applies with respect to 
differences in determination of profit attributable to different parts of the 
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enterprise.
379
 The role of Article 7(3) is to deal with attribution of profit for the 
purpose of allocation of taxing rights between two contracting countries.
380
 The 
rationale is to ensure that there is no unrelieved double taxation of the profits that are 
properly attributed to the permanent establishment.
381
  
 
Despite their different approach, both OECD and UN models clearly exclude 
business profit dealt separately in other provisions of the models as a general rule.
382
 
They include dividends, royalties, interest and other incomes.
383
 However, there are 
exceptions to these rules.  Dividend is  taxed as business profit if a beneficial owner 
of a dividend is a resident of contracting state, carrying on business in other 
contracting state in which the company is paying dividend is resident through 
permanent establishment situated therein and holding in respect of which dividends 
are paid is effectively connected with permanent establishment.
384
  Likewise, interest 
is taxed as business profit of permanent establishment if beneficial owner of interest 
is a resident of a contracting state in which the interest arises through permanent 
establishment situated there in. Debt claim in respect of kind of interest to be paid is 
effectively connected with such permanent establishment.
385
 Royalties are also taxed 
as business profit of permanent establishment ―if the beneficial owner of the royalties 
is a resident of contracting state in which the royalties arise through a permanent 
establishment situated therein and the right or property in respect of which the 
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royalties are paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment.‖386 
Unlike the OECD, the UN model extends the business profit to include profit that 
arises from performance of personal services from a fixed base and that dividend, 
royalties or interest is effectively connected to permanent establishment or fixed 
base.
387
  
 
In addition, both OECD and UN models tax other business incomes as business 
profits of permanent establishment if ―the recipient of such income, is a resident of a 
contracting country, carries on business in the other contracting country through a 
permanent establishment situated therein and the right or property in respect of 
which the income is paid is effectively connected with such permanent 
establishment.‖388  Nevertheless, scholars submit that such exception is merely an 
application of general international and domestic interpretation rule of ‗generalia  
specialibus non delegant,‟ meaning that a subsequent general provision does not 
repeal or override an earlier specific provision.
389
  Similarly commentators posit that 
the rule is in conformity with practice generally adhered to in bilateral conventions.  
 
Thus, it is submitted that before taxing business profit of the PE, it is important to 
establish whether the business profit falls within the ambit of Article 7 of both 
models or not. Failure to establish the business profit may cause dispute to countries 
that tax permanent establishment on source basis. However, interest royalties and 
other incomes may either be taxed separately or as a business profit according to tax 
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laws of contracting states. Where the business profit of permanent establishment falls 
within the ambit of Article 7, source country should tax profit attributable to 
permanent establishment at arm‘s length principle as if the permanent establishment 
is independent. 
 
An overview of international transfer pricing as enshrined under the UN and OECD 
models reveals that they have special characteristics, which provide uniform bench 
mark rules between developed and developing countries. The paramount 
characteristic of such model is international character, which implies that all 
transactions of goods and services made between associated MNCs must be made at 
arm‘s length price. Such models have solved difficulties caused by multiplicity of 
laws, which associated MNCs may face in various countries they operate. This is the 
case, in particular, on when different laws become applicable in respect of different 
aspects of the transaction. Accordingly, it meets the needs for international 
transactions by taking into account costs of production of goods or services together 
with involvement of the permanent establishment and agents. Therefore, the models 
provide uniform rules aiming at ensuring the same results wherever applied, as 
rightly stated that, 
“An argument in favour of using the arm‟s length principle is that it 
is geographically neutral, as it treats profits from investments in 
different places in a similar manner. However this claim of neutral-
ity is conditional on consistent rules and administration of the arm‟s 
length principle throughout the jurisdictions in which an 
international enterprise operates. In the absence of consistent rules 
and administration, international enterprises may have an incentive 
to avoid taxation through transfer pricing manipulation.”390 
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3.7  Methods to Arrive at Arm’s Length Price  
As pointed in preceding discussions, both UN and OECD models set a principle that 
transactions between associated parties should be made at arm‘s length price. Yet, 
both models are silent on methods to arrive at arm‘s length price. It is in this context 
that both UN and OCED establish specific transfer pricing Guidelines to provide for 
methods to arrive at arm‘s length price. These are United Nations Practical Manual 
on Transfer pricing for Developing Countries of 2013 (UN Guidelines)
391
 and The 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations of 2010 (OECD Guidelines). The UN Guidelines is the first efforts 
by United Nations to develop concrete Guidelines for handling transfer pricing 
issues.  
 
The manual came into force in 2013 and it was preceded by regional instrument 
made to regulate transfer pricing issues, namely, OECD Guidelines first published in 
1995 and USA transfer pricing regulations.
392
 It is important to note that the UN 
Guidelines is largely influenced by OECD Guidelines because Article 9 (1) and (2) 
of UN Model was reproduced from OECD model except Article 9(3).
393
 
394
 The UN 
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Guidelines contains 10 chapters. The main objectives of UN Guidelines are as 
follows: first, to provide benchmark of transfer pricing upon which national transfer 
pricing legislation of member countries should incorporate.
395
 Second, is to offer 
developing countries a basis for informed method at a practical level on arriving at 
arm‘s length price by taking into account their development level.396  
 
The scope and application of the UN Guidelines is limited to associate MNCs 
operating across countries in determining arm‘s length price. The Guidelines may 
also apply to Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) between the tax payer and revenue 
authorities.
397
 In terms of UN Guidelines, ―the rationale for the arm‘s length 
principle is that the market governs most of the transactions in an economy it is 
appropriate to treat intra-group transactions as equivalent to those between 
independent entities.‖398  To arrive at arm‘s length price, both OECD and UN 
Guidelines provide five methods that are not used in any hierarchal manner but 
rather, depend on circumstances of particular transactions.  
 
The methods are comparable uncontrolled price, resale price method, and cost resale 
method commonly known as traditional methods. Other methods are transactional 
net margin method and profit split method commonly known as transactional profit 
methods.
399
 However, selection of a method depends on strengths and weaknesses of 
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each method, the nature of the controlled transaction; availability of reliable 
information (in particular, on uncontrolled comparables) needed to apply the selected 
method; and the degree of comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled 
transactions.
400
 The starting point of selecting the method is to understand the nature 
of transaction between associated MNCs through functional analysis, which entails 
analysis of performed function, risk assumed and asset used. 
 
3.7.1  Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) 
The method compares price of goods and services of associated MNCs‘ transactions 
to the price charged for goods and services of independent corporations in 
comparable circumstances.
401
 The comparison may be made between one associated 
corporation and with an independent corporation commonly known as internal 
comparison. Similarly, it can be made between independent corporations commonly 
known as external comparables.
402
 In making comparison, required information 
encompasses prices for internal and external comparables. The transaction of 
associated MNCs is considered comparable to transaction of independent 
transactions if there are no differences in the transaction that will materially affect 
the price.
403
  
 
In other words, if there are differences between the said transactions but do not affect 
the price for transactions they are deemed to be comparable. Comparability will also 
be accepted if a reasonable accurate adjustment can be performed between 
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transactions of associated MNCs and independent corporations.
404
 Reasonable 
adjustment is rational if it is made based on type and quality of the product, delivery 
terms, volume of sales and related discounts together with product characteristics, 
contractual terms, risk incurred and geographical factors.
405
 Where reasonable 
adjustment is not possible, it is envisaged that tax authorities should rely on other 
methods.
406
  
 
In determining the degree of comparability, the UN Guidelines require the following 
factors to be considered: characteristics of the property or service provided 
contractual terms, economic circumstances, and business strategies. Function 
performed, risk assumed and asset used must be taken into account for functional 
analysis purposes.
407
 The CUP method is direct measure of the arm‘s length principle 
because it is two sided analysis reflecting different two parties to the transaction. The 
method can be used instantly in transaction(s) involving commodity products.
408
 
However, the CUP method may be affected by difficulties in finding comparables 
from independent corporations because the method requires certain standards of 
comparability to be attained.
409
 
3.7.2  Resale Price Method (RPM)  
This method compares profit margins on price of goods and services between 
associated MNCs and profit margin of sales by associated parties to an unrelated 
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company. The prices of goods and services obtained from associated MNCs are 
resold to an independent corporation. To determine an arm‘s length price, resale 
price is reduced by resale gross profit margin after taking into account function 
performed and the remaining amount is deemed to be a transfer price of associated 
parties.
410
 In other words, there must be two associated MNCs selling goods or 
services from each other at a price deemed to be not at arm‘s length price. The 
second embodies associated resale goods or services to an independent corporation 
with a certain gross profit margin. The gross profit margin obtained is then compared 
with the gross profit by an independent corporation in similar circumstance. Once the 
gross profit margin of associated MNCs is found to be similar to that of the 
independent corporation, the gross profit margin is then added to initial price 
between associated MNCs to achieve transfer price.  
 
In comparing gross profit margin between associated MNCs and an independent 
corporation, consistency of accounting is required such that in its absence, it renders 
application of RPM be difficult.
411
 In determining the arm‘s length profit earned by 
associated MNCs, two methods are employed, namely, transaction and functional 
comparison. The former entails transactions between related parties compared with 
transactions of an Independent Corporation. The latter entails comparison of function 
performed, asset used and risk incurred between associated MNCs and an 
independent corporation.
412
 Under RPM, the transaction of associated MNCs is 
considered comparable to transaction of independent transactions if there are no 
                                                          
410
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differences in the transactions which will materially affect the gross profit margin.
413
 
Presence of minor differences is not an issue. Comparability is also accepted if 
reasonable accurate adjustment can be performed between transactions of associated 
MNCs and independent corporations to eliminate the effect of such differences.
414
  
 
However, the Guidelines is silent on what is deemed to reasonable adjustment while 
applying RPM. Functions performed between associated MNCs are considered 
comparable with functions of the Independent Corporation if the following is taken it 
to account: Performed functions must have less effect on price than cost of 
performing function, substantial gross profit margin should not be added in the resale 
price, an exclusive right of reseller to resale goods should be taken into account and 
consideration of accounting practices applies to reseller as well as an independent 
corporation.
415
  
The RPM is reliable in situation when demands are not affected by price fluctuation 
and can be used without forcing distributors to inappropriately make profit.
416
 
However, in applying this method, it is difficult to find comparables of gross profit 
margin from independent corporations due to inconstancy of accounting practices 
between associated and independent corporations. Moreover, it is one sided because 
it relies on one party in transfer pricing analysis.
417
 In terms of UN Guidelines, the 
RPM can be used where the CUP method is not applicable where sales companies do 
                                                          
413
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414
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not own valuable intangible properties and where reliable comparison can be 
available.
418
  
 
3.7.3  Cost Plus Method (CPM)  
Cost plus Method (CPM) is the third method that involves cost of production of 
goods or services transferred or provided between associated MNCs.  The CPM 
compares the gross profit mark-up earned by the tested party with the gross profit 
mark-ups earned by comparable companies.‖419 While taking into account performed 
functions, risk assumed and the market condition, an appropriate mark up is added to 
the transaction between associates to make an appropriate gross profit.
420
  
Comparison is then made between profit mark-up of associated MNC and that of the 
Independent Corporation. Thus, transfer price between associates is the cost of goods 
sold plus arm‘s length profit mark-up. In determining the arm‘s length mark up, two 
methods are employed, namely, transaction and function comparison.
421
 The former 
entails comparison of gross profit mark up of associates and that of an independent 
corporation. The latter entails comparison between gross profit mark‐up earned by 
independent companies performing functions and incurred risks to performed 
functions and risks incurred by the associated MNCs.
422
 Under CPM, the transaction 
of associated MNCs is considered comparable to transaction of independent 
transactions if there are no differences in the transactions that will materially affect 
                                                          
418
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the gross profit markup.
423
 Presence of minor differences is not an issue. 
Comparability will also be accepted if reasonable accurate adjustment can be 
performed between transactions of associated MNCs and independent corporations 
to eliminate the effect of such differences.
424
 However, like in RPM, the Guidelines 
are silent on aspects deemed to be reasonable adjustment while applying CPM. 
 
Strength of CPM method is availability of comparables because it is based on 
internal costs readily available between associated MNCs.  The method is useful in 
the following transactions: sale of tangibles, semi-finished goods and transactions 
involving a contract manufacturer, a toll manufacturer or a low risk assembler who 
does not own product intangibles and incurs little risk.
425
 However, the weakness of 
the method is existence of a weak link between the level of costs and market price, 
which affects gross profit mark ups. It requires consistence of accounting as well as 
other factors and its absence renders comparable difficult. It focuses only on related 
party manufacturer and no incentive to control manufacturer‘s cost. 
 
3.7.4  Profit Split Method  
Profit Split Method (PSM) is the fourth method used to determine transfer price 
between associated MNCs. It is dived in the following two parts: Transactional Net 
Margin Method (TNMM) and the Profit Split Method (PSM). The TNMM examines 
the net profit margin relative to an appropriate base (for example, costs, sales and 
assets) that a taxpayer realizes from a controlled transaction. This is compared to the 
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net profit margins earned in comparable uncontrolled transactions.
426
 The TNMM 
requires identification and comparison of profit net margin realized by associated 
MNCs with the gross profit margin realized by independent corporations in 
comparable circumstances.
427
 Comparison may be made between net margins earned 
by one associated corporation with net margin earned by an independent corporation 
dealing on comparable circumstances or net margins earned between independent 
corporations operating in similar circumstances.  
 
This is achieved by comparing transactions or functions performed.
428
 Unlike RPM 
and CPM, in determining arm‘s length net profit margin, under TNMM profit level 
indicators
429
based on operating profit,
430
 they are used to compare net profit margin 
of associated MNCs and the net profit of an independent corporation.
431
 It is worth 
noting that under UN Guidelines, net margins cannot be affected easily by 
transactional differences. The method does not employ complex analysis and it can 
be used even by one associated party that holds intangibles.
432
 However, net margins 
are easily affected and it is difficult to get reliable information. The profit split 
method (PSM) requires first, identification of aggregated profit earned by associated 
MNCs. The aggregated profit is then split among associates based on relative value 
of each associate‘s contribution based on performed function(s), assumed risk and 
                                                          
426
 UN and OECD glossaries. 
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429
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assets used by each associate.
433
 The split profit of an associate is then compared 
with split profit that would have been anticipated and reflected in an independent 
transaction made at arm‘s length. If the profit is in accordance with profit of an 
independent part, then the profit is said to be at arm‘s length.434 The PSM seeks to 
―eliminate the effect on profits of special conditions made or imposed in a controlled 
transaction by determining the division of profits that independent enterprises would 
have expected to realize from engaging in the transaction or transactions.‖435 In 
splitting profit, two methods are employed, namely, contribution analysis and 
residual analysis. The former entails combined profit of associated MNCs 
transactions on the basis of operating profit distributed between associates and then 
compared with the same transaction of independent corporations. The latter involves 
two steps, first, allocation of sufficient profit to each associated MNC to provide 
basic arm‘s length compensation for routine contributions and second, allocation of 
residual profit, which remains after sufficient profit is allocated between associates 
based on circumstances of a particular case.
436
   
 
In selecting the most appropriate transfer pricing method and in applying the selected 
method, the Guidelines require comparability analysis to be performed.
437
 
Comparability analysis involves two distinct related steps. The first step is to 
understand economically significant characteristics of the transaction between 
associates and the role of each part in associated MNCs. This is achieved by 
analyzing characteristics of the property, function performed, contractual terms, 
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economic circumstances and business strategies.
438
 The second step involves 
comparison between conditions of associated enterprises‘ transactions and 
transactions between independent corporations.
439
 In order to understand operations 
of associated MNCs and roles of parties to associated, the Guidelines require 
functional analysis to be performed.
440
 It involves identification of function 
performed, assets used and risk assumed.
441
  
 
Comparability conditions between associated and independent parties are regarded 
comparable if ―the economically relevant characteristics of the two transactions and 
the circumstances surrounding them are sufficiently similar to   provide a reliable 
measure of an arm‘s length results‖.442 In absence of comparables   practical 
approach is used to establish degree of comparability so long as it does not affect the 
arm‘s length intended.‖443 In absence of reliable comparables, the Guidelines set a 
general rule that, ―the transaction is or is not arm‘s length or arm‘s length is not 
applicable to the particular transaction.‖444 The UN Guidelines clearly note 
complexity and expenses involved in making comparability analysis. However, the 
burden of cost should not be the reason to delusion of comparability standards. It is 
important to note that the comparison procedure itself is very cumbersome and it 
gives room for tax payers to conceal some pieces of information. Comparability is 
based on mathematical accounting methods without legal requirements. This brings 
uncertainty to application of the law.  Comparability analysis adds burden to a tax 
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payer who is required to apply the selected method to arrive at arm‘s length rate. In 
practice, both exercises are long, complicated and cumbersome. It involves a lot of 
expenses and it imposes serious challenge for tax administrators to establish 
anomalies in a transaction because they are not involved from the very beginning.  
 
3.8  Transfer Pricing Documentation Requirement 
The UN Guidelines also require a taxpayer to prepare sufficient documentation at the 
time of transfer pricing preparations. The document is regarded sufficient if it 
contains details demonstrating tax payer‘s compliance with arm‘s length principle.445 
The tax authorities are empowered to obtain such document when required. 
However, the Guidelines require that the documentation should not impose cost and 
burden to tax payers that are disproportionate to the circumstances.
446
 Few questions 
may arise here. ‗What should the tax payer do if the cost of preparation of the 
document is disproportionate to the circumstances? What should tax authority do 
when found that the transaction has transfer pricing query, and tax payer did not 
prepare document due to the cost involved?‘ The Guidelines is silent on all these 
questions. In due regard, it may be difficult to implement documentation 
requirements as enshrined in the Guidelines.  
 
Generally, the burden of proof of documentation lies on the tax authority.
447
 
However, a taxpayer is required to prove on adequacy of the documents where the 
domestic law provides so.
448
 In handling transfer pricing documents, prudent 
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business principle should prevail between tax payer and tax authority.
449
 
Accordingly, both parties are required to exercise good faith through reasonable 
documents of arm‘s length principle.450 It should be noted that the words ‗good faith 
and reasonable‘ are not measurable in law and their uses are subjective and hence, 
they do not create certainty in law. In both Guidelines, amount of information from 
tax payer is limited and rationale behind is that at the time of filling documents, no 
particular query would have been raised by the tax authority. Thus, it is burdensome 
to prepare documents for purpose of showing appropriateness of transfer pricing 
determination only.
451
 It is interesting to note that the UN Guidelines do not give its 
position but rather, reproduced OECD Guidelines on preparation of documentation. 
If arriving at arm‘s length price requires full analysis, which needs to be recorded, 
why should the Guidelines limit information? Limitation provided in the Guidelines 
may create room for a tax payer to conceal relevant information of transfer pricing. 
There are also provisions for regulation of penalties to the taxpayer for failure to 
comply with document requirements. The Guidelines require that the taxpayer 
should be penalized for underpaying due tax and for non-compliance with document 
requirements.
452
 The penalty may be of civil or criminal nature, depending on 
circumstances of the case.
453
 However, in terms of UN Guidelines,‖ it is unfair to 
impose sizable penalties on taxpayer exerted reasonable efforts in good faith to 
undertake a sound transfer pricing analysis to ascertain arm‘s length price.‖454 
Undoubtedly, this requirement limits domestic laws to impose serious penalties on 
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tax payer on mentioned offences. In this context, the Guidelines may give loophole 
to the tax payer not to comply.  
 
3.9  Transfer Pricing Audits and Risk Assessment  
Concerns that associated MNCs take advantage of complexities in arriving at arm‘s 
length price to manipulate prices have subjected them to audits by revenue 
authorities. The purpose is to increase tax revenue and future compliance with a view 
of protecting tax base.
455
 Generally, transfer pricing audits are time and resources 
intensive to revenue authorities such that long and complicated procedures must be 
followed to identify risks. Risk identification and assessment are important steps in 
ensuring that the most appropriated cases are selected for audit.  However, 
sometimes, even effective risk identification, assessment tools and processes may not 
always guarantee successes in audit.
456
 The reason is that details available at risk 
assessment stage may not be conclusive evidence regarding the arm‘s length nature 
of profits or prices.  
 
Identification of transfer pricing risks depends on available data and accessible data 
from the taxpayer.
457
 Once the data are obtained, the revenue authority has to 
identify categories of risks. Such risks arise from intergroup transactions that may 
include intentional profit shifting through new business structures, restructuring, 
incorrect functional classification, use of incorrect methods, thin capitalization and 
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unintentional profit shifting.
458
 In identifying transfer pricing risks, the Guidelines 
require transactions, jurisdiction and risk approach to be used.
459
 In the mentioned 
processes, source of information primarily should be provided by the taxpayer. 
Publicly available information such as news paper, website and data bases may also 
be used.
460
 The revenue authorities are also required to consider risk indicators such 
as consistent and continuous losses by MNCs, lower effective tax rates for associates 
in low tax countries and low profit in host country, while high profits are made in 
another country where associates operate. Existence of centralized supply chain 
companies in low tax country must be considered.
461
 Special procedures need to be 
followed in assessing the transfer pricing risk.  
 
Accordingly, risk assessment tools must be used and findings should be provided.
462
 
The examination team should include economist, lawyer, external examiner and 
computer audit specialist.
463
 The transfer pricing risks examination is subject to 
limitation of time as regulated by domestic law.
464
 To establish whether or not there 
is actual risk between associated MNCs, the revenue authority must understand 
taxpayers‘ businesses. In this context, revenue authorities are required to understand 
taxpayers‘ operations and their associates plus their roles played in a transaction 
under the audit.
465
 This is sought to be achieved by going through a long list of 
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documents.
466
 Where it is found that arm‘s length principle was not followed by the 
taxpayer, adjustment may be done by the examination team and the taxpayer will be 
informed accordingly.
467
  Where the taxpayer is dissatisfied with such adjustments, 
settlement opportunities are available between the taxpayer and examination team or 
appeal officer, depending on countries‘ laws.468 Once all these are done, the audit 
case is assumed to be complete and properly documented for future reference and 
should be closed.
469
 
 
3.10  Transfer Pricing Dispute Avoidance and Resolution 
Complexity involved in arriving at arm‘s length price provides potentials for disputes 
between taxpayer and revenue authorities.  In this context, it is necessary to avoid 
transfer pricing dispute before it happens and when it does, the proper dispute 
resolution mechanisms should be followed. The purpose is to facilitate efficient and 
equitable determination and collection of tax revenue at the same time avoiding 
double taxation.
470
Transfer pricing dispute may be avoided by using tax treaty 
provisions, either bilateral or multilateral and Mutual Agreement Procedures (MAP). 
471
 Transfer pricing dispute resolution involves use of mutual agreement procedure 
(MAP) and Advance Pricing Agreement (APA). The purpose of MAP is to provide 
effective means for reconciling differing treaty positions of contracting countries in 
avoiding double taxation.
472‖ APA is an arrangement that determines, in advance of 
controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g., method, comparables and 
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appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for 
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of 
time‖.473 An APA is formally initiated by a taxpayer and requires negotiations 
between the taxpayer, one or more associated enterprises and one or more tax 
administrations. The APA process comes about as a supplement to traditional 
judicial administrative and treaty mechanism for resolving transfer pricing issues. 
Such APA is applied where there is considerable problem in establishing the manner 
in which arm‘s length principle should be applied and results that may lead to double 
taxation.
474
 The APA is a procedural process involving mutual agreements between a 
taxpayer and tax authorities.
475
 These agreements are contracts usually for multiple 
years between a taxpayer and at least one tax authority specifying the pricing method 
that the taxpayer will apply to its related company transactions. In essence, the APA 
follows same transfer pricing methods to arrive at arm‘s length price.  
 
The only difference is that APA contract is entered before the actual transaction 
between associated parties. Accordingly, the APA does not depart from the arm‘s 
length principle. Key objective of APA is to eliminate double taxation that may be 
caused by uncertainty about acceptability of the applied method. Other related 
objectives of APA are to facilitate principled, practical and cooperative negotiations; 
to resolve transfer pricing issues expeditiously and prospectively; to use resources of 
the taxpayer and the tax administration more efficiently; and to provide a measure of 
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predictability for the taxpayer.
476
 The main advantage of APA is to allow revenue 
authorities to obtain much as information as possible from the taxpayer about 
transactions between associated parties. That may be useful in detecting risk that 
may exist between associated MNCs. To ensure that the Guidelines are complied 
with, it calls for every member countries to build transfer pricing capability. This is 
sought to be achieved by establishing transfer pricing units in tax authorities. The 
Guidelines set eight key features that transfer pricing unit should contain. They 
include the following: the relationship between tax policy and tax administration; the 
need for evaluation of current capabilities and gaps to be filled; the need for a clear 
vision, a mission and a culture that reflects them; Organizational structure; 
Approaches taken to build team‘s capability; need for effective and efficient business 
processes; advantages of staged approaches to reaching long-term goals; and need 
for monitoring to assess effectiveness and for fine tuning.
477
 
 
Examination of the UN Guidelines reveals that the main aim of the UN Guidelines is 
to provide practical solution(s) for developing countries on how to arrive at transfer 
price between associated MNCs based on arm‘s length principle. Thus, establishment 
of the UN Guidelines intended to bring uniformity in determining transfer price 
among developing countries. Since the UN Guidelines are specifically designed for 
developing countries,
478
 it takes into account development level of these countries. It 
provide basis upon which transfer prices may be arrived at and hence, it bring 
certainty to both associated MNCs and tax administrators in determining arms‘ 
                                                          
476
 Brem M., Globalization, multinationals and tax base allocation: Advance Pricing Agreements as 
Shifts in international tax policies?, IIMA Working Paper, no. 2005-12-01. P.7. 
477
 Chapter for of UN Guidelines , para 4.1.1. 
478
  See title of the UN Guidelines.  
 
 
120 
length price..  Notably, transfer pricing methods take in to account transfer pricing 
theories and counteract them.  For example, the economic theory and accounting 
theory require transfer price to be compared with market price, if available.
479
 This is 
in line with CUP method, which requires comparability of market price. Similarly, 
economic theory and accounting theory harmonize well with RPM in establishing the 
profit margin for purpose of calculating transfer price in absence of market price.  
Cost plus method (CPM) works well with mathematical programming theory in 
identifying cost of goods or services provide for the purpose of establishing transfer 
price.
480
 The UN Guidelines were established on the basis of the UN model with the 
view of providing practical application on transfer pricing issues for developing 
countries. It is surprising to note that the UN Model is made for both developing and 
developed countries, while the UN Guidelines are made for developing countries 
only.
481
 It is unclear when developed countries implementing UN Guidelines will use 
UN Guidelines or OECD Guidelines. It is not disputed that UN Guidelines borrowed 
a lot from OECD and there are various issues specifically focused on developing 
countries, which are quite different from OECD.
482
 Clarity of the law is necessary for 
its implementation. However, the UN Guidelines, in some instances, lack consistence 
and clarity such that they leave much to be desired.   
From practical point of view, the transactions referred in UN Guidelines are of goods 
or services.
483
 Additionally, theories of transfer pricing were methods are derived, in 
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a kind, referring to transactions of goods or services and not property.
484
 In the same 
spirit, chapters one and two of the UN Guidelines use the word ‘goods‘ consistently.  
To the contrary, chapter six of the Guidelines consistently uses the word ‗property‘ 
to infer transactions carried out between associated or independent corporations for 
property.
485
 The problem is that neither the UN Guidelines nor UN model defines the 
term property for transfer pricing purposes. Ordinarily, goods and property have 
different meaning.    Property means ―anything that is owned by a person or entity.‖ 
Property is divided into two types: "real property," which is any interest in land, real 
estate, growing plants or the improvements on it, and "personal property" 
(sometimes called "personality"), which is everything else."
486
 Furthermore, the UN 
Guidelines define the term ‗mispricing‘ to mean a short-term to pricing, which is not 
in accordance with arm‘s length standard.  
 
In addition, mispricing in not intended to imply existence of tax avoidance or evasion 
motive behind a particular transactions.
487
 This definition is against spirit of the law, 
which requires curbing manipulation of transfer pricing by associated MNCs 
achieved through mispricing. Although the UN Guidelines provide for circumstances 
upon which mispricing is not necessarily tax avoidance or tax evasion, advanced 
reasons do not outweigh the spirit of the law to deter manipulation of transfer 
pricing. The UN Guidelines enshrine the notion of good faith in various provisions 
requiring both associated MNCs as tax payers and revenue authorities to exercise, 
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thought or practice good faith when determining arm‘s length transfer price.488  
There is a possibility for both tax payers and tax administrators to have different 
approaches to the notion of good faith. What is considered to be good faith by a tax 
payer may not be considered the same by the revenue authority.  The problem is that 
the UN Guidelines does not provide any guidance as to how broad in scope the duty 
of good faith should be and the extent to which it should govern the relationship 
between the tax payer and tax administrators.  Since no compromise was reached, the 
notion of good faith under the UN Guidelines remains vague.  
 
3.11  Conclusion  
The review of international transfer pricing under international law leads to the 
following conclusions: First, the OECD and UN models expressly spell transfer 
pricing principles, which offer strong normative roots for transfer pricing laws of 
regional and individual countries.  The norms can be well established from 
international taxation provisions of such regional and countries‘ domestic transfer 
pricing laws. To the country level, frequent reference to arm‘s length principle for 
transaction between associated MNCs is made in ant-avoidance provisions. 
Similarly, courts of law have been referring to arm‘s length principle in determining 
transfer pricing matters. This affirms acceptance and recognition of arm‘s length 
principle. Second, there is no single approach in application of methods to arrive at 
arms‘ length price. Each method is applied depending on circumstances of a 
particular case.  
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Notably, uncertainty and complications involved in arriving at arm‘s length rate give 
potentials for manipulation of transfer price between associated MNCs. Accordingly, 
risk identification and audit assessment for transfer pricing examination by revenue 
authorities are long as well as complicated processes, requiring resources and time. 
Such processes which depend to a great extent, on information from taxpayers may 
render detection of risks futile. Third, although UN model is made for developing 
countries it has not escaped from the influence of OECD model because developing 
countries are dominantly relying on OECD model. Forth, both OECD and UN 
models provide a uniform basis for solving the problem of international economic 
double taxation primarily to encourage investment by preventing double taxation. 
Most importantly, the international instruments do not take in to account transfer in 
extractive sector which is likely to be a big concern for EAC countries.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TRANSFER PRICING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN EAST AFRICAN 
COMMUNITY 
 
4.1  Introduction 
An increase in foreign investments caused by trade and investment has enhanced 
challenges for international transfer pricing in EAC. International trade and 
investment in EAC are largely caused by trade liberalization and investment that 
have direct impact on transfer pricing. This chapter examines various arrangements 
of international trade and foreign investments in which EAC countries have been 
involved. It considers the extent of implications of international transfer pricing to 
EAC countries. The first part surveys socio- economic and political context of EAC 
countries. The rationale for looking in socio-economic context is that transfer pricing 
is not independent from economic and political forces. The second part covers 
linkage between trade and foreign investment as well as international transfer 
pricing. The third part comprises liberalization of economy and its impact on transfer 
pricing regulation in the region. The forth part reviews transfer pricing laws and 
standards as enshrined in regional instruments. It consequently argues that 
international trade and investment through such arrangements effectively pull 
international transfer pricing framework in EAC countries towards international 
stance and away from its local context. 
 
4.2  An Overview of East African Community 
The EAC is an intergovernmental cooperation of United Republic of Tanzania, 
Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. The United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda 
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and Kenya are founding members of the East African Community (EAC).
489
 The 
Treaty establishing the East African Community (The Treaty) was signed by heads 
of governments of the founding partner states on November 30
th
, 1999, in Arusha 
Tanzania and came in to force in July, 2000.
490
 The EAC was formally launched on 
January 15
th
, 2001. Rwanda and Burundi acceded to the Treaty and became full 
members in July, 2007 and hence, increased membership of the community from 
three to five countries. The EAC is located between 5030"N, 120S, 28045"E and 410 
50" E, with total area of 1.817.7 thousand kilometer squares.
491
 The EAC has 
recorded population of 145 million in 2013.
492
 Politically, EAC states have 
presidential system of government where the President is both the head of state and 
government. 
 
The history of EAC cooperation can be traced back in 1917 when Custom Union 
between Kenya and Uganda was established by colonialist.
493
 That was followed by 
the East African High Commission of 1948 to 1961.
494
  The objective of the 
Commission was to administer certain inter territorial services including tax 
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Ideological Formation of Tanzania, Social Legal studies, Vol. 4, London and New Delhi, SAGE, 
1995 p. 148. 
490
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differed between the colonial and post colonial periods. 
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matters.
495
 During colonialism, the economies of Kenya, Mainland Tanzania (then 
Tanganyika) and Uganda were integrated by the British colonialists so as to serve 
interests of the colonial power (Britain).  Under that system, Kenya received more 
investment from Britain than Mainland Tanzania and Uganda.
496
 Historically, this is 
explained by the fact that Kenya, unlike Mainland Tanzania and Uganda, was a 
settler and crown colony in which not only many British settlers stayed but also they 
meant to stay forever. Hence, they felt assured to invest more in Kenya than in 
Mainland Tanzania and Uganda. To implement the goal of attracting more 
investments in Kenya than Mainland Tanzania and Uganda, the British colonialists 
used the law as a tool for that purpose. By using their colonial legislature, the British 
colonialists made some laws that influenced the pattern on investment in East 
African countries.  
 
During colonial period, the main source of revenue was the colonial government. In 
managing tax issues, the High Commission enacted East African (Income Tax 
Management) Act.
497
 The Act synchronized all EAC countries‘ tax legislation but 
excluded tax rates and allowances.
498
 In 1958, East African Income (Management) 
Act
499
 was enacted. The Act repealed and replaced the 1952 Act. In terms of 1958 
Act, tax was levied on residents of East Africa on their incomes derived from sources 
within East Africa. Incomes from sources outside the region were taxed to the extent 
                                                          
495
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496
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that they were remitted and received in East Africa.
500
 Although colonialism was 
essential an expansion of MNCs from developed countries, transfer pricing issues 
were not a concern.   
 
In 1961, 1962 and 1963, Mainland Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya gained their 
independence, respectively. After independence, there arose competition over 
management of economic issues where Mainland Tanzania and Uganda felt that they 
stood to lose more than they gained.  Consequently, the East African High 
Commission failed and resulted into tension within the East African countries.
501
 To 
address the problem, the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) was 
formed in 1961 by Agreement.
502
  Emphasis under the EASCO still laid on economic 
benefits from cooperation by focusing much on investments. However, the 
cooperation collapsed in 1967 due to failure to agree in setting up EAC federation.
503
  
During that period, tax matters were still regulated by Act Number 10 of 1958. In 
1967, East African Cooperation was formed.
504
 The 1967 Treaty aimed at bringing 
about even economic development among the partner counties.
505
  Like in previous 
cooperation, Act Number 10, continued to be applied on tax matters until 1971when 
it was replaced by East African Income (Management) Act of 1971.
506
 The desire of 
having investments and create even economic development always existed within the 
community.  
                                                          
500
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501
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The existing EAC aims at widening and deepening cooperation among the partner 
states through development of policies and programmes in various fields for their 
mutual benefits with the view to achieve economic integration, among other 
things.
507
  In order to achieve the said objectives, the Treaty requires the partner 
countries to take measures to ensure rationalization and harmonization of the 
investments
508
 with the view of promoting the community as a single investment 
area.
509
 In the implementation process, the partner states established the East Africa 
Community Custom Union (EACCU),
510
  aiming at enhancing foreign investment in 
the community.
511
 Article 5 of the Treaty stipulates objectives of the community to 
include attaining, widening and deepening cooperation among the partner states.  
This is to be achieved by development of policies and programmes in various fields 
with a view of achieving economic, social and political integration. The treaty 
provides that,- 
“Community organs, Institutions, laws shall take precedence over 
similar national   ones on matters pertaining to implementation of 
the treaty”.512 In pursuance to the provision above, the partner 
countries undertake to make necessary legal instruments to confer 
precedence of community organs, institutions and laws over similar 
national ones.‖513 
 
It means that partner states are obliged to ensure not only domestication of the Treaty 
within their countries‘ laws, but also they should ensure timely implementation of its 
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projection and general adherence to its provisions by instituting all mechanisms and 
programmes that relate to cooperation to enhance economic integration. 
 
4.3  Linkage between Trade and Foreign Investment and International 
Transfer Pricing 
The desire to make EAC as a single investment area and efforts to implement such 
desires enhanced an increase in trade as well as investments in the region. Increases 
in such investments are from within and outside the EAC countries.  Investments 
and, in particular, foreign investments have been seen as a key drive that has been 
inducing EAC countries to increasingly involve their economies in regional as well 
as global levels. Such EAC countries have been taking various steps to facilitate 
foreign investment mostly from developed countries.
514
 This is sought to be achieved 
by changing domestic laws and policies by adopting bilateral treaties with countries 
where investments are sourced or with their trading partners. Such bilateral treaties 
may be tax agreements, investment treaties or trade agreements.   
Facilitation of trade and investment in EAC countries is a result of implementation of 
liberalization policies of multilateral institutions such as International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Such institutions required developing 
countries to involve their economies in free market economy. Accordingly, 
increasingly sophisticated and powerful technological as well as legal regulatory 
environments, especially in developing countries enhanced interaction of economies 
between developed and developing countries like EAC. This is achieved by 
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removing international trade barriers, which resulted in smoothing movement of 
goods and services between countries. In due regard, big cooperation from developed 
and emerging economy countries expanded their economic activities to EAC 
countries by established associated entities.
515
 Arguably, most foreign investments in 
EAC countries are not completely new but rather, they are mere part of large 
corporations operating from countries where they are sourced.  
 
The increase in MNCs in EAC would mean an increase in transfer pricing practices 
in the region. In this context, benefits from MNCs are two-fold. First, the difference 
between countries‘ tax laws provides potentials for MNCs to avoid tax on their 
worldwide income. This is achieved by using legal loop holes that exists in countries 
tax laws setting up prices within corporation without necessarily considering arm‘s 
length principle as required by the law.  Since the aim of MNCs is to maximize 
profit, such situation may create a room to under or overprice goods and services 
transacted within corporation.
516
 Second, it provides potentials for reallocation of 
market shares through off shore companies with the view of reducing operation costs 
and maximizes profit.
517
 Such situation creates room for MNCs to shift profit from 
high to low tax countries or to countries where a parent company operates. 
Consequently, countries involved fall in a risk of losing their right share of tax 
through manipulation of transfer pricing.Globalization of MNCs has enhanced the 
role of transfer pricing legislation in facilitation of trade and investment in the world. 
                                                          
515
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This is evidenced by bilateral tax treaties concluded in the past to regulate 
international transfer pricing arising between associated MNCs across countries.
518
  
The undertaking view is of four-fold. First, absence of transfer pricing law may 
render host countries in which MNCs operate to lose their right share of tax. Second, 
ineffective transfer pricing system of law may create loophole for MNCs to avoid tax 
beyond legal requirement(s). Hence, in case of conflict between revenue authorities 
and MNCs as tax payers, it may render MNCs to be inadequately protected. Third, in 
absence of proper transfer pricing law, both tax administrators and MNCs may have 
limited reference when dealing with transfer pricing challenges. Fourth, absence of 
proper transfer pricing law may discourage foreign investors to developing countries 
like EAC.
519
 It is in this context such that it is important to consider involvement of 
EAC in facilitation of MNCs‘ activities influence international transfer pricing 
regulations in the region. 
 
4.4  Liberalization of Economy and its Implications to Transfer Pricing 
Regulation in EAC  
The EAC countries have experienced major economic reforms for more than three 
decades. Such reforms caused growth of economy in the region as a result of 
liberalization policy implemented under auspices of multilateral institutions, namely, 
IMF and WB. Such institutions required EAC countries to privatize state owned and 
controlled enterprises together with liberalization of import and export prices of 
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commodities including capital flows. In order to achieve liberalization objectives, 
such institutions provided policy and legal infrastructures, which EAC countries had 
to follow while reforming their economies. Implementation of such reforms was a 
condition to attract foreign investments for developing countries.
520
 Consequently, 
developing countries formulated policies and laws to attract more foreign 
investments in their respective countries.
521
 The result was that EAC countries had to 
depend and participate in private sector, in particular, foreign investment.  
Existing EAC liberalized its economy by formulating policies and laws to facilitate 
high investments as well as trade in the region. Establishment of EACCU and East 
African Community Common Market (EACCM) protocols is some steps taken by 
EAC to liberalize their economy and make the region as single investment area. Such 
step facilitated higher investment flow between member countries and beyond the 
region. This is achieved through removal of trade and investment barriers within the 
EAC. Facilitation of investment is enhanced through intra – trade on mutual 
arrangement basis.
522
 This is achieved through removal of non-tariff barriers,
523
 
creation of common external tariff 
524
 and elimination of internal tariff 
525
 and 
provision of anti-dumping measures.
526
 Accordingly, promotion of efficiency in 
production within EAC 
527
 through fair competition has improved investment of the 
region. Furthermore, enhanced domestic, cross border and foreign investments 
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521
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through simplified customs procedure,
528
 tax incentive on capital goods and zero 
tariffs on primary raw materials have brought positive changes to EAC. Moreover, 
promotion of economic development and diversification of industries
529
 have played 
an important role in increasing investment in the region. Presence of ready market 
with population of almost 150 million made possible through implementation of 
EACCM attracted more investments in the region. Establishment of joint institutions 
on border control, which plays an important role to deter smuggling, illegal cross 
border transactions and control of transit goods has increased operation of associated 
MNCs originating from within EAC.
530
 Presence of such MNCs essentially means an 
increase in transfer prices practices from within and beyond the community.  
 
Apart from establishment of EACCU, establishment of East African Community 
Investment Model code
531
 (Investment model) significantly played a great role in 
facilitation of investment in the region. The investment Model aims at harmonizing 
investment laws in the region thereby reducing harmful investment competition 
between member countries. Globalization of investment and trade has made EAC 
member countries to take proactive measures to improve regional investment 
climate. This is sought to be achieved by pursuing open, liberal and transparent 
investment policies to contribute to their economic progress principally through the 
private sector led development.
532
  In this context, investors both local and foreign 
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are ensured of right to private ownership establishment.
533
  Most importantly, the 
investment code provides tax incentive for investors investing in export processing 
zones, manufacturing under bond, free trade zones and technology parks. These 
incentives include;, 
              ―10 years corporate tax holiday and 25% tax thereafter,10 years 
withholding tax holiday, duty and value added tax (VAT) 
exemption, on raw materials, machinery, equipment and other 
inputs, stamp duty exemption,100% investment deduction on 
capital expenditure within 20 years, complete exemption from 
dividend tax, duty and tax free import of goods from domestic 
tariff area, duty free import of two motor vehicles for use of 
business enterprise allowed under certain conditions, exemption 
of income tax on interest on borrowed capital, relief from double 
taxation subject to bilateral agreements, exemption of income tax 
on salaries of foreign technicians for 3 years subject to certain 
conditions and exemption from property tax for 10 years.”534 
 
Arguably, the EAC investment code, which regulates investors, may provide 
potentials for transfer pricing manipulation by allowing huge tax incentives to 
investors. Facilitation of investment in EAC also has impact on attracting foreign 
investments in the region.  The EAC has entered in economic partnership with other 
regional blocks such as Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with European 
Union (EU), Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with USA, and 
COMESA-EAC and SADC Tripartite free trade area and trade cooperation with 
China and India.
535
 Entering in economic partnership with EU means that EAC have 
opened room for 18 developed countries.
536
 Such kind of relations has potential in 
attracting MNCs from EU to invest in the EAC countries and therefore, increase 
transfer pricing practices in the region. 
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The EPA, for example, covers trade in goods and development. It adheres to non-
discrimination principles on imports and exports.
537
 Accordingly, it contributes to 
eradicate non–tariff barrier in intra EAC trade.538 The main export from EAC to EU 
is dominated by coffee, cut flowers, minerals, fish and vegetables.
539
 The imports to 
EAC from EU are mainly machinery and mechanical appliance, equipment and parts, 
vehicle and pharmaceutical products.
540
 Although EU may be seen to be supporting 
the EAC, in real sense, the trade relation may have impact on tax matters. Imported 
machinery and equipment from EU may enjoy exemptions as capital goods.  The 
trend of export between EAC and EU from 2012 to 2013 shows that EU imported 
more than EAC exported to EU.
541
 Such kind of partnership intensifies involvement 
of MNCs‘ operations in EAC, which potentially exposes EAC to the potential effect 
of international transfer pricing. Likewise, expansion of a common market within 
EAC and tripartite preferential free trade area of EAC–COMESA and SADC 
provides a potential market for foreign investments.  
 
Foreign investments in EAC countries are also from other African countries like 
South Africa and Mauritius.
542
 For example, in 2012, South Africa and Mauritius 
were leading investors in Tanzania. Mauritius is a tax haven country and provides 
potentials for transfer pricing manipulation including profit shifting from EAC. In 
this context, foreign MNCs stand to benefit more than local MNCs. This is because 
local MNCs are able to invest within the region and very few have invested in 
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comparative African advanced economies like South Africa and Mauritius.
543
 To the 
contrary, MNCs from such countries have invested heavily in the region. Likewise, 
EAC MNCs are lacking capacity to invest in their counter partners like EU, USA and 
China. For example, it is a reported that intra-trade within EAC states is 3.8 billion 
US dollars, while international trade volume with EAC is 33 billion US dollars.
544
 
The EAC exports volume is 11 billion UD dollars while import volume is 26 billion 
US dollars and investment flow is 1.7 billion US dollars.
545
 From these statistics, it is 
clear that EAC trades more internationally than intra-region. The rate of investment 
is also high, which means that more MNCs are carrying out business in the region 
and therefore, transfer pricing is highly practiced.  
Prosperity of the economy of any country or regional integration requires sufficient 
tax revenue collected by revenue authorities from tax payers.  Such tax authorities 
and tax payers are influenced as well as governed by the law, which, as part of the 
ideological superstructure, must inevitably not lag behind economic changes in any 
society. Tax laws, in particular, constitute the legal regime that applies to local and 
foreign investments for promoting economic development of a country or region.  
The primary role of tax law is to encourage and regulate taxation in various sectors 
of the economy. Thus, tax laws play a great role in success or failure of effective tax 
collection of countries. As far as EAC countries are concerned, transfer pricing 
standards were introduced after liberalization of the economy.
546
 To a significant 
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extent, domestic laws have tended to incorporate arm‘s length principle and other 
standards contained in the model conventions.
547
 This is in line with the requirement 
of multinational institutions as rightly pointed out that, 
„„A drafting issue for the domestic [tax] law is that the arm‟s length 
principle should be provided for both branches and subsidiaries. 
This is most easily done by using language similar to that found in 
tax treaties. Such an approach ensures that there is a basis in 
domestic law for making transfer pricing adjustments. In many 
countries, it is not clear whether tax treaties on their own would 
provide a sufficient basis for such adjustments, and, in any event, it 
is necessary to have the rules in the case of residents of countries 
with which there is no tax treaty in force. Using statutory language 
based on treaties has the added advantage of giving a clear signal 
that the country intends to follow international norms.‟‟548 
Introduction of transfer pricing provision in EAC countries was mainly to avoid 
double taxation and allocate taxing rights to countries where MNCs operate. 
Accordingly, this was done with a view to attract more foreign investors in their 
respective countries so as to keep up pace with requirement of international taxation 
norms. Additionally, by abiding by these standards, it is believed that governments 
provide potentials in obtaining the right share of tax arising from MNCs‘ transactions 
for countries‘ economic development.  Arguably, foreign investments have been seen 
as major means of obtaining huge taxes that will help governments to enhance 
economy and provide public services.
549
   Accordingly, importation of transfer 
pricing standards from developed countries significantly limits options available to 
                                                          
547
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EAC countries as tax policy choices seem not to be influenced by countries‘ 
economic structure and administrative capacity.  
 
With ongoing discovery of natural resources and implementation of the policy of 
making EAC as the single investment area supported by liberalization of market, 
involvement of MNCs‘ operations is likely to increase. Most likely, such MNCs are 
from developed countries. There is an emerging pattern of MNCs from emerging 
economies such as China and India as well as among developing countries like 
Nigeria, South Africa and Mauritius.
550
 Consequently, arm‘s length principle is 
becoming highly applicable. Growing of MNCs‘ activities seems to be derived from 
their desire to obtain profit and reduce overall corporations‘ tax liability.  
Such desire reflects objectives for which MNCs are established
551
 and in the 
magnitude of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded by EAC countries with 
their trade partners.
552
  Although the argument for having BITs and Double Tax 
Treaties (DTAs) is to attract more foreign investments in the region, it is 
questionable whether or not tax losses caused by loopholes in such treaties can be 
compensated by the increase in volume of MNCs investments in the region. It is 
common knowledge that attraction of foreign investment and protection of the same 
is another thing. There is consensus from scholars and investors that investing in 
Africa generally is unsafe because of weakness in adherence to the rule of law and 
that investors are insufficiently protected in Africa.
553
 The investors are of the view 
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that developing countries like EAC are lacking proper tax laws, in particular, transfer 
pricing to protect their business profits.  Hence, home countries of MNCs had to find 
a way of protecting and capturing profits that may arise out of MNCs‘ operations 
across countries. It is generally accepted under international taxation principle that 
countries have the right to tax income either on source or resident bases. Thus, 
countries, which host investments, have the right to tax on source, while countries 
where investments are sourced, they tax on resident basis.  
Equally important, another great concern for foreign investors is payment of double 
tax for their investments, which seems to increase transaction costs that need to be 
avoided. Likewise, a host country may require effective mechanisms for exchange of 
information between countries in relation to economic activities of MNCs for tax 
purposes before acceptance of investment. It is in this context that home countries of 
MNCs negotiated and concluded Double Tax agreements with EAC countries.
554
 
 
From investors‘ countries, DTAs are seen mainly as means to protect and capture 
their profits and partly as means to remedy local institutions‘ deficiency together 
with governance.
555
 It is within this context that transfer pricing standards have been 
enshrined in EAC DTAs. Such standards were seen as a condition to avoid double 
tax to investors so as to obtain intended profit at the same time facilitating more 
capital imports by MNCs in the region. From EAC countries‘ perspective, the 
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conclusion of such DTAs seems to connote the following: first, as means to attract 
more foreign investors in the region.
556
 Such desire seems to be derived from the 
notion that foreign investment plays an important role in generating tax for economic 
development, among other things.
557
 By signing DTAs, EAC countries will be in a 
position to obtain the right share of tax from MNCs‘ profits.  
Second, it is a way to impress foreign investors that EAC countries are not unsafe 
destination.
558
 Third, it is as a mechanism for exchange of information between 
countries in relation to economic activities of MNCs in case of tax dispute for 
purpose of tax compliance. This was seen important because developing countries 
like EAC are seen as having weak tax law and administrative capacity in regulating 
international tax.
559
 
 
The increase in DTAs involving EAC countries plays an important role in promoting 
MNCs‘ operations, in general. The EAC countries are becoming interdependent and 
connected to MNCs‘ operations, but they face challenge of reflecting in their tax 
regimes global standards in dealing with international transfer pricing. Transactions 
of MNCs through transfer pricing impose challenges for EAC countries to align 
transfer pricing laws so as to abide by their desire to attract more MNCs to countries 
with which they signed DTAs. The fact that liberalization of economy was 
                                                          
556
 McGauran, K., note 30, p.5 See also, Neumayer E., Do Double Taxation Treaties Increase Foreign 
Direct Investment to the Developing Countries?, Journal of Development Studies. 43 (8) 2007, pp 
1501-1519 available at http://ssrn .com/ abstract=766064, p.2; Accessed September 2013. See also 
Ahmed S.A.S and Giafri R.N.M., The Role of Double Taxation Treaties on Attraction of Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Review of Literature. Research Journal of accounting, ISSN 2222- 
2847online Vol 6, no 12, 2015. 
557
 Like importation of technology, employment opportunities etc. 
558
 Masot V., Bilateral Investment Treaties and a Possibility Multilateral Framework on Investment 
and WTO; Are Poor Countries Caught in Between? 20 NWJ Int‘l L &Bus (2005 -2006) pp 95 and 
114. 
559
 Mclure, Jr., C.E., note 36. 
 
 
141 
influenced by multilateral institutions is highly influenced by policies, rules and 
programmes of developed countries‘ standards.560 Consequently, such rules, policies 
and programmes suitable for developed countries‘ economies and administrative 
capacity were imported in EAC countries.  
 
On the basis of the importation, EAC countries formulated policies and laws, to a 
great, extent reflect requirements of foreign investments. Arguably, laws, 
programmes and standards on transfer pricing were not set and implemented to 
reflect specific needs including administrative capacity of EAC in handling transfer 
pricing intricacies. To this extent EAC countries were opened for potential transfer 
pricing challenges. Such countries may consider foreign investment as one of the 
means to obtain taxes necessary for economic and citizens‘ development. However, 
EAC countries laws are may be ineffective and inefficient in capturing their tax 
potentials that may arise out of international transactions by MNCs.  
 
For example, it is estimated that developing countries capture only 40 percent of 
their potentials and lose US dollars 160 billion a year through international transfer 
pricing manipulations.
561
 Arguably, the desire for attraction of foreign investment 
has put EAC countries to institute transfer pricing laws, which reflect MNCs‘ 
desires, a situation, which may preclude them from making proper analysis of 
consequences that may be caused by application of the arm‘s length principle.  
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4.5  International Transfer Pricing Regime in East African Community 
4.5.1  The EAC Treaty 
The EAC treaty has nothing explicit related to transfer pricing between associated 
MNCs. However, it contains provisions upon which transfer pricing laws can be 
inferred and form basis for transfer pricing laws. Article 5 of the EAC Treaty 
stipulates objectives of the community to include attaining, widening, and deepening 
cooperation among the partner states.  From economic and tax perspective, the treaty 
provides for cooperation in investment and industrial development.
562
 To achieve 
such requirement, the EAC treaty necessitates harmonization and rationalization of 
investment of tax incentives with a view of promoting EAC as a single investment 
area.
563
 Accordingly, it requires avoidance of double taxation for investments across 
borders
564
 and harmonization of tax policies with a view of removing tax distortions 
so as to bring about efficient resource allocation within the region.
565
 In addition, the 
treaty allows free movement of capital so as to encourage cross–border trade and 
financing instrument.
566
 
 
This is to be achieved by developing policies, laws, institutions and programmes in 
various fields with a view to attain economic, social and political integration.  
Accordingly, the EAC Treaty requires ―community organs, institutions, laws to take 
precedence over similar national   ones on matters pertaining to implementation of 
                                                          
562
 Article 79. 
563
 Article 80(f).  
564
 Article 80(h). 
565
 Article 83(e). 
566
 Articles 80 - 87 respectively. 
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the EAC treaty.‖567 Pursuant to this provision, the partner countries are required to 
undertake necessary legal instruments to confer precedence of community organs, 
institutions and laws over similar national ones.
568
 This means that the partner states 
are obliged to ensure not only domestication of the EAC treaty within their domestic  
laws, but also ensure timely implementation of its projection and general adherence 
to its provisions  by instituting all mechanisms, laws and programmes that relate to 
cooperation to enhance economic integration.  It is within this ambit the EAC 
countries have entered in Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation and 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (EAC DTA).  The 
EAC DTA contains arm‘s length principle and other standards of transfer pricing as 
enshrined in model conventions. Examination of standards and principles contained 
in the EAC DTA including clauses demonstrates the extent to which EAC countries 
have bound themselves in obligation that potentially affect as well as shape their 
policy choices in transfer pricing regulations.   
4.5.2  EAC Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income 2011 (EAC DTA) 
The East African Community Double Taxation Agreement (EAC DTA) is a 
multilateral treaty for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion 
with respect to taxes on income.
569
  Such taxes, which the EAC DTA applies, are 
taxes chargeable in accordance with provisions of the income tax laws of member 
                                                          
567
  Article 8(4) of the Treaty for the Establishment East African Community, 1999. 
568
  Ibid,Article 8(5). 
569
 Article 2 of the EAC DTA. It was established on 2010 and came in to force on 2011. 
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countries.
570
 The treaty seeks to eliminate double taxation among countries by 
imposing an obligation on the resident state to give credit to source country against 
the resident country‘s tax on income or exempt the income from tax. The parties to 
the treaty are the Republics of Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda as well as the 
United Republic of Tanzania and it is applicable to residents or one of the residents 
of contracting countries.
571
 In context of transfer pricing, when stakeholders need to 
establish whether or not the prices are made at arm‘s length, the EAC DTA provides 
for requirements that need to be followed while setting transfer price between 
associated MNCs operating within the region. Such provisions are discussed in the 
next sub-sections. 
 
4.5.2.1 Arms’ Length Principle in EAC Context 
Arm‘s length principle is a corner stone of regulating transfer pricing between 
associated MNCs enshrined under the EAC DTA.
572
  The principle provides that, 
            “… and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ 
from those which would be made between independent 
enterprises, then any income which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason 
of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the 
income of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.‖573 
 
                                                          
570
 Ibid, Article 2(3). These laws are  Income Tax Act, Cap 470 RE 2014 of the laws of Kenya, 
Income Tax Act Cap 332 RE 2008 ,  of Tanzania, Income Tax Act, Cap 340 of the Laws of Uganda, 
Rwanda Law no 16/2005 of 18/08/2005 and law no 17/2005 and Burundi Income Tax act of 2008. 
571
 Ibid, Article 1. 
572
 Ibid, Article 9(1) (b). 
573
 Article 9(1) para 1 of EAC DTA. It is worth noting that, the wording of Article 9 (1) para 1 are 
identical with wording of Article 9(1) of OECD and Article 9(1) UN model, except that, the EAC 
DTA uses the word ‗income‘ and the OECD and UN model uses the word ‗profit‘. However, for 
purpose of transfer pricing, Article 7 of EAC DTA uses the word profit throughout for transfer 
pricing purposes. 
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The principle requires that transfer of goods and services between associated 
enterprises should be made at market price like those would have been made 
between independent parties.
574
 In context of this principle, the enterprise is regarded 
as associate of another if it participates directly or indirectly in either management or 
control or capital of an enterprise of another contracting state.
575
 Or the same persons 
participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an 
enterprise of a contracting state and an enterprise of the other contracting states.
576
  
 
Notwithstanding such requirement, there are no clear guidelines under circumstances 
a person is said to control the other for transfer pricing purposes.  However, scholars 
posit that the notion ‗control‘ should be used in its broader sense to include sufficient 
degree of control in relation to participation in management whether or not legally 
enforceable, directly or indirectly, whether horizontal or vertically.
577
 However, in 
practice, the degree of control is different from member countries. For example, the 
threshold for control in Kenya for transfer pricing purposes is 25 percent of the share 
holding or voting power in the entity.
578
 To the contrary, threshold control in 
Tanzania is 50 percent or more of the rights to income or capital or voting power 
through one or more corporations.
579
 Generally, the arm‘s length principle applies to 
taxation of income to persons who are residents of one or any of the other 
                                                          
574
 Article 9(1) (b) of the EAC DTA. 
575
 Ibid, Article 9(1) (a). 
576
 Ibid, Article 9(1) (b). 
577
 Blank M. et al., note 589 p.128. 
578
  paragraph 32(1) of part IV of the second schedule of ITA CAP 470 RE 2014. For more details see 
discussion in chapter seven at para 7.3.2.1. 
579
 Ibid, Section 3 (i) (bb). For more details see discussion on chapter six at para 6.4.3.2. 
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contracting states.
580
 It means that for arm‘s length to apply, associated enterprises 
must be in different states.  For that reason, associated parties operating within a 
country are excluded from the ambit of EAC DTA. The provision also excludes 
foreign controlled companies for transfer pricing purposes. In context of EAC 
countries, the purpose of arm‘s length principle is first, to secure appropriate tax base 
in each country where MNCs operate; second, to avoid economic double taxation 
and to attract foreign investors as well as cross border trade to the region.
581
   
 
In essence, transfer pricing rules are avoidance rules aiming at elimination of double 
tax and encourage foreign investors in the region. The principle applies only when 
transfer price between associated MNCs is not at arm‘s length because of their 
special relations between them. It is in this context that Article 9(1) empowers 
revenue authorities of contracting states to adjust transfer pricing in accordance with 
arm‘s length principle. However, the EAC DTA is silent on modalities of adjustment 
for purpose of obtaining arm‘s length price.  To the contrary, the EAC DTA clearly 
provides for corresponding adjustments with a view of elimination of double 
taxation. 
  
The arm‘s length principle requires adjustment where one contracting state includes 
in the income of enterprises of the other state arm‘s length profits, which have been 
                                                          
580
 Ibid, Article 1. This means that non EAC enterprise related to an enterprise of EAC shall be subject 
the EAC DTA. This is important as EAC is not trading within its member states only; it also trades 
with other third countries including those in other regional communities such as COMESA and 
SADC. Similarly, foreign direct investments among EAC member countries are becoming 
increasingly important. Just like other regional integration such as ECOWAS
580
 and European 
Union (EU) who have established specific transfer pricing laws to keep pace with requirement of 
raising revenue from profit of associated MNCs. 
581
 Blank M. et al., The Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement of the EAC hand book, p.125. 
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charged in other state   prices.
582
  To this extent, the state, which made such 
inclusion, shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged 
therein on that income. The adjustment can be made through deduction
583
 or 
exemption
584
 methods. However, corresponding adjustment cannot be made if it is 
time bared according to countries‘ laws of limitations,585 except where there are 
fraud, default and neglect.
586
 Likewise, where there is judgment duly made by 
judicial, administrative or other legal proceedings, adjustment of income of 
enterprises cannot be made.
587
  
 
4.5.2.2 Resident Principle in EAC Context 
In context of EAC, for arm‘s length to apply there must be a transaction between 
residents associated MNCs between contracting countries. A corporation is regarded 
a resident if it is incorporated under the laws of that state or if place of effective 
management is situated therein or any other criterion of similar nature.
588
 Where the 
corporation has two or more contracting countries, the resident of such corporation is 
regarded to be where effective management is situated.
589
 However, the EAC DTA is 
silent on meaning of ‗effective management.‘ The income tax laws, which are 
referred to are also silent on meaning of effective management.
590
 There is serious 
concern with determination of a residence of a company by using phrase ‗effective 
                                                          
582
  Article 9(2) of EAC DTA 
583
 Ibid, Article 24(1). 
584
 Ibid, Article 24(2). 
585
 Ibid, Article 9 (3). 
586
 Ibid, Article 9(4). 
587
 Ibid, Article 9 (5). 
588
 Ibid, Article 4(1). This article clearly excludes any person who is liable to tax in respect only of 
income from sources in that state. 
589
 Ibid, Article 4 (3).  
590
 See for example section 10 of ITA, Cap 340 of the laws of Uganda, Section 66 of ITA, Cap 332 
RE 2008 of Tanzania and Section 2 (1) of ITA Cap 470 RE 2014 of the laws of Kenya.  
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management‘ to determine tax liability of MNCs. Van de Merwe, for example,  
argues that the phrase ―effective management‖ is ambiguous because it ether refers 
to nature of management or level of management and management decision.
591
 It is 
difficult to apply because each case is determined according to circumstances of a 
particular case.
592
 On level of management, it is not clear at what level of 
management can residence of a company be determined, either at the place where 
activities are managed or at the place where actually broader, strategic decision are 
taking place.
593
 He further posits that in determining residence of a company by 
using effective management, the following questions arise:- ―who manages the 
company? At what management level is it important to determine residence? What is 
the nature of effective management? Is there any guidance to be instituted from 
management and control? Can there be more than one place of effective 
management?‖594  
Arguably, the notion of effective management is relevant to traditional trade where 
decision makers of companies used to meet physically at a particular place.
595
 With 
the modern technology development in communications, decision makers of the 
companies are using video conference, electronic mails (e-mails), phone and the like. 
Furthermore, an idea of residence as a central key on principles and policies in 
relation to international taxation of foreign investment seems to be both outdated and 
                                                          
591
  Van de merwe B.A., Residence of A Company: Meaning of effective Management, South Africa 
Mercantile Law Journal, 2002, pp79-92, p.81. 
592
 Ibid. 
593
 Ibid. 
594
 Ibid 79.  
595
 Oguttu A. W., Resolving Double Taxation: The Concept of „Effective Management‟ Analyzed from 
South African Perspective, XLI No 1 The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern 
Africa, 2008, pp 80-104p.86. 
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unstable.
596
 Likewise, Kirsch points out that there is no substance connection 
between corporate tax residence and corporate economic attributes in a global 
economy.
597
Avi Yonah concludes that charging tax on residence basis is not very 
meaningful.
598
  Scholars further argue that taxation on residence basis is easy and 
vulnerable to tax manipulations, in particular, for MNCs in shifting profit from one 
country to another.
599
 The issue is, ‗what will happen if profit of a whole company is 
generated by subsidiary of company X in country C but the such subsidiary is 
managed wholly in country Y? In context of transfer pricing, it creates room for 
manipulation of prices where the profit will be made in another country and 
therefore, the tax base in which subsidiary company operates may be eroded.  
 
4.5.2.3 Permanent Establishment in EAC Context 
In determining taxing rights of residents of associated MNCs and whether or not the 
corporation has presence in contracting countries, permanent establishment concept 
is employed.  The East African Community Double Taxation Agreement (EAC 
DTA) defines permanent establishment as a fixed place of business through which 
                                                          
596
 Graetz, M. J. and O‘Hear, M. M., The Original Intent of U.S. International Taxation, Faculty 
Scholarship Series. Paper 1620, 1997, P.1066, available at  
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 December 
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 Avi-Yonah R. S., International Tax as International Law, University of Michigan Law, Public Law 
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the business of enterprises is wholly or partially carried out.
600
  Such permanent 
establishment includes place of management, a branch, an office, a factory, a 
workshop, a warehouse for storage facilities for others, a mine, a gas or an oil well, a 
quarry or any other place of extraction of natural resources.
601
 Permanent 
establishment also encompasses a building site or construction, installations other 
than mines and natural resources, assembly or supervisory activities, which last for 
more than six months.
602
 Furnishing of services and consultancy services through 
employee as well as other persons engaged if such activities continue for the same 
connected project for a period of aggregated more than six months within any twelve 
months constitutes a permanent establishment.
603
   
For an insurance company, permanent establishment exists in a country where it 
collects premium or insured risks are situated.
604
 Likewise, permanent establishment 
also can be formed if a person habitually exercises a general authority in the first-
mentioned country to conclude contracts in the name of the enterprise, unless his 
activities are limited to purchase of goods or merchandise for the enterprise; or 
maintains in the first mentioned country a stock of goods or merchandise belonging 
to the enterprise from which he regularly delivers goods or merchandise on behalf of 
the enterprise.
605
 The EAC DTA clearly excludes activities of preparatory or 
auxiliary character to form permanent establishment.
606
 Likewise, permanent 
establishment cannot exist if it carries on business through broker, general 
                                                          
600
 Article 5 (1) of the EAC DTA. 
601
 Ibid, Article 5 (2) (a) to (h). 
602
 Ibid, Article 5 (3) (a). 
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 Ibid Article 5 (3) (b). 
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commission agent acting on the ordinary cause of their business.
607
 From the fore 
discussions, it is clear that the concept of permanent establishment as a tax payer in 
the host country presupposes physical existence. However, with development of 
modern technology where communication is enhanced, it makes the physical 
requirement of permanent establishment as enshrined in EAC DTA to be applicable 
to physical permanent establishment only. It means that an existing requirement of 
existence of permanence as enshrined leaves out electronic transactions by MNCs. 
Consequently, MNCs may take advantage of the situation by conducting their 
international transactions through electronic means.
608
  By using internet, MNCs are 
able to transfer goods and services between themselves all over the world without 
being easily interfered with revenue authorities of countries where transactions 
occurred.  
 
4.5.2.4 Business Profit for Transfer Pricing Purposes 
The EAC DTA sets a general rule that profit of enterprises should be taxed in the 
country where it is situated.
609
 However, there are exceptions to this rule. Where an 
enterprise operates in another country through permanent establishment, it requires 
business profit attributable to permanent establishment to be taxed in the country 
where it is situated.
610
 Article 7(2) requires each permanent establishment situated in 
contracting states to be taxed on attributable profit obtained under arm‘s length 
                                                          
607
 Ibid, Article 5 (7). 
608
 Commonly known as e-commerce, which is defined as processes of carrying out commercial 
activities through electronics means by using internet where by voice, data and images take place in 
cyber space with little or no physical activities in absence of geographical boundaries. For more 
detail see Doernberg R and Hinnekens L., Electronic Commerce and International Taxation, 1999, 
p.3. 
609
 Article  7(1) of EAC DTA. 
610
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rate.
611
 It means that any attributable profit between associated enterprises operating 
through permanent establishment relied on internal agreement will be subject to 
adjustment by revenue authorities in accordance with arm‘s length principle. In 
determining attributable profit amount, the EAC DTA sets a general rule that 
expenses incurred for business purpose, executive and general administrative cost 
should be deducted in the country where the permanent establishment is situated or 
somewhere else.
612
 Accordingly, it prohibits any deductions, which are not allowed 
as deduction under laws of the country where the permanent establishment is 
situated.
613
   
 
However, in determining profits of permanent establishment, amounts charged by 
head office of the corporation or any of its offices by way of royalties or fees in 
return for use of certain rights are not taken in to account except for banking 
enterprises.
614
 Such loop holes may provide potentials for associated MNCs to 
manipulate prices. The agreement also excludes profit obtained by mere purchase of 
goods or merchandise by permanent establishment
615
 Moreover, the EAC DTA 
requires that methods used to determine the profits attributable to the PE should be 
used on yearly basis unless there is sufficient reason to depart.
616
 The rationale 
behind is to limit contracting states to change methods used so as to create certainty 
and consistency. However, the rule does not prevent contracting states to impose 
additional requirements in preventing duplications of accounting methods. EAC 
                                                          
611
 Ibid, Article 7(2). 
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 Ibid, Article 7(3) (a). 
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 Ibid, Article 7(3) (b). 
615
Ibid, Article 7(5). 
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DTA clearly excludes business profits dealt separately in other provisions as a 
general rule.
617
 They include dividend, interest, royalties and other incomes.
618
 
However, there are exceptions to this rule. In terms of dividend, where a beneficial 
owner of a dividend is a resident of the contracting state, carrying on business in 
other contracting state in which the company is paying dividend is resident through 
permanent establishment situated therein and holding in respect of which the 
dividends are paid is effectively connected with permanent establishment, Article 7 
shall apply.
619
 The EAC DTA defines the term dividend to mean income from shares 
or other rights, not being debt claims, participating in profits as well as income from 
other corporate rights subjected to the same taxation treatment like income from 
shares by laws of the contracting state of which the company making a distribution is 
a resident.
620
  
 
Likewise, interest is taxed as business profit of permanent establishment if the 
beneficial owner of interest is a resident of a contracting state in which the interest 
arises through permanent establishment situated there in and the debt claim in respect 
of which the interest paid is effectively connected with it.
621
 The term interest is 
defined to mean income from debt claims of every kind whether or not secured by 
mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate in the debtor's profit, and, 
in particular, income from government securities as well as income from bonds or 
debentures including premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, bonds and 
                                                          
617
 Ibid, Article 7(7).  
618
 Ibid, Articles 10, 11, 12 and 23 respectively.  
619
 Ibid, Article 10(4). 
620
 Article 10 (3). 
621
 Ibid, Article 11 (5). 
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debentures.
622
 Accordingly, royalties are taxed as business profit of permanent 
establishment ―if the beneficial owner of the royalties is a resident of contracting 
state in which the royalties arise through a PE situated therein and the right or 
property in respect of which the royalties are paid is effectively connected with such 
PE.‖623  
 
4.6  Methods to Arrive at Arm’s Length Price 
The EAC DTA is silent on methods to arrive at arm‘s length price. Generally, such 
methods are enshrined under domestic transfer pricing regulations of contracting 
states.
624
These are comparable uncontrolled price, resale price method, cost plus 
method and profit split method.
625
 Notably, the handbook is for training purposes for 
officials working in revenue authorities and Ministry of Finance of respective 
countries.
626
 The purpose is to bring uniform application and interpretation of the 
DTA in all EAC partner states. This means that there are no transfer pricing 
guidelines at community level. Therefore, countries have discretion to make their 
own guidelines in determining arm‘s length price.  
  
Likewise, the EAC DTA is silent on comparability aspect. However, in context of 
EAC DTA practical point of view, it is not necessary that comparables should be 
                                                          
622
 Ibid, Article  11(4). 
623
 Ibid, Article 12 (4). 
624
  Income Tax (Transfer Pricing Rules) 2014 of Tanzania, Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) 2006 of 
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identical.
627
 Thus, the comparability aspect is based on none of the differences that 
can materially affect the price or reasonable accurate adjustment that can be made.
628
 
Adjustments arising out of comparability may result in different arm‘s length price. 
It may be more or less the same with price between related parties. From practical 
point of view, different ranges of prices are allowed as transfer prices provided they 
are within the range of price compared.
629
  Comparability analysis is based on OECD 
Guidelines because the EAC DTA is based on the OECD model. Consequently, 
domestic transfer pricing regulations are interpreted in line with OECD Guidelines. 
For example, Rule 9 of Income Tax (Transfer Pricing Rules) of 2014 of Tanzania 
clearly requires such rules to be interpreted in line with OECD and UN models.  To 
the contrary, such requirement does not exist in Kenyan transfer pricing law. In 
addition, issues related to documentation requirement and transfer pricing audits are 
regulated by individual countries‘ domestic laws.  While the EAC aims at bringing 
uniform interpretation within its member states, lack of clear transfer pricing 
Guidelines of the community may impede such desire from being obtained. 
 
4.7  Transfer Pricing Dispute Resolution Mechanism in EAC 
MNCs‘ operations in various countries have not been very smooth. While struggling 
to obtain profit in a cause of their businesses, they found engaging in dispute with tax 
authorities. It is common knowledge that tax avoidance is lawful and the tax payer is 
allowed to arrange tax affairs to minimize tax liability. However, MNCs have taken 
                                                          
627
 This can be inferred from Income transfer pricing regulations of member states which requires 
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discussion in chapter 6 at para 6.4.3.2; See also Blank M. et al., note 633 p.146. 
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advantage of loopholes that are found in law to avoid tax beyond legal requirements. 
Accordingly, MNCs have been manipulating transfer prices by using the same laws 
either by over- or under- pricing goods and services transacted between them. To this 
extent, tax revenue of the host countries where MNCs operate comes in to play by 
auditing accounts of a particular company to establish such manipulation. When the 
revenue authority is satisfied that there is existence of any special arrangement, 
which amounts to manipulation of prices, the revenue authority makes adjustment to 
such prices by reflecting arm‘s length price. Thus, transfer pricing cases happen 
when the revenue authority is claiming its right share of tax, which it believes to be 
lost because the arm‘s length was not taken in account by MNCs, while MNCs claim 
that the arm‘s length principle was adhered to and no tax needs to be adjusted.  
 
Generally, the EAC DTA does not provide specific transfer pricing dispute 
resolution mechanism. In case of any dispute arising out of this agreement, the 
person may take the matter to the competent authority within two years from the first 
date of notification. The person can take the matter for two reasons only. First, if it is 
being taxed not in accordance with the agreement and second, if a person is not 
handled according to nondiscrimination principle.
630
 Arguably, there are no special 
provisions or guidelines in handling transfer pricing. Each country is handling such 
disputes according to its domestic transfer pricing laws. 
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4.8  Conclusion 
The preceding analyses lead to conclusion that EAC instruments provide arms‘ 
length principle in regulating transactions between associated parties.  Currently the 
arms‘ length principle has been explained and applied in the context of OECD 
model. This is partly because such principle is derived from OECD model. It was 
imported to developing countries including EAC through liberalization of economy 
policies as a way of attracting foreign investors. Essentially, transfer pricing laws of 
EAC is a replica of OECD and UN models with slight modification.  The EAC 
instruments do not take in to account issues related to extractive sector which its 
impact to transfer pricing manipulation is big.  
Accordingly, rules related to taxation on source basis are weak compared to 
residence principle. Moreover, the instruments do not provide limitation of benefits 
provisions to limit other person to benefit from treaty.  There is potential for such 
DTA to impose some problems in relation to transfer price manipulation like those 
caused by such models. This is because legislators seem to have failed to recognize 
and draw attention on growing legal challenges of international transfer pricing 
emerging from an increase in foreign associated MNCs‘ investments.  
Accordingly, they have failed to make appropriate choices commensurate to the local 
context while taking in to account international transfer pricing standards in crafting 
domestic laws. The significant challenge in crafting transfer pricing laws 
commensurate with the local context is affected by desire of EAC countries to attract 
more foreign investors with a view of obtaining more tax, among other things. As a 
result, legislators have been enacting laws and policies, which attract more foreign 
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investors without taking in to account risks that may be associated with such steps, in 
particular, transfer pricing issues. Apart from desire to attract foreign investment, 
constant pressure from developed countries to follow international transfer pricing 
standards as a  benchmark in reforming local transfer pricing laws has greatly 
influenced legislators to adopt such standards.   
 
The five partners of the EAC, to date, have different  provisions of law governing 
transfer pricing in their respective countries as discussed in this chapter.  Each state, 
through its investment laws, appears to be competing with others to attract more 
strategic investors to supply its internal market.
631
  It is clear that EAC member 
states, while showing interest in economic cooperation, they do not seem to be taking 
measures towards a common transfer pricing regime.  The essence of the matter is 
that transfer pricing laws of the partner states are of wide variety, lacking 
coordination even clarity in some cases. Although arm‘s principle has been enshrined 
in various countries‘ anti- avoidance legislation its application is limited to certain 
transactions only. Furthermore, in EAC, issues of transfer pricing have not largely 
been tested in the court of law.
632
 Arguably, EAC countries would need effective 
transfer pricing regime to contribute towards facilitation of foreign investment in the 
regional. The main concern is to find the best and appropriate approach 
commensurate with the level of economic development of EAC countries. Linked 
with this concern is relatively lack of capacity for EAC countries to invest across 
                                                          
631
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borders in particular, in developed countries
 633
  Yet, EAC countries have been 
involved in massive investment and market liberalization measures in promoting 
foreign investment such that they may be regarded as reaffirmation of their support 
for global approach of transfer pricing standards. Whilst the argument inherited from 
such focus might be valid, the implication arising from implementation of foreign 
investment facilitation arrangements may suggest a different conclusion. EAC tax 
administrators may sometimes find that complying with international accepted 
standards of transfer pricing as often developed at OECD level may put them to the 
disadvantage.
634
  Consequently, it may be difficult for them to object the global 
approach in international transfer pricing regulations, which have enclosed standards 
that have already been accepted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
633
 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014, pp. 37-39.  It is stated that Kenya has crossed to Asia 
countries.  
634
 Ali-Nakyea A. et al.,  International Transfer Pricing in Developing Countries, International 
Transfer Pricing  
Journal, 2013 (Volume 20), No. 6 November/ December 2013 pp 395 to 399  p. 395. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AGRESSIVE TAX PLANNING AND TRANSFER PRICING 
MANIPULATION IN EAST AFRICA  
 
5.1  Introduction 
Traditionally, international transfer pricing law has evolved as tax avoidance 
legislation with respect to intercompany transactions by MNCs. The rationale is to 
allocate taxing rights and avoid double taxation for MNCs operating in more than 
one country.  From developing countries‘ perspective such as EAC, transfer pricing 
laws were developed as means to promote greater inflow of foreign investments.
635
 
Hence, policies and laws are made to reflect such objective.
636
 The tax avoidance 
laws on transfer pricing are mainly based on arm‘s length principle, which OECD 
and UN have agreed upon as international standards for transactions between MNCs. 
This has been reflected in domestic tax laws and multitude of DTAs concluded 
between countries on income and capital. However, underlying policies, approaches 
and interpretations seem to vary from countries to countries and in some instances it 
is unclear.
637
 
 
This chapter invokes theoretical aspect of transfer pricing standards in considering 
the way associated MNCs have been using such standards to manipulate transfer 
                                                          
635
  Para  4 of the UN model 2011, see also, United Nations Trade and Development, the 2002 
Monetary  Consensus Conference on Trade and Development , available at United Nations 2002, 
A/CONF/198/11 .  
636
 See chapter one above. 
637
 Riedel N et al., The Increasing  Importance of Transfer Pricing Regulations: a worldwide 
overview, Oxford  University Centre for Business Taxation  Said Business School, Park End 
Street, Oxford.OX1 1HP p. 6. 
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pricing under the auspices of tax avoidance. Use of transfer pricing standards and 
principles through aggressive tax planning to facilitate manipulation of transfer 
pricing is discussed. It is argued that existing transfer pricing standards provide 
potentials for associated MNCs to manipulate transfer prices. The BEPS Action plan, 
which came to rescue failure of existing transfer pricing standards is reviewed and 
analyzed. The chapter concludes by showing that the existing international efforts 
through BEPS action plan to curb transfer pricing manipulation essentially are not 
departing from arm‘s length principle.  
 
5.2  Relationship between Tax Treaties and International Transfer Pricing 
The increase of MNCs‘ operations in the globe and desire to attract foreign 
investments has brought enormous policy challenges with regard to international 
taxation. Such operations have put countries on how to allocate taxing rights on 
income generated out of MNCs‘ transactions in countries where they operate. 
Difference in tax laws between countries, which were normally exploited by MNCs 
to avoid tax beyond legal requirement, is another challenge. Ordinarily, countries 
have the right to tax income arising within the country.
638
 In this context, foreign 
investment in the host country in which income is attributable to permanent 
establishment initially derived would have the first right in taxing such income.  
 
Consequently, the home country of foreign investor would be left with no taxing or 
residual taxing rights.
639
 Consistent with this there is no contractual obligation 
                                                          
638
 This is according to territorial principle of international law. 
639
 Michael L., The UN Model Tax Convention as Compared with the OECD Model Tax Convention – 
Current points of Differences and Recent Development, Asia – Pacific Tax Bulletin, January 
/February 2009, p.4. 
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between the foreign investor and the host country to enforce taxing rights in the 
investor‘s country in case of tax dispute. If the resident country would use unilateral 
exemption system to prevent double taxation, no tax would be collected on income 
derived from the source country. Likewise, if unilateral credit system is used it 
would only collect tax to the extent if any, that its tax rate exceeds that of the source 
country.
640
 Thus, the DTAs came in to play to capture taxes having foreign elements, 
which countries are unable to capture. Consequently, it necessitated countries to 
change unilateral and domestic laws to adopt double tax agreements (DTAs) to 
capture such tax. The OECD and UN conventions are tax treaties made as models 
upon which countries refer when crafting their transfer pricing laws. Both UN and 
OECD models present an important form of technical assistance upon which existing 
and future bilateral tax treaties commonly known as double tax agreements (DTAs) 
are based.
641
 From developed countries‘ perspective, the conclusion of tax treaties 
between them is seen as an important aspect to trade and investment.
642
 Developed 
countries were also investing in developing countries felt that the then existing tax 
treaties between them were not working well to developing countries as rightly 
pointed out by Fiscal Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development that, 
            ―Existing treaties between industrialized countries sometimes 
require the country of residence to give up revenue. More often, 
however, it is the country of source which gives up revenue. Such 
a pattern may not be equally appropriate in treaties between 
developing and industrialized countries because income flows are 
largely from developing to industrialized countries and the 
                                                          
640
 Ibid. See also Mc Gauran K., note 30, p.11. 
641
 Economic and Social Council resolution 1541 (XLIX). 
642
 OECD., Fiscal Incentives for Private Investment in Developing Countries: Report of the OECD 
Fiscal Committee, Paris, 1965, para 163. 
 
 
163 
revenue sacrifice would be one-sided. But there are many 
provisions in existing tax conventions that have a valid place in 
conventions between capital-exporting and developing countries 
too.”643 
 
Developed countries also were of view that tax treaties could benefit developing 
countries in a way they do to developed countries.
644
  It is in this context that UN 
Economic and Social Council set an ad hoc group of experts and tax administrators 
to formulate tax treaty guidelines
645
 between developed and developing countries. 
The result was that the UN model as model convention for developing countries 
came in to play. From developing countries‘ conclusion of DTAs, it is seen as means 
to attract foreign investments and to avoid double taxation.
646
  
 
Generally, DTAs are enabled by substantive laws of a particular country.
647
 By 
signing DTAs, states invariably give up some taxing rights, the extent of which is 
subject to lengthy and complex treaty negotiations with another state whereby 
mutual investment takes place.
648
 Contracting countries expect equal rights on 
apportionment of tax that arises from international transactions.  This is possible if 
both countries have more or less the same level of investment. 
                                                          
643
  Ibid, para 163 and 164. 
644
 Ibid, para 163. On its opinion Fiscal Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development stated that ―the traditional tax conventions have not commended themselves to 
developing countries‖. Therefore there was a need to help developing countries to develop tax 
treaty guideline. see para 164.  
645
 Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, Resolution 1273 (XLIII) adopted on 4 August 
1967. From Africa, Ghana, Tunisia and Sudan were members to the ad hoc group. These efforts 
were influenced by developed countries. 
646
 see for example DTA between Denmark and Tanzania for avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital, 1976 which came in to 
force 1
st
 January, 1977, see also Agreement between Canada and United Republic of Tanzania for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and Capital, 1996 which came in to force 29th August 1997. 
647
 See for example section 41 of ITA Cap 470 RE 2014. 
648
 Mc Gauran,  note 30p.12  
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Accordingly, the invariably given up taxing rights may be offset by reduction in 
administrative burden in investment and hence, accrue revenue for both countries.
649
  
The situation is different when DTA is signed by two countries with different 
investment levels, particularly between developed and developing countries.  The 
developing countries most likely are mere capital importers and therefore, trading off 
taxing rights might not be the same. This is because home countries where 
investments are sourced retain taxing rights on profits earned by their corporations in 
host countries through resident principle.  Since countries have given up some taxing 
rights, it is not easy for developing countries like EAC to offset such taxing rights.  
 
The situation becomes worse when developing countries signed DTA with tax haven 
countries
650
 whereby there is possibility for MNCs to use for treaty shopping 
purposes.
651
 The fact that arm‘s length is enshrined in model tax conventions in 
which countries have adopted in their respective countries, DTAs and domestic laws 
provide a direct link with transfer pricing. Accordingly, other standards that link with 
determination of arm‘s length price are also enshrined in the convention models. 
Application of such standards provides potential challenges in applying arm‘s length 
principle to curb transfer pricing manipulation.  
 
                                                          
649
 Ibid. 
650
 See DTA between Tanzania and Switzerland, Uganda and Netherlands. 
651
  Treaty shopping is a ―graphic expression used to describe act of resident of a third country taking 
advantage of a fiscal treaty between two contracting states‖ see Union of India and Azadi Bachao 
Andolan  [2003] SC 56ITR  India P. 113;  In EAC for example, Uganda has DTA with Netherlands 
which is regarded as tax haven country, there is possibility of MNCs to set  conduit entities for 
purpose of enjoying favorable terms of the treaty  resulting in profit shifting  through transfer 
pricing. 
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5.3  International Transfer Pricing Standards and its Link to Price 
Manipulation 
Although every DTA has a particular language, several standards are shared between 
majorities of double tax instruments. Standards that are commonly found in DTAs 
include allocation of taxing rights between contracting countries, defining  persons 
who are  entitled benefits of treaty, tax avoidance and relevant tax principles between 
contracting countries, exchange of information, mutual agreement, non-
discrimination and  anti-treaty shopping provisions.
652
 Although such standards are 
not expressly addressing transfer prices, they provide basis upon which both tax 
authorities and MNCs consider when dealing with transfer prices. Accordingly, they 
are the same standards and laws that may be used by MNCs under the umbrella of 
tax avoidance to manipulate transfer prices. The following part examines principles 
and standards as they link and implicate international transfer pricing 
manipulation.
653
 
 
5.3.1  Application of Arm’s Length Principle 
The EAC countries have included arm‘s length principle in their DTAs and domestic 
laws.
654
  The principle is premised in comparability of transactions between 
associated and independent parties based on their economic or financial relations. 
The principle requires transactions between associated MNCs to be delineated first 
and then compared to an independent transaction. This is achieved by using 
functional analysis through relevant economic factors. Methods to arrive at arm‘s 
                                                          
652
 See OECD and UN models. For more details see chapter 3. 
653
 This particular part is discussed in context of EAC. 
654
 See article 9 of DTA between Tanzania and Canada, Kenya and UK, Uganda and Netherland, EAC 
double tax agreement.  
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length are employed in making such comparison.
655
 Where it is established that a 
delineated transaction is more or less the same with transaction of independent 
parties, then transfer price between associated parties is said to be arm‘s length price. 
The fact that arm‘s length principle is based on comparability; arguably, in absence 
of comparables it may render application of arm‘s length inapplicable. In due regard, 
associated MNCs may take advantage of the situation. For example, it is common 
knowledge that in developing countries like EAC countries, most investors import 
technology on their area of investment. It is likely that such technology may miss 
comparables.  
Apart from comparables, there is no requirement for hierarchal application of 
methods to arrive at arm‘s length price and the taxpayer is at liberty to choose any 
method that deems fit for its transaction. The problem is that the taxpayer may 
choose a method that may favour its interest even if other methods could be highly 
appropriate for such transaction.
656
 Accordingly, the interplay between arm‘s length 
principle and other standards that provide bases for transfer pricing provide 
potentials for transfer pricing manipulation. 
 
5.3.2  Allocation of Taxing Rights  
The DTAs that EAC countries have concluded specify standards for allocation of 
taxing rights for MNCs‘ income operating in contracting countries.657 The standards 
require that source country to tax active income only if they are attributable to 
                                                          
655
 For more details on methods to arrive at arm‘s length price see discussion on chapter 2. 
656
 In practice however, CUP is regarded as a traditional methods and associated parties ought to use 
that method first before embarking to other methods. 
657
 Cooper J. et al., Transfer Pricing and Developing Economies: A handbook for Policy Makers and 
Practitioners, Directions in Development. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-
46480969-9. License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO, 2016, p.35.  
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permanent establishment.
658
 This means that a permanent establishment cannot pay 
corporate tax in the host country.  The right to tax passive incomes such as 
dividends, interest and royalties is completely removed from source country unless 
there is permanent establishment with a specified rate that the source country can 
impose tax.
659
 Such standards also set limits upon which a source country can tax 
passive income. For example, both DTAs between Canada and Tanzania and UK and 
Kenya require source country to tax passive income amount, which does not exceed 
15 percent of gross amount of such income.
660
  The requirement that business profit 
in context of transfer pricing be taxed on resident basis and limited right to tax 
passive income by source country entails that MNCs are entitled more taxing rights 
than source country. This implies that EAC as source countries are denied their right 
share of tax, which could be obtained from MNCs‘ transactions.  Arguably, this is 
the effect of OECD based DTAs because such standards were set to reflect 
developed countries, in particular, OECD members‘ interests in reducing source 
based taxation of capital exporting enterprises.
661
   
 
In context of transfer pricing, allocation of taxing rights is done by using arm‘s 
length principle. Such principle requires business profit of associated enterprises to 
be taxed separately at a market price as if they are independent parties.
662
 Such 
allocation is made by adjusting business profits believed not to be taxed under arm‘s 
                                                          
658
 Article 7(1) of DTA between Canada and Tanzania; see also Article 8(1) of the DTA between UK 
and Kenya. 
659
  Ibid, Articles 10 (1), 11(1) and 12(1), see also, Articles 11 (1), 12 (1) and 13 (1) of DTA between 
UK and Kenya. 
660
 Ibid, Article 10 (2) (a), 11 (2) and 12 (2), see also Article 11 (1) (b), 12 (2) and 13(2) of DTA 
between UK and Kenya. 
661
  McGauran, K., note 30 p.14. 
662
 Article 9 of DTA between of Canada and Tanzania and Article 10 of DTA between UK and 
Kenya. For more details on arm‘s length principle see chapter 3. 
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length principle.  Thus, a source country will potentially be expected to align its 
transfer pricing law in a manner that is in line with DTAs. To import such principle 
may mean to protect profits of MNCs. The right to tax passive income on resident 
basis as enshrined in EAC countries‘ DTAs gives room for MNCs to manipulate 
transfer prices that may arise out of passive income such as interest. For example, for 
MNCs to establish and manage their activities, they require equity or debt capital.  
 
When a new subsidiary company is established, the parent company may finance 
working capital in short-term until it starts making profit. Such capital may be 
equity, which increases the credit base of the company or loan and shows in the debt 
column of the company‘s account such that it will have to be paid with interest.663 In 
context of transfer pricing, when determining arm‘s length interest, the rate of 
interest on loan, capital amount of the loan, the currency and the credit worthiness of 
the borrower must be considered.
664
 When a company is having higher level of debt 
capital than equity, it is said to be thin capitalized.  
 
The result is that profits from the new subsidiary may be repatriated to repay debt at 
an interest rate higher than arm‘s length price. Consequently, the EAC countries may 
lose their share of tax because such an income may be shifted from one entity to 
another in form of interest payable on loan amount.
665
  
 
                                                          
663
  Cobham, A., et al, note 37. p. 5. 
664
 Ibid, 
665
  Although substantive laws of countries provide for thin capitalization ratios, the interpretation of 
treaty prevails over countries law and therefore there is little host country could do. 
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The DTAs also require that any other income not dealt with in other articles of such 
DTA be taxed only by resident country.
666
 Basically, the principle extends more 
taxing rights to resident than source country. Arguably, such principle would work 
well if both contracting countries have more or less some level of economic 
development with reciprocal investments. In this context, both contracting countries 
stand to benefit from such income that may arise and not deal with other provisions 
of the particular DTA.
667
 To the contrary, EAC countries are having low level of 
economic development and therefore, they have no capacity to invest in developed 
countries that they signed DTAs. It means that EAC countries stand to lose more tax 
than developed countries. Implementation of such principle would mean that 
associated MNCs, in context of transfer pricing, may allow permanent establishment 
to take advantage to generate incomes not covered by particular DTA such that they 
would be taxed on resident basis only. It implies that tax rights as allocated in DTAs 
potentially play a role of shifting taxing rights from source country to resident 
country of an investor or to tax haven countries.
668
  
 
5.3.3  Qualification for DTA Benefits  
Normally, DTAs provide persons entitled to benefit from such agreements with a 
view of ensuring that taxing rights are allocated accordingly. EAC countries‘ DTAs 
have concluded and adopted meaning of legal persons for purpose of enjoying treaty 
benefits. DTAs grant benefits to residents of both contracting countries who are 
                                                          
666
  Article 22(1) of DTA between Canada and Tanzania; see also Article 24 of DTA between UK and 
Kenya. 
667
 This requirement may work well within EAC because the level of economic and investment is 
more or less equal.  
668
 Busse M., et al The relationship between double taxation treaties and foreign direct 
investment.2010, p.5 available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/210417692 assessed30th  
June 2015. 
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liable for tax therein by reason of domicile, residence, place of effective 
management, place of incorporation or any other criterion of similar nature.
669
 
Accordingly, domestic laws have also adopted the same meaning.
670
 In context of 
such definition, a corporation is a resident of that state if it is incorporated or where 
the place of effective management is situated.
671
 Furthermore, the definition of 
residence includes any other ―criterion of similar nature‖ in determining residence of 
a corporation for treaty benefits and allocation of tax rights. This definition is open-
ended because it has potential to cover other legal entities, depending on MNCs‘ 
activities. The broad definition of residence is influenced by the character of MNCs‘ 
operations operating across countries. It is argued that qualification of corporation as 
a residence by way of ‗effective management‘ and any other ‗criterion of similar 
nature‘ may create room for taking a variety of legal entities that evolve in response 
to creativity of MNCs‘ activities in profit maximization. It may include special 
purpose entities
672
 or companies, which have no physical activities in a particular 
                                                          
669
 Article 4 of the DTA between Tanzania and Canada. 
670
 Section 66 4 (a) and (b) ITA RE 2008.  
671
 See article 3 (a) and (b) of DTA between Tanzania and Canada. For meaning of effective 
management See discussion chapter 3. 
672
 The OECD definition of SPEs is as follows: ―Multinational enterprises (MNEs) often diversify 
their investments geographically through various organizational structures. These may include 
certain types of Special Purpose Entities. Examples are financing subsidiaries, conduits, holding 
companies, shell companies, shelf companies and brass-plate companies. Although there is no 
universal definition of SPEs, they do share a number of features. They are all legal entities that have 
little or no employment, or operations, or physical presence in the jurisdiction in which they are 
created by their parent enterprises which are typically located in other jurisdictions (economies). 
They are often used as devices to raise capital or to hold assets and liabilities and usually do not 
undertake significant production. An enterprise is usually considered as an SPE if it meets the 
following criteria: (i) The enterprise is a legal entity, a. Formally registered with a national 
authority; and b. subject to fiscal and other legal obligations of the economy in which it is resident. 
(ii) The enterprise is ultimately controlled by a non-resident parent, directly or indirectly. (iii) The 
enterprise has no or few employees, little or no production in the host economy and little or no 
physical presence. (iv)Almost all the assets and liabilities of the enterprise represent investments in 
or from other countries. (v) The core business of the enterprise consists of group financing or 
holding activities, that is – viewed from the perspective of the compiler in a given country – the 
channeling of funds from non-residents to other non-residents. However, in its daily activities, 
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country, but may qualify for benefits under DTAs.
673
Accordingly, such DTAs do not 
provide any test to qualify a corporation or any other legal entity to treaty benefits. 
For example, requirement that the corporation must itself carry on business in a 
whole or part in the country of residence or the corporation must not be merely an 
investment holding company not carrying business at all.
674
 The implication of this is 
that it not only broadens the scope within which resident corporations may be created 
but also it widens obligation of the source (host) country in dealing with transfer 
pricing issues between associated MNCs.  
 
The importance of such criterion is that the EAC becomes vulnerable to transfer 
pricing issues in the following scenarios: Firstly, there is potential for the host 
country to lose right share of tax because more taxing rights are on residence basis of 
MNCs. Accordingly, EAC countries have no reciprocal investments with developed 
countries that they signed DTA and hence, they do not have corporation, which can 
be taxed on residence basis to benefit them. Secondly, MNCs have capacity to 
establish special purpose entities that may be used to shift profit obtained from 
transfer pricing manipulation. Accordingly, MNCs have large networks of DTAs that 
they may use treaty shopping
675
 advantage and make difficult for host country to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
managing and directing plays only a minor role.‖ See the 4th Edition of the OECD Benchmark 
Definition of Foreign Direct Investment. 
673
 Although interpretation of DTA require adherence of Vienna Convention that in case of conflict, 
provisions of treaty need to be interpreted in good faith, and that provision of treaty prevails in case 
of conflict. Conduit entities may fall within DTA because of any other criterion notion embodied in 
DTAs. This is so because in interpreting provision of treaty, definition of particular treaty prevails 
over other methods of interpretation. Again, notion of ‗good faith‘ as enshrined in DTAs is vague 
and not measurable. See Vogel, K., note 262. 
674
 Ward D.A., Access to Tax Treaty Benefits, Advisory Panel on Canada, Research Report prepared 
for Advisory Panel on Canada‘s System of International Taxation, 2008, p. 4. 
675
 Treaty shopping is a ―graphic expression used to describe act of resident of a third country taking 
advantage of a fiscal treaty between two contracting states‖ see Union of India and Azadi Bachao 
Andolan (2003) SC 56ITR  INDIA P. 113. 
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implement anti-treaty measures. Thirdly, in case of transfer pricing dispute, it may be 
difficult for EAC to conduct audit and obtain comparables for functional analysis 
purposes. Generally, the broad definition of residence of a corporation provides 
potential for manipulation of transfer prices between associated MNCs. Such 
potentials are exacerbated by the fact that EAC tax authorities have low 
administrative capacity to handle transfer pricing issues.
676
  Hence, MNCs stand to 
benefit more on residence principle than the source country. 
 
5.3.4  Exchange of Information and Administrative Cooperation  
Exchange of information is another principal enshrined in EAC countries‘ DTAs.677 
The essence of this principle is that tax revenue of contracting countries should be 
able to obtain information on financial and economic activities of their residents, 
either corporations or individuals operating across countries for purpose of enforcing 
tax compliance. This principle offers foundation for assistance, cooperation and 
coordination in resolving enforceability of international tax problems between 
contracting countries. However, exchange of information for tax purposes is not 
automatic and it can only be obtained upon request. Yet, the country, which 
information is requested from is not treated to be under obligation to do so.
678
 From 
EAC countries‘ perspective, tax transparency prays an important role because 
manipulation of transfer prices by MNCs is an obstacle in obtaining their right share 
of tax. Thus, use of this principle could be useful for EAC countries. The gist of the 
matter is that arm‘s length principle requires analysis of various data used by a 
                                                          
676
  Absence of  transfer pricing cases in some of EAC countries may be taken as evidence.  
677
 Article 30 of DTA between Canada and Tanzania.  
678
 Article 30 of DTA between Tanzania and Canada. 
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taxpayer to establish whether or not the principle was followed. To the contrary, 
inclusion of exchange information does not ensure detection of manipulation of 
prices. A mere request of information cannot detect such offences. From legal point 
of view, strong evidence needs to exist so as to request information from another 
country. This is because the DTAs do not make exchange of information between 
contracting countries as mandatory and such situation poses serious difficulties for 
effective information exchange. Since manipulation of prices is within parameters of 
tax planning associated with lack of transparency, it means that even initial 
suspicions are hard to prove in absence of reliable information.
679
  
 
5.3.5  Elimination of Double Taxation 
Another important feature of DTAs, which EAC countries have concluded thus far 
enshrines requirement for elimination of double taxation.
680
  It was the original role 
of double tax treaties.
681
  The methods are credit and exemptions. Significance of 
these provisions is that an investor is entitled to be relieved from paying tax on 
income, which he has paid in a home country. Arguably, this would require 
reciprocity of investment from both contracting countries. Since EAC countries are 
unlikely to have investment in developed countries, they stand not to benefit from 
such relief. However, most double tax relief has been solved partly through domestic 
legislation provided through credit and exemption.
682
 As the resident country is given 
                                                          
679
 McGauran, K .  note 30 p.19. 
680
 Article 24 of the DTA between Canada and Tanzania, see also article 26 of DTA UK and Kenya. 
681
League of Nations, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion: Report and Resolutions Submitted by the 
Technical Experts to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, League of Nations 
document no. F.212, Geneva: League of Nations, February 7, 1925. 
682
Article 24 of EAC DTA. See also McIntyre M.J., legal Structure of Tax Treaties, 2003 revised 
edition 2010 p.2 available atwww.iatj.net/.../LegalStructureofTaxTreaties.-M.McI,  Accessed 
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more taxing right, it is also obliged to avoid double taxation. The credit method 
entails the resident remaining liable in the country of residence on his or her 
worldwide income. Any lowering of tax rates in the source state is calculated against 
the resident state‘s tax rate, leading to one tax rate for the investor. In context of 
transfer pricing, however, significant problems of double taxation still exist. It 
happens when revenue authorities make adjustment in arriving at arm‘s length price 
on the income, which might be already paid tax in another country. Accordingly, 
given the complexities involved in arriving at arm‘s length price, there is a danger of 
MNCs not to pay tax on either country. 
 
Thus, it is submitted that arm‘s length and other transfer pricing standards as 
enshrined in EAC countries‘ DTAs and in tax convention models are vulnerable to 
transfer pricing manipulation between associated MNCs. Yet, EAC countries are still 
embracing such standards. The embracement may be inferred due to fear from 
discouraging investments, which have been seen as important means to develop their 
economies.
683
 Recall, such standards as enshrined in EAC countries‘ DTAs are based 
on OECD model.
684
 Accordingly, investors from OECD countries prefer OECD 
model to be applicable because it favours residence principle. Given lack of 
reciprocal investment from EAC countries, there is no equal bargaining power when 
negotiating with such countries.
685
 The effect of OECD model lock in provides 
potentials for EAC countries to incorporate international norms of transfer pricing, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1.May 2015, stating that, ―tax treaty to day seems reaffirming the operation of the credit or 
exemption system that most countries have unilaterally adopted to prevent double tax‖. 
683
 See discussion chapter 4. 
684
 See article 9 of DTA between Tanzania and Canada, Kenya and UK, Uganda and Netherland, EAC 
double tax agreement.  
685
 In this context EAC countries are likely to face pressure from their investors‘ home countries to 
embrace OECD transfer pricing standards. 
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which, to a great extent, remains unenforceable.
686
 This is evidenced by either few or 
absence of transfer pricing cases in EAC. For example, to date there is no transfer 
pricing case that has been decided in Tanzania, but only in Kenya few cases 
including one land mark case of Unilever.
687
  Thus, policy makers and legislators fall 
in dilemma of interaction of competing considerations of the need for raising tax 
revenue and the need for attracting foreign investments. The UN model, which is 
made for developing countries provides for, to a lager extent, but not exclusive right 
for countries to tax on source basis. As indicated before, one purpose of the UN 
model is to help developing countries in their tax treaty negotiations with developed 
countries.
688
 However, more that 80 percent of its provisions are adopted from 
OECD model, save for few provisions, which are either new or are highly brood. For 
example, the definition of permanent establishment under the UN model is broader 
than the OECD model.
689
 The UN model also provides limited force of attraction 
rule that aims to deter manipulation of permanent establishment attribution rules. 
Likewise, the UN definition of royalties is broader than the OECD model.
690
  
 
Although the UN model is made for developing countries, it failed to solve the 
existing dilemma. The failure of UN model to solve such dilemma is caused by the 
following reasons: Firstly, evolution and changes of UN Model have always been 
                                                          
686
 ―Many developing countries have included in their tax legislation some of the measures requested 
by the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition, e.g. transfer-pricing regulations based on 
OECD guideline‖ See also, OECD note 22. 
687
 An interview with TRA officials in Tanzania and KRA Kenya. 
688
 Resolution 1273 (XLIII) of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. 
689
 See art. 5 of UN model, on 12 months period. 
690
 Article 12(3) of UN model. 
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towards increasingly similarity with the OECD model.
691
 Consequently, the OECD 
model has capacity to induce or destroy other models like the UN model. Secondly, 
there is lack of global international tax instrument, which is above all other 
convention models capable to regulate both developed and developing countries. 
Thirdly, EAC countries may be lacking political power and influence on treaty 
negotiation(s) with developed countries. 
5.4  International Tax Planning and its Linkage to Transfer Pricing 
Manipulation 
Apart from tax treaties in playing a significant role in transfer pricing manipulation, 
activities of tax advisers under auspices of tax planning significantly contribute to 
manipulation of transfer prices by MNCs.  It is common knowledge that before 
starting business, normally, MNCs seek advice from tax advisers on how best they 
can position their investments to minimize tax payment in a certain country.
692
 The 
main preoccupation is to see that MNCs minimize tax liability in their world wide 
incomes. This is sought to be achieved by evaluating tax implications of various 
investments and their strategies.
693
 Such responsibility is attained through contracts 
between MNCs and tax advisers in regard to tax arrangements of their businesses 
across countries. Since tax arrangements are done within auspices of tax avoidance, 
they have a direct impact on transfer pricing manipulations. This part focuses on how 
                                                          
691
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tax avoidance provisions are used by associated MNCs to manipulate prices by 
avoiding tax beyond legal requirements. This may be useful for EAC legislators in 
developing appropriate responses to transfer pricing manipulation problem. 
 
It is common knowledge that every person, whether an individual or legal person, 
has duty to pay tax on taxable income according to laws of the particular country. 
The taxpayer ought to interpret provisions of tax legislation with the view of 
complying with law requirements. Unlike other laws, tax legislation are notoriously 
susceptible to different interpretations.  Consequently, doubt may arise about the 
exact tax results from a transaction as well as freedom of contract that enables a 
choice in the legal form of a transaction or an entity.
694
 To create certainty in such 
situation, the law allows tax payers to take advantage of the law if such law does not 
create liability to pay tax or to arrange its affairs to pay less tax, which is commonly 
known as tax avoidance.  Generally, tax avoidance is lawful and allowed for three 
related reasons: Firstly, tax payers are entitled to follow onerous interpretation of 
ambiguous tax legislation. Secondly, taxpayers may exercise freedom of contract and 
commerce to opt for legally permissible arrangement(s) of affairs and can take in 
account options, which are cost-effective including the least onerous tax burden. 
Thirdly, government designs tax laws that offer a lower tax burden to taxpayers in 
defined circumstances.
695
  It is within this ambit that tax planning comes in to play to 
allow taxpayer exercise freedom of contract and commerce in arranging tax affairs 
with a view of minimizing tax burden. In essence, tax avoidance places an obligation 
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to taxpayers to plan their tax affairs while taking incentive of the law without 
infringing the spirit of the law and legislators‘ intention. 
 
Tax planning ―is a process of taking into consideration all relevant factors in light of 
the material non-tax matters for the purpose of determining whether or not and if so, 
when, how and with whom to enter into and conduct transactions, operations 
including relationships with the object of keeping the tax burden falling on taxable 
events and persons as low as possible while attaining the desired business plus other 
objectives.‖696  Tax planning is lawful and is allowed under the law of different 
countries under tax avoidance rules.
697
 Both tax avoidance and tax planning are 
arrangements, which aim at lawful reduction of tax liability of the tax payer. 
However, the former entails securing loopholes in tax laws and minimize its tax 
liability within parameters of the law,
698
 while the latter not only secures loopholes 
but also ensures compliance with tax obligation to avoid penal provisions.
699
 
However, ―tax planning may reach a point beyond which it cannot be tolerated 
within a legal system intended to conform to principles of justice‖,700 commonly 
known as aggressive tax planning or aggressive tax avoidance.
701
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Generally, there is no clear demarcation between aggressive tax planning and tax 
avoidance. However, MNCs usually use schemes that fall between tax evasion and 
tax avoidance and take advantage of variation of laws between countries.
702
 
Sometimes the distinction between aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance can be 
made by courts.
703
  It is submitted that tax avoidance is the one that results in 
benefits that are intended by the legislatures. To the contrary, aggressive tax planning 
is one that results in benefits that are not intended by the law and infringes the spirit 
of the law together with purpose of the legislator.
704
 However, it can be argued that 
the difference between lawful avoidance and aggressive tax planning can be inferred 
from the taxpayers‘ intentions. If there is malice aforethought, it may amount to 
unlawful avoidance. If there is no intention then, it amounts to lawful avoidance. The 
link between aggressive tax planning and MNCs is that the former arranges 
associated MNCs‘ affairs such that profits are earned where they are taxed at the 
lowest possible rates and expenses are incurred where their deductions yield the 
greatest tax relief.
705
 
  
                                                          
702
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703
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5.4.1  Transfer Pricing Manipulation Schemes 
As stated before, aggressive international tax planning is done by tax advisers. The 
obligation of such advisers is to ensure that MNCs exploit difference in gaps in the 
relevant countries‘ tax laws as well as create opportunity to reduce, defer or 
eliminate MNCs‘ overall tax liability. The implication is that tax advisers always 
look out for new schemes and new ways to exploit weaknesses of the law. They 
promote tax avoidance schemes to their clients that are sometimes not legally 
available. The said advisers may advise MNCs in complex strategies and contrived 
structures that may not reflect the substance of their business and instead, they would 
be designed to avoid tax.
706
 Such avoidance schemes are often informal 
arrangements created to obtain tax benefits of the client by reducing their tax 
liability, while they contravene intention of legislators that give benefits to tax 
advisers.
707
 The interplay between associated MNCs, tax haven, tax arbitrage, 
qualified and experienced lawyers and accountants and less aggressive transfer 
pricing laws is a key to obtaining such objective. However, not all tax planning 
amounts to transfer pricing manipulation. One of the objectives of aggressive tax 
planning is minimization of taxation in a foreign operating or source country to high 
tax jurisdiction either by shifting gross profit via trading structures or reducing net 
profit by maximizing deductions at the taxpayer level.
708
 Aggressive tax planning 
provides for a direct link with international transfer pricing in that tax avoidance 
schemes, which do not reflect substance of associated MNCs‘ businesses involve 
                                                          
706
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transactions between associated MNCs uses transfer pricing. To achieve this 
objective, various avoidance schemes are used by associated MNCs to manipulate 
transfer prices. The schemes depend on the transaction used. The common 
transaction involves tangible goods, intangibles, services and intra-group 
financing.
709
  
 
5.4.1.1 Under or over- Pricing of Prices and Invoices 
This scheme involves over- or under- pricing of prices or invoice of goods 
transferred between associated companies with a view of shifting profit. For 
example, in 2012, it was discovered that Resolute Goldmine Tanzania Limited was 
selling gold at US$530 per ounce to an associated company outside Tanzania. At that 
time, market price of the gold was US$1,200 per ounce.
710
 The tax lost from such 
scheme was substantial amount of royalties for the use of the mine. Over-invoicing 
entails that invoices for goods transferred between associated parties do not reflect 
the actual amount of transferred goods. For example, in 2011, it was established that 
India reported to import 120,000 tons of cashew nuts from Tanzania. However, an 
export company from Tanzania reported to have exported 80,000 tons.
711
  Through 
such scheme, export tax and corporate tax for 40,000 tons that were not charged were 
lost. Such over-invoicing was also noted on fuel transactions imported in Tanzania, 
which had import duty exception for mining in companies.
712
 Notably, such miss 
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invoicing was from tax haven countries, namely, Switzerland and Singapore. 
Tanzania, for example, lost more than 19.69 Pound Sterling between 2005 and 2007 
as a result of bilateral trade mispricing with the EU and USA.
713
 A study by Global 
Financial integrity reveals that African countries such as Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya, 
Uganda and Mozambique collectively lost US$ 14.39 billion between 2002 and 
2011.
714
 
 
5.4.1.2 Thin Capitalization  
This scheme entails use of interest rate obtained from intra-financing between 
associated MNCs. Generally, interest on debt is deductable by the debtor for tax 
purposes but dividend on shares is not.  This distinction creates strong preference for 
MNCs to use debt financing so as to reduce tax in source countries where their 
subsidiaries carry on business, while dividends received by resident company from 
subsidiaries are often exempted from resident country‘s tax.715 The manipulation can 
be done by using three ways: first, MNCs from tax haven may finance a related 
company in a high tax country. The amount of interest deductable in the high tax 
country is overpriced and repatriated to pay loan in a low tax country. In that way, 
MNCs benefit further.  Second, there is potential for overpricing of interest due to 
exchange rate risks claimed in strong currency. Third, the company may thin its 
capital by having a large amount of debt to equity ratio.  For example, in 2007, Geita 
                                                          
713
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Gold Mine had 125,970:1 of debt to equity ratio. Consequently, Tanzania lost 
US$830 from 2001 to 2007.
716
 
5.4.1.3 Use of Intellectual Property Rights 
This scheme involves the right to use intellectual property rights such as trade mark, 
technological knowhow and marketing intangibles. From practical point of view, 
most MNCs operating in EAC hold intellectual property rights, which are licensed 
associated companies for annual royalty payment. For example, Tanzania Breweries 
Company limited (TBL) is a subsidiary of SABMiller, the largest breweries 
company, which uses intellectual rights of parent company SABmiller Plc. However, 
the trademark owned by the parent company for African brands are registered in the 
Netherland where there no or minimal royalty taxes are paid.
717
 For TBL to use trade 
mark, it must pay the parent company. The TBL may treat royalty charges as 
expenses that qualify for tax relief in Tanzania while the income in the hand of the 
parent company attracts no or low tax rate in the Netherlands.  
 
5.4.1.4 Use of Special Conduit Entities  
The scheme entails establishment of entities, which may be incorporated in tax haven 
countries where corporate tax rates are very low, for example, Mauritius corporate 
tax rate is 15 percent.
718
In this context, MNCs may take advantage by registering 
their corporations in countries where corporate tax is low. For example, MultiChoice 
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Tanzania is a permanent establishment of MultiChoice Africa which is wholly-
owned by Naspers Group registered in Mauritius. MNCs may take advantage on the 
way various tax avoidance rules interact and develop a scheme that may reduce their 
tax liability. This may be achieved by developing special transfer pricing 
programmes to suit certain MNCs transactions either by increasing or reducing the 
transfer prices for such particular circumstances.  In World Com, a USA giant 
telecommunication company increased its profit by adopting intangible creating asset 
transfer pricing programme called the asset ‗management foresight‘ and registered in 
low tax country, which, in turn, licensed to other associates for annual royalty 
payment.
719
 
 
5.4.1.5 Use of Management Fee  
This scheme entails use of management fee and other costs to avoid tax. In this 
context, MNCs may register management in a country where management fee is low 
compared to where operations of the company are taking place. For example, 
SABmiller Plc registered Bevman service Management Company in Switzerland 
where the tax in Management Company is charged at a lower rate than elsewhere. 
Assuming that the company is responsible in managing its subsidiary in Tanzania, 
for that reason, the TBL has to pay Bevman fee for the services received. Arguably, 
MNCs potentially have opportunities to escape tax with respect to international 
investment rather than domestic investment.
720
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Accordingly, MNCs with more extensive international operations have lower 
worldwide effective tax rates.
721
 Aggressive tax planning reduces the present value 
of tax payments and generally, it increases after tax rate of return to investors‘ 
corporation.
722
 Such planning affects effective tax rate of MNCs in two ways: First, 
it creates temporary or permanent book tax differences between a corporation‘s 
pretax income and taxable incomes. In order to obtain an effective tax rate, pretax 
income is divided to taxable income.  In this context, the effective tax rate is reduced 
because of various deductions on taxable income while pre-tax remains the same.
723
 
Because of aggressive tax planning by MNCs, it is estimated that US$365 shifted 
from developing to developed countries due to transfer pricing manipulations.
724
  As 
already noted, aggressive tax planning by MNCs is done by tax advisers. In running 
their activities, normally, tax advisers have their code of conduct in which they refer 
while doing their businesses. Such codes of conduct does little more than shroud the 
way tax advisers exploit flaws in international tax law avoidance schemes for their 
clients.
725
 Tax advisers are also responsible for preparation of MNCs‘ group transfer 
pricing policy. Group transfer pricing policy records transfer pricing practices that 
yield arm‘s length results in specific circumstances. Accordingly, such policy may 
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also provide room for transfer pricing manipulation by not crafting their policy 
according to arm‘s length principle as required by the law.726  
 
The problem with tax advisers is that they are also government advisers and receive 
government contracts. Accordingly, normally, governments seek assistance in 
auditing their accounts.
727
 The effect of this is that it may be difficult to challenge 
and discipline their activities.  On top of that, some countries like Tanzania do not 
have regulatory authorities for regulating Accounting firms.  Scholars argue that big 
tax advisers have established international structures and they are present in OECD 
meetings. They may become potential in frustrating development of accounting 
standards that can expose corporate tax avoidance schemes.
728
 Accordingly, the big 
firms control formulation of audit standards at international federation of 
standards.
729
 Generally, it can be argued aggressive tax planning has given MNCs 
power to exploit opportunities for avoiding tax through transfer pricing on profits 
arising from MNCs activities.  
 
Arguably, existing international transfer pricing standards potentially provide room 
for MNCs to manipulate transfer prices. The interplay between aggressive tax 
planning and complexities surrounding arriving at arm‘s length price exacerbate the 
problem.  Manipulation of prices has caused enormous profit shifts from countries 
where economic activities of MNCs take place and consequently, they affect tax base 
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of host countries. Arm‘s length principle, which is a corner stone in regulating 
transfer prices between associated MNCs, ought to provide a concrete solution to 
existing problem. However, such principle is not providing a complete solution. The 
problem has irked both developed and developing countries. It is in this context that 
the OECD and G20 countries came up with another plan to complement the existing 
arm‘s length principle and other transfer pricing standards that seem to fail. As a 
result, the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan (BEPS Action Plan) was 
established. The next part examines   BEPS Action Plan in curbing transfer pricing 
manipulation by MNCs. 
 
5.5  Transfer Pricing in Context of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action 
Plan 2013  
5.5.1  Background to BEPS Action Plan 
The incentive provided by international transfer pricing standards to MNCs and the 
role played by aggressive tax planning using both international treaties and domestic 
tax laws, significantly have brought challenges in curbing manipulation of transfer 
prices. Accordingly, the existing arm‘s length principle, which seems not effective 
enough to catch all spheres of transfer pricing manipulations, has caused serious 
profit shifting and base erosion in host countries.
730
 The problem has irked both 
developing and developed countries. However, concerns on tax base erosion between 
developed and developing countries are different. In developed countries, there is a 
symmetric level of investments and therefore, the impact of base erosion may be 
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more or less the same. Accordingly, the tax revenue authorities of such countries are 
more sophisticated to counter aggressive planning. To the contrary, developing 
countries such as EAC, for a long time, have been capital importers and thus, the 
impact of base erosion goes one way only. The BEPS was adopted by OECD and 
G20 countries in response to the growing volume of base erosion and profit shifting 
by MNCs. The BEPS Action Plan came as a measure to ensure that profit by MNCs 
are taxed where economic activities generating that profit are performed or where the 
value of intangible is created. The objective of BEPS action plan is, 
―To complement existing standards that are designed to 
prevent double taxation with instruments that prevent 
double non-taxation in areas previously not covered by 
international standards and that address cases of no or 
low taxation associated with practices that artificially 
segregate taxable income from the activities that 
generate it.”731 
 
The motive for aggressive tax planning has been caused by both domestic law and 
tax treaties, which provide room to be manipulated by taxpayers. Consequently, such 
planning has changed the way MNCs have been carrying on their businesses. In due 
regard, MNCs have been keen to follow aggressive tax planning to keep pace with 
the theory of their establishment.
732
 The situation has been exacerbated by 
globalization, development of technology as well as communication and raise of 
digital economy, which affected the physical elements‘ presence of PE for tax 
purposes.
733
 The digital economy, in particular, has caused a large amount of money 
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to be extracted without paying any tax in either country they operate.
734
 Hence, 
various host countries‘ tax bases have been eroded through transfer pricing enabled 
by digital economy. Although various countries have anti-avoidance tax rules, 
unfortunately, the existing anti avoidance rules, in particular, arm‘s length principle 
seems not sufficient enough to curb base erosion and profit shifting to keep pace with 
changes caused by aggressive tax planning.
735
 To address those challenges, the 
OECD and G20 countries adopted BEPS Action Plan as a viable solution.
736
 These 
efforts are reaffirmation by both OECD and G20 countries that existing arm‘s length 
principle on which the current rules are based present significant problems in curbing 
transfer pricing manipulation.  
 
5.5.2  An Overview of BEPS Action Plan 
The BEPS Action Plan contains 15 Actions that need to be implemented as follows: 
Action 1, addresses tax challenges of the digital economy, Action 2 deals with 
neutralization of effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements. Action 3 requires 
strengthen CFC rules and Action 4 requires limitation of base erosion via interest 
deductions and other financial payments. Action 5 requires counter harmful tax 
practices more effectively by taking into account transparency and substance. Action 
6, requires prevention of treaty abuse; Action 7 requires prevention of artificial 
avoidance of PE status and Action 8, 9 as well as 10 require assurance of transfer 
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pricing outcomes in line with value creation in relation to intangibles, risks and 
capital including other high-risk transactions.  Action 11 requires establishment of 
methodologies to collect and analyze data on BEPS address it. Action 12 requires 
taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements. Action 13 requires 
re-examination of transfer pricing documentation. Action 14 requires countries to 
make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective and Action 15 requires 
development of a multilateral instrument.
737
 
 
The BEPS Action Plan holistically touches associated MNCs‘ operations, in one way 
or another, and where issues transfer pricing may feature indirectly. However, the 
most direct provisions in context of transfer pricing are Actions 8, 9, 10, and 13. For 
purpose of this work, Actions 4, 6, and 7 were considered.
738
 Implementation of 
BEPS Action Plan measures is not uniform such that some require an immediate 
action, for example, revise guidance on transfer pricing. Other measures require 
changes to bilateral tax treaties and other measures require domestic law 
implementation.
739
 In transfer pricing context, implementation requires countries to 
comply with existing transfer pricing standards as administered by OECD and UN 
models. It is important to note that the BEPS Action Plan is a soft law and therefore, 
it is not binding to non-members like EAC.  
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5.5.3  Guideline in Applying arm’s Length Principle in the Context of BEPS 
Action Plan 
The desire to align transfer pricing outcomes with value creation to counter 
manipulation of transfer prices manipulation has necessitated the need to improve 
application of arm‘s length principle. The fact that arm‘s length principle is a corner 
stone for setting transfer pricing between associated MNCs, the principle is 
strengthened to ensure that outcomes of transfer pricing are in line with value 
creation. To keep pace with rules, measures and principles as enshrined in BEPS 
Action Plan, specific guideline were developed by OECD in applying arm‘s length 
pricing in context of BEPS. The guideline covers eight areas and is examined in 
detail because they are corner stone of any transfer pricing analysis for both revenue 
authorities and associated MNCs. It worth noting that arm‘s length guideline in 
BEPS context is replacing Chapter I Section D of the OECD guideline for transfer 
pricing 2010.
740
   
 
5.5.3.1 Identifying Commercial or Financial Relations 
As stated before, comparability analysis is the corner stone for arm‘s length principle 
to apply. To run comparability analysis, the guide requires two important aspects to 
be taken in to account. First, identification of commercial or financial relations and 
conditions including economically relevant circumstances attached to those relations 
so as to delineate transaction of associated MNCs. Second, an undertaking to 
compare conditions and economically relevant circumstances of accurately 
                                                          
740
 OECD/ G20 Base Erosion and profit Shifting Project, Final Report, 2015 p.15. It should be noted 
that at the time when this work was written the document was not on published and therefore 
reference is made to OECD/G20 G20 Base Erosion and profit Shifting Project, Final Report, 2015. 
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delineated transactions of associated MNCs with conditions together with 
economically relevant circumstances of comparable transactions between 
independent corporations.
741
 Identification of commercial or financial relations and 
conditions together with economically relevant circumstances requires the following 
be done: First, to understand broadly, the industry or sector in which the MNE group 
operates
742
 and factors affecting business performance.
743
 The understanding may be 
derived from particulars of group of MNCs under analysis, which normally contains 
information on factors affecting their performance.
744
  For revenue authority, such 
information may be found in the master file submitted to them in accordance with 
requirement of Action 13.
745
 Second, identification of operations of each MNC 
within that group followed by analyses of activities of each MNC and then 
identification of their commercial or financial relations between associates as 
expressed in their transactions.
746
 This is done so as to delineate actual transactions 
between associates.  
 
In delineating accurate transaction, the guide requires economically relevant 
circumstances in which transactions taking place should be considered.
747
 They 
include the following: first, contractual terms of the transaction. Second, functions 
performed by each of the parties to the transaction, taking into account assets used 
and risks assumed, including how those functions relate to the wider generation of 
                                                          
741
 Ibid, para 1.33. 
742
 The business may be mining, pharmaceutical, luxury goods, manufacturing industry, 
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743
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value by the MNC group to which the parties belong, the circumstance surrounding 
the transactions and industry practices; third, characteristics of property transferred 
or services provided; fourth, economic circumstances of parties and the market in 
which the parties operate; and fifth, business strategies pursued by the parties.
748
  
 
5.5.3.2 The Contractual Terms of the Transaction 
These are terms of contract concluded between associates of group of MNC. They 
provide terms upon which goods and services between them are transferred. Such 
terms may include responsibilities of each division, obligations and rights, 
assumption of identified risks, and pricing arrangements. Such information is useful 
because it provides for starting point of delineating transaction between them and 
their intention at the time of concluding their contract.
749
 Where the terms of contract 
do not provide sufficient information for transfer pricing analysis, the guide requires 
that resort should be made to actual conduct of the associates of the particular 
MNC.
750
 In terms of the guide, the actual conduct of the parties should be established 
by analyzing other categories of economic relevance of commercial or financial 
relations.
751
 However, it is unclear about methods to be employed in analyzing 
conduct of the parties by using other relevant economic patterns. 
 
When it is established that characteristics of the transaction that are economically 
relevant are inconsistent with the written contract between the associates, the 
transaction reflected in the actual conduct of the parties should prevail in delineating 
                                                          
748
 Ibid p. 16 para 1.36. 
749
 Ibid,p.18, para 1.42. 
750
 Ibid, para 1.43. 
751
 For details of other economic relevance category see note 772 above. 
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the actual transaction of associates.
752
 Where there are material differences between 
contractual terms and the conduct of the associated MNCs in their relations, 
functions they actually performed, the assets actually used and risks actually 
assumed in the context of the contractual terms should be used to determine the 
factual substance as well as accurately delineate the actual transaction.
753
 Where 
there has been a change in terms of a transaction, the guide requires examination of 
circumstances surrounding the change. That should be done in order to establish 
whether or not original transaction has been replaced through a new transaction with 
effect from the date of change or whether or not the change reflects into intentions of 
parties in the original transaction.
754
  
 
5.5.3.3 Function Analysis 
In determining arm‘s length price functional analysis is important in establishing 
economically significant activities including responsibilities, asset used and risk 
assumed by parties to the transaction. Accordingly, risk analysis is corner stone of 
functional analysis for arm‘s length price purposes. Therefore, functional analysis is 
useful in delineating transaction between associates for the purpose of comparing 
with transaction of an independent corporation. The analysis focuses on aspects 
parties actually do and capability they provide in generating value of a group as a 
whole together with the contribution of each associate.
755
 The capability of each 
associate is important in identifying economically relevant commercial or financial 
relations and as such, capability affects options that are realistically available. 
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Accordingly, such capability is used in comparing a similar situation in arm‘s length 
arrangements.
756
   
 
In analyzing risk assumed in commercial or financial relations, the guide provides 
the following six steps that need to be followed: Step one involves identification of 
economic risks with specificity.
757
 This entails definition and categories of transfer 
pricing. The guide defines risk in a transfer pricing context as an effect of uncertainty 
on the objectives of the business.
758
 Transfer pricing risks are categorized according 
to source, which gives rise to such risks. They include strategic risks or marketplace 
risks, infrastructure or operational risks, financial risks, transactional risks and 
hazard risks.
759
 
 
Step two entails determination on how specific, economically significant risks are 
contractually assumed by the associated enterprises under terms of the transaction. 
Contractual assumption of risk embodies risk clearly identified in the contract 
between associated parties and the party assuming such risk. It provides clear 
evidence of a commitment to assume risk prior to materialization of risk outcomes. 
Such evidence forms an important part for revenue authorities‘ transfer pricing 
analysis of risk analysis in commercial and financial relations, which may occur 
years after conclusion of such contract.
760
 However, not every contractual exchange 
of potentially higher but riskier income for lower but less risky income between 
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associated enterprises is automatically arm‘s length.761 Accordingly, the pricing 
adopted in the contractual arrangements alone does not determine which party 
assumes risk.
762
 
 
Step three entails function analysis in relation to identification of associate(s), which 
control,
763
 manage
764
 and perform risk mitigation function and have financial 
capacity to assume the risk, and the associate encountered outcomes of such risks.
765
 
Step four entails interpreting information obtained in steps 2 and 3 as well as 
determine whether or not contractual assumption of risk is consistent with the 
conduct of the associated enterprises and other facts of the case by analyzing whether 
the associated parties follow the contractual terms; and whether the party assuming 
risk, as analyzed exercises control over the risk and has the financial capacity
766
 to 
assume the risk.
767
 This is sought to be achieved by analyzing whether or not the 
associate follows contractual terms and whether or not the associate actually has 
financial capacity to manage as well as control the risk.
768
 Where or not it is 
established that conduct of both parties is consistent with contractual obligations, the 
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analysis is said to be complete.
769
 Where it is established that the conduct of the 
associated parties is inconsistent with contractual terms in relation to risks, which are 
economically significant, such terms may be used by third party for pricing purposes 
between them. The assumption of risk should be determined according to the actual 
conduct of the associates.
770
 Where the associate party assuming risk is not 
controlling the risk, further risk analysis should be taken by using step five.
771
  In 
establishing whether or not the party assuming risk controls that risk, the guide 
requires the identified risk between associated MNCs be compared with risk of 
independent parties‘ transaction as a control test.772 
 
Step five entails allocation of risk between associates to MNCs. Under this step, 
where analyses one to four establish that the party assuming risk is not controlling 
that risk, then the risk should be allocated to the associate, which actually controls 
and manages the risk.
773
 Where more than one associate controls the risk and have 
finance capacity to assume the risk, the risk should be allocated to associates who 
have the most control of risk.
774
 In circumstances where no associate parties are 
identified as controls and have capacity to assume the risk, rigorous analysis of the 
facts and circumstances of the independent parties‘ case will be performed for the 
purpose of identifying reasons for such situation. Based on that assessment, the 
revenue authorities will determine what adjustments to the transaction needed for the 
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transaction to result in an arm‘s length price.775 Step six entails pricing of the 
transaction by taking into account consequences of risk allocation. This step, 
essentially, entails the relationship between performed functions and corresponding 
allocation of returns of the associates in an MNC.  The guide sets a general rule that 
an assumed risk should be compensated with an appropriate anticipated return, and 
risk mitigation should be appropriately remunerated.
776
 Thus, a taxpayer who 
assumes and mitigates a risk will be entitled to greater anticipated remuneration than 
the taxpayer that only assumes a risk or only mitigates, but does not do both.
777
 The 
guidance provides that associates, which have financial capacity to assume risk but 
do not perform any relevant economic activities and do not exercise control over the 
financial risk will not be allocated any excess profits as well as will not be entitled to 
any more than a risk-free return.
778
 
The guidance sets another general rule that, ―a functional analysis is incomplete 
unless the material risks assumed by each party have been identified and considered 
since the actual assumption of risks would influence the prices and other conditions 
of transactions between the associated enterprises.‖779 Thus, the associate party 
assuming the risk for transfer pricing purposes needs to control risk and has financial 
capacity to assume the risk. However, for enterprises to have control over risk, an 
enterprise is not required to perform the risk mitigation activities itself, but it is 
required to be actively involved in the decision process when outsourcing these 
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activities.
780
 Nevertheless, the guidance does not provide any guideline on how 
taxpayers and revenue authorities will allocate risks in practical stances. Such 
situation may render application of arm‘s length principle difficult to implement. 
5.5.3.4 Characteristics of Property or Services 
The guidance requires characteristics of property and services to be considered in 
delineating controlled transaction for comparison purposes. 
             ―In the case of transfers of tangible property, the physical features 
of the property, its quality and reliability, and the availability and 
volume of supply; in the case of the provision of services, the 
nature and extent of the services; and in the case of intangible 
property, the form of transaction (e.g. licensing or sale), the type 
of property (e.g. patent, trademark, or know-how), the duration 
and degree of protection, and the anticipated benefits from the use 
of the property.”781  
 
However, characteristics of service and property may be given more or less weight, 
depending on the method used to arrive at arm‘s length. Expressly, more weight is 
given to CUP method than other methods.
782
   This factor is subjective because it 
depends on the method applied in transfer pricing analysis. Accordingly, lack of an 
hierarchal requirement in applying arm‘s length methods contradicts with this 
guidance.
783
 This situation may provide room to MNCs to select a method that would 
not necessarily consider characteristics of the property or services. Furthermore, the 
guide clearly acknowledges that practically, comparability for methods based on 
gross or net profit indicators often put more emphasis on functional similarities than 
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on product similarities.
784
 Arguably, the guide acknowledges difficulties involved in 
comparing characteristics of property and services and thus, there is a danger of 
setting rules, which are not implementable. 
 
5.5.3.5 Economic Circumstances 
Economic circumstances are compared for purpose of determining whether or not 
differences in economic circumstances have a material effect on price and whether 
reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate effects of such differences. 
In terms of the guide, relevant economic circumstances for transfer pricing purposes 
include, but they are not limited to, the following, 
“Geographical location, the size of the market, the extent of 
competition in the markets and the relative competitive positions of 
the buyers and sellers, the availability of substitute goods and 
services, the levels of supply and demand in the market as a whole 
and in particular regions, if relevant, consumer purchasing power, 
the nature and extent of government regulation of the market, costs 
of production, including the costs of land, labour, and capital, 
transport costs, the level of the market (e.g. retail or wholesale), 
and the date and time of transactions.”785  
 
Where economic circumstances between associated MNCs and independent 
corporations are more or less the same, such situations are comparable.
786
 Where 
economic circumstances are found to be significantly different, the guide is silent on 
recourse to be taken by the MNCs or revenue authorities. Such situation may provide 
advantage to MNCs to manipulate prices because they are not bound to make 
comparison in absence of comparability situation. 
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5.5.3.6 Business Strategies 
Business strategies are also considered when determining comparability of controlled 
and uncontrolled transactions. Business strategies in context of transfer pricing 
include, but they are not limited to, innovation and new product development, degree 
of diversification, risk aversion, assessment of political changes and input of existing 
and planned labour laws together with duration of arrangements
787
 and market 
penetration schemes.
788
 Generally, a taxpayer is required to follow business strategy 
that distinguishes it from potential comparables. To establish whether  taxpayer 
actually followed business strategy, the conduct of the parties and the cost of 
business strategy should be taken in to account. The taxpayer is deemed to follow 
business strategy if he produces a return sufficient to justify its costs within a period 
of time that would be acceptable in an arm‘s length arrangement.789 This is possible 
only if the taxpayer is in a position to foresee such expectations.
790
 However, if such 
an expected outcome was not foreseeable at the time of the transaction or if the 
business strategy is unsuccessful but nonetheless is continued beyond what an 
independent corporation would accept, the arm‘s length nature of the business 
strategy may be doubtful and may warrant a transfer pricing adjustment. Certainty of 
the law is very important for its implementation. Arguably, examination of economic 
strategies for transfer pricing purposes is based on possibilities and expectation. 
From practical point of view, it may be difficult for revenue authorities to establish 
whether a taxpayer was in a position to foresee results of such strategy because a 
foreseeable element is not measurable. Accordingly, the guide is silent under 
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circumstances the taxpayer was in a position to see what was coming. Such 
uncertainties may provide chances to associated MNCs to manipulate prices.   
 
5.5.4 Recognition of the Accurately Delineated Transaction  
Delineated transaction between associated parties for transfer pricing purposes is 
recognized once substance of the commercial or financial relations has been 
identified by analyzing economically relevant factors. The actual transaction as 
delineated is used to determine transfer price under the arm‘s length principle.791  
The general rule is that where the same transaction can be seen between independent 
parties in comparable circumstances, such transaction should be recognized for 
transfer pricing purposes.
792
 However, there is an exception to this rule. The 
accurately delineated transaction can be disregarded for transfer pricing purposes if 
such transaction viewed in its entirety lacks commercial rationality of arrangements 
between unrelated parties in comparable circumstances. The guide does not clearly 
set out under what circumstances can accurately delineate transaction can be 
disregarded but this is inferred from examples provided in the guide.
793
   
 
5.5.5  Losses 
The guide also requires losses to be examined for transfer pricing purposes if the 
associate of MNC continuously makes losses while continuing to carry on with 
business.
794
 The assumption is that an associate cannot continue to make business if 
it always makes losses. Therefore, there is a way in which associate MNCs benefit 
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from that business. Hence, only justifiable losses may not be taken in to account for 
transfer pricing analysis purposes. Thus, both taxpayer and revenue authorities have 
to analyze justifiable losses that may not be taken in to account for transfer pricing 
purposes.
795
 In terms of guide, the losses are justifiable if they are recurring for a 
reasonable period and they are made for specific objectives of the business 
strategy.
796
Accordingly, same types of losses that an independent corporation would 
have incurred under the arm‘s length principle. The losses are not justified if in 
context of business strategy they continue beyond a reasonable period, particularly 
where comparable data over several years show that the losses have been incurred 
for a period longer than that affecting comparable independent corporation. 
However, the guide does not provide   guideline on period deemed to be reasonable. 
Again, the term reasonable as used is vague and not measurable such that it provides 
uncertainty of the law. 
5.5.6  Effect of Government Policies 
The effect of government policies must be taken into account in evaluating transfer 
price between associate MNCs as a condition affecting market in a particular 
country. Sometimes the government makes intervention in the market for policy 
reasons and actually affects transactions.
797
 The affected transaction of associate 
MNCs should be compared with transaction of independent parties affected by the 
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same intervention.
798
  In determining arm‘s length price, the revenue authorities are 
required to adjust arm‘s length price to account for government intervention. Where 
the government intervention applies only to transactions between associated MNCs, 
the guide clearly states that, 
―There is no simple solution to the problem. Perhaps one way to 
deal with the issue is to apply the arm‟s length principle viewing 
the intervention as a condition affecting the terms of the 
transaction. Treaties may specifically address the approaches 
available to the treaty partners where such circumstances exist.‖799 
 
In essence, the guide acknowledges difficulties involved in applying arm‘s length 
principle. Use of words like ‗perhaps‘ suggests probability and failure to provide 
concrete solution(s) to application of arm‘s length principle. In addition, the guide is 
silent on a situation where there is no DTA between countries. It means that the 
guide provides incomplete solutions in applying arm‘s length principle. Although 
both taxpayer and revenue authorities are likely to be affected, the revenue authority 
stands to lose more than the taxpayer.  
 
5.5.7  Use of Customs Valuations 
The guide recognizes that arm‘s length principle is used by customs administration 
as comparison of value of imported goods between related seller and buyer. Just like 
in transfer pricing, special relations that exist between related seller and buyer may 
affect the value of imported goods for customs evaluation purposes.  Thus, customs 
evaluation may be used by revenue authorities in evaluating the arm‘s length 
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character of a controlled transaction transfer price and vice versa.
800
  This is possible 
because customs officials may have contemporaneous information regarding the 
transaction that could be relevant for transfer pricing purposes, especially if prepared 
by the taxpayer, while tax authorities may have transfer pricing documentation, 
which provide detailed information on circumstances of the transaction.
801
 However, 
it requires cooperation between income tax and customs administration in evaluating 
transfer prices within the country.  
 
5.5.8  Location Savings and Other Local Market Features 
Location savings refer to a situation whereby associated MNCs relocate some of 
their activities to a place where costs are lower than in location where activities were 
initially performed. The location savings and other local market features may affect 
comparability including arm‘s length prices. With regard to location savings for 
transfer pricing purposes, it is necessary to determine whether location servings 
shared between associated MNCs.
802
 Where the functional analysis shows that 
location savings exist that are not passed on to customers or suppliers, and where 
comparable in the local market are present, such comparables will be sufficient to 
provide basis upon net location savings should be allocated among associated 
MNCs.
803
 In absence of comparables, allocation should base on analysis of function 
performed, risks assumed and assets used of the relevant associated MNC. With 
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regard to other local market features,
804
 it is necessary to examine data on 
comparable uncontrolled transactions in that geographic market to establish whether 
or not a comparability adjustment is required.  Where the examined data show that 
comparable local market features are present then the need for making specific 
adjustments for local market features would not arise.
805
 In absence of reasonable 
local market comparables, determination of appropriate comparability specific 
adjustments for features of the local market should be based on underlying facts and 
circumstances.
806
  
 
The guide requires that in conducting a transfer pricing analysis, intangibles such as 
contractual rights, government licenses or know-how necessary to exploit that 
market should be distinguished from tangible local market features.
807
 The 
contractual rights and government licenses may limit access of competitors to a 
particular market and may affect the manner in which economic consequences of 
local market features are shared between parties to a particular transaction. In these 
circumstances, it is necessary to determine each affiliated party‘s contribution to 
                                                          
804
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obtain the license to determine allocation of profit attributable to the license of 
intangible. In assessing the impact of the government license, contribution by the 
local member of local market intangibles and other group members of intangibles 
such as skills, experience, and knowledge should be considered.
808
 
 
5.5.9  Assembled Workforce  
Workforce 
809
 is another factor also affects transfer pricing and is taken into account 
in a transfer pricing comparability analysis. The guide indicates the need to 
determine benefits or detriments of the unique assembled workforce with that of 
independent parties. However, the guide is silent on modalities on how the 
determination can be done. The guide states that, 
―where it is possible to determine the benefits or detriments of a 
unique assembled workforce vis-à-vis the workforce of enterprises 
engaging in potentially comparable transactions, comparability 
adjustments may be made to reflect the impact of the assembled 
workforce on arm‟s length prices for goods or services.”810 
 
In absence of such possibilities, the associated may take advantage of the situation 
and affect the arm‘s length price. Where an assembled workforce is transferred from 
one associate to another as part of the transaction, time and cost savings should be 
reflected in the arm‘s length price charged for the transferred assets.811 If the transfer 
of a workforce or a secondee results in the transfer of valuable know-how, then the 
transfer of that valuable know-how should be valued in accordance with rules on 
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intangibles and an appropriate price should be paid for the right to use the 
intangibles.
812
 
 
5.5.10 MNC Group Synergies 
Associated MNCs may benefit from interactions or synergies amongst group 
members that would not generally be available to similarly situate independent 
enterprises. Such synergies may stem from economies of scale, combined or 
integrated computer and communication systems, integrated management, and 
elimination of duplicative expenses.
813
 Such synergies may be unfavorable if they 
impose bureaucratic impediments that smaller, nimbler enterprises do not face or as a 
result of additional burdens and requirements placed on units because they are part of 
a large organization. Consequently, that smaller unit of associated parties receives 
incidental benefits.
814
 Under such circumstances, no compensation should be paid for 
incidental benefits received by an MNC group member solely because it is a member 
of the larger MNC group.
815
 Where synergistic benefits and burdens of group 
membership may arise because of deliberate concert the nature of the advantage or 
disadvantage, the amount of the benefit or detriment and the manner the benefit or 
detriment should be allocated among group members must be determined through 
functional and comparability analysis.
816
 If important group synergies exist and can 
be attributed to deliberate concerted group actions, the benefits of such synergies 
should generally be shared by group members in proportion to their contribution to 
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creation of the synergy.
817
 In this context, arguably, revenue authorities must depend 
on information from the taxpayer and in absence of such information, the said 
processes cannot be implemented. 
 
The review and analysis of guidance to apply arm‘s length principle in context of 
BEPS Action Plan reveal that to arrive at arm‘s length price, it requires long and 
complex procedure to follow. That may require sufficient well equipped human 
resources and other resources to manage such analysis. However, the guidance does 
not provide conclusive solution in certain areas, which seem to materially affect 
transfer price between associated MNCs. The principle is subjective because it 
depends on nature of transaction and available comparables. In some instances, it 
does not provide practical solution(s) to relevant issues. In other circumstances, the 
application depends on reasonableness and foresee-ability of certain issues, patterns, 
which bring uncertainty of the law. Such uncertainty is undesired in law. Therefore, 
the principle is uncertain and cannot assure countries‘ right share of taxes arising 
from associated MNCs. In addition, the guidance admits difficulties involved in 
arriving at arm‘s length principle.   Although such guidance could be seen as 
providing room for EAC countries to shape their policies and law in a manner that 
would take into account international standards and principles, the way they are 
formulated including complications involved in arriving at arm‘s length price, in 
practice, it tends to restrict realization of objective of curbing transfer pricing 
manipulation. 
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5.6  BEPS Action Plan Measures in Curbing Transfer Pricing Manipulation 
The BEPS Action Plan sets a timeframe upon, which measures in form of rules or 
principles will be developed and used by countries in tackling base erosion as well as 
profit shifting problems.
818
 Thus, OECD and G20 came up with package of measures 
believed to represent the first substantial renovation of the international tax rules in 
almost a century.
819
 Such measures are expected to render ineffective aggressive tax 
planning as discussed below. Action four 
820
 requires countries to design rules to 
prevent base erosion through use of interest expense. In context of transfer pricing, 
use of interest techniques is normally practiced by associated MNCs through intra-
group financing.  In due regard, the OECD developed a fixed ratio rule as a measure 
to prevent such concern. The rule requires associated MNCs to deduct net interest 
expense economically equivalent to interest to a percentage of its earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA ratio).
821
 Given different 
situations of countries in tackling BEPS, the OECD sets a range of 10 percent to 30 
percent to ensure that countries apply a fixed ratio that would be low enough to 
tackle BEPS.
822
 However, currently, the EBITDA is not dealing with banking and 
insurance sectors because of their specific features and they require specific rules to 
deal with. 
 
                                                          
818
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Action Plan six requires countries to develop rules to prevent arrangements through 
which a party who is not a resident of one of the two contracting countries of a tax 
treaty to obtain benefits that the treaty grants to residents of the countries.
823
 These 
arrangements are often implemented by establishing conduit companies for purpose 
of shifting profit from host countries.  In due regard, the three measures have been 
taken by OECD as follows: first, countries are required to include, in their tax treaty, 
a clear statement that countries to a tax treaty intend to avoid creating opportunities 
for non-taxation through avoidance by using treaty shopping arrangements. Second, 
there has to be inclusion of limitation on benefits rule (LOB) in DTA as specific anti-
avoidance rule.  
 
The LOB entails to limit treaty benefits to entities that have sufficient link with its 
country of residents. Third, there has to be inclusion of principle purpose of test rule 
(PPT) in DTA as a general ant-avoidance rule based on principal purposes of 
transaction or arrangements.
824
Where it is established that one of the principal 
purpose of arrangements or transactions is to obtain treaty benefits, such benefits 
would be denied, unless such benefits would be in accordance with the object and 
purpose of provisions of the DTA.
825
 The PPT rule is applicable where such 
transaction or arrangement is not covered by LOB.
826
 Action eight requires countries 
to assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation of 
intangibles.
827
 This Action requires countries to develop rules to prevent BEPS by 
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moving intangibles among group members. It involves:- (i) adopting a broad and 
clearly delineated definition of intangibles; (ii) ensuring that profits associated with 
the transfer as well as use of intangibles are appropriately allocated in accordance 
with (rather than divorced from) value creation; (iii) developing transfer pricing rules 
or special measures for transfers of hard-to-value intangibles; and (iv) updating the 
guidance on cost contribution arrangements.
828
   
Measures taken in regard to definition of intangible, the word is expanded and thus, 
―intangible‖ is intended to address something, which is not a physical asset or a 
financial asset, capable of being owned or controlled for use in commercial activities, 
whose use or transfer would be compensated had it occurred in a transaction between 
independent parties in comparable circumstances.
829
 The guidance clearly 
distinguishes intangible from market conditions or local market circumstances that 
are incapable of being owned or controlled. The guidance also provides definition of 
marketing intangibles as, 
 
―An intangible that relates to marketing activities, aids in the 
commercial exploitation of a product or service, and or has an important 
promotional value for the product concerned. Depending on the context, 
marketing intangibles may include, for example, “trademarks, trade 
names, customer lists, customer relationships, and proprietary market 
and customer data that is used or aids in marketing and selling goods or 
services to customers.”830 
 
 
With regard to allocation of profit by associated MNCs on use or transfer of 
intangibles, the guidance sets a principle that legal ownership alone of intangibles by 
associated MNCs does not necessarily generate a right to returns from exploitation of 
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the intangible.
831
 In determining the arm‘s length condition for transactions that 
involve use or transfer of intangibles and parts dealing with ownership, the guidance 
requires six steps to be followed. First, it encompasses identifying the intangibles 
used or transferred in the transaction with specificity and specific economically 
significant risks associated with the development, enhancement, maintenance, 
protection, and exploitation of the intangibles. Second, identifying full contractual 
arrangements with special emphasis on determining legal ownership of intangibles 
based on terms and conditions of legal arrangements.  
 
Third, identifying parties performing functions, using assets, and assuming risks 
related to developing, enhancing, maintaining, protecting, and exploiting the 
intangibles by means of the functional analysis, and, in particular, which parties 
control any outsourced functions, and control specific, economically significant 
risks. Fourth, confirming consistency between terms of contractual arrangements and 
conduct of the parties. Fifth, delineate actual controlled transactions in light of legal 
ownership, other relevant contractual relations and the conduct of the parties; and 
sixth, where possible, determine arm‘s length prices for transactions consistent with 
each party‘s contributions of functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed.832 
 
In regard to hard-to- value to intangible,
833
 the guideline sets the rule that the tax 
administration can consider ex post outcomes as presumptive evidence about 
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appropriateness of ex ante pricing arrangements, based on reliability of information 
on kind of ex ante pricing that has been based.
834
 The purpose of this guide is to 
ensure that transfer pricing analysis is not weakened by information asymmetry 
between the taxpayer and tax authorities. However, it does not take extra measures to 
compel MNCs to provide information on time, particularly to developing countries. 
This is important because developing countries like EAC are vulnerable to 
manipulation of transfer prices.  Accordingly, this approach is very cumbersome and 
seems not to be realistic for EAC. It is common knowledge that most if not all 
intangibles, in particular, techno know how used by MNCs in developing countries 
are developed by them and it may come to countries where the MNC associates 
operate after a certain couple of years. For a country like Tanzania, it may be 
difficult to obtain such information. Although this approach may seem to be viable to 
solve existing intangible transfer pricing, there is danger for EAC legislators to adopt 
BEPS measures that are not implementable and unrealistic in the economy. Action 
nine deals with risks and capital.  
 
This Action requires countries to develop rules to prevent BEPS by transferring risks 
among, or allocating excessive capital to associated MNCs. The guide focuses more 
on accurately delineating transactions between associated enterprises by examining 
contractual relations against the actual conduct of the parties through a transfer 
pricing comparability analysis. The guide sets a principle that allocation of risk 
should be considered under arm‘s length principle and that legal ownership of 
finance risks alone does not create an entitlement to profits. To assume a risk for 
                                                                                                                                                                    
intangible are highly uncertain, making it difficult to predict the level of ultimate success of the 
intangible at the time of the transfer. See OECD/G20 Report p.110. 
834
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transfer pricing purposes, the associated MNCs need to control the risk and have the 
financial capacity to assume the risk.
835
  The guide defines control over risk as: 
 
"(i) The capability to make decisions to take on, lay off, or decline a 
risk-bearing opportunity, together with the actual performance of 
that decision-making function and (ii) the capability to make 
decisions on whether and how to respond to the risks associated 
with the opportunity, together with the actual performance of that 
decision-making function."
836
 
 
Financial capacity refers to an enterprise's capability to access funding when 
managing risk as well as absorbing consequences of risk in the event of an 
unfavourable outcome.
837
  
Action ten requires countries to develop rules to prevent BEPS by engaging in 
transactions, which would not or would only very rarely occur between third parties. 
This will involve adopting transfer pricing rules or special measures to: (i) clarify 
circumstances in which transactions can be re-characterized; (ii) clarify application 
of transfer pricing methods, in particular profit splits, in the context of global value 
chains; and (iii) provide protection against common types of base eroding payments, 
such as management fees and head office expenses.
838
  With regard to re 
characterizing of transaction, the guide provides a principle to re-categorize 
contractual terms to reflect commercial or financial patterns that actually exist 
between associated MNCs based on their conduct and economically relevant 
characteristics of the transaction including options realistically available to the 
parties.
839
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In comparing situation with independent parties, the guide suggests to look at 
contractual terms and actual legal ownership in light of commercial or financial 
relationship between associated MNCs. Where it is established that the conduct and 
characteristics, which are economically relevant are inconsistent with a written 
contract between associated MNCs, the actual transaction should be delineated for 
transfer pricing purposes in accordance with characteristics of the transaction 
reflected in the conduct of the parties.
840
  Thus, the actual conduct of associated 
MNCs is a key factor in delineating a transaction and aligning transfer pricing 
outcome. 
 
With regard to clarifying application of transfer pricing methods, selection of the 
most appropriate transfer pricing method should be based on a functional analysis 
that provides a clear understanding of the MNC‘s global business processes and the 
manner intangibles interact with other functions, assets, and risks that comprise the 
global business.
841
 In other words, it is especially important to ground comparability 
and functional analysis on an understanding of the MNCs‘ global business by 
identifying all factors that contribute to value creation, which may include borne 
risks, specific market characteristics, location, business strategies and MNE group 
synergies.
842
  On transfer of intangibles, the selected transfer pricing method selected 
take into account all relevant factors materially contributing to creation of value, not 
just intangibles and routine functions.
843
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The revised guidance makes clear that any of the five OECD transfer pricing 
methods as well as ‗alternative methods‘844 might constitute an appropriate transfer 
pricing method for transactions involving transfers of one or more intangibles.
845
  In 
this respect, the OECD explicitly states that a rule of thumb cannot be used as 
evidence that a price or apportionment of income is arm‘s length including an 
apportionment of income between a licensor and a licensee of intangibles.
846
 
Whereas it recognizes use of thumb rule, under limited circumstances, transfer 
pricing methods based on costs may be utilized, particularly where the intangibles 
are not unique and valuable, for example, development of intangibles used for 
internal business operations, such as internal software.
847
 This implies that transfer 
pricing methods most likely to prove useful in matters involving intangibles is CUP 
and transactional profit split method.
848
  In clarifying the split profit method in the 
context of global value chains, the OECD is still working on it. Action thirteen deals 
with re-examination of transfer pricing documentation. The Action requires countries 
to develop rules regarding transfer pricing documentation to enhance transparency 
for tax administration by taking into consideration compliance costs for business.
849
 
The rules developed include a requirement that MNCs should provide all relevant 
governments with needed information on their global allocation of income, economic 
activity and taxes paid among countries according to a common template. Measures 
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taken by the OECD are a three-tiered standardized approach to transfer pricing 
documentation to be followed.  
 
First, MNCs are required to provide to tax authorities with high-level information 
regarding their global business operations and transfer pricing policies in a ‗master 
file‘ to be available to all relevant tax authorities in countries they operate.850 
Second, detailed transactional transfer pricing documentation should be provided in a 
‗local file‘ specific to each country, identifying material related party transactions, 
the amounts involved in those transactions, and the company‘s analysis of the 
transfer pricing determinations they have made with regard to those transactions.
851
 
Third, large MNCs are required to prepare Country-by-Country files containing 
information on pre-paid tax and paid tax in each country they operate. Such report 
should also contain their number of employees, stated capital, retained earnings and 
tangible assets in each tax jurisdiction.
852
 
 
 
In enhancing compliance, the guide requires local files and country-by-country to be 
finalized before due dates for filing tax returns for a relevant fiscal year. However, 
due to some circumstances, the country-by-country submission time may be 
extended up to one year.
853
 Tax authorities are required to maintain confidentiality of 
documents availed to them by MNCs.
854
 Most important innovation in the guide is 
that it provides templates for all three kinds of reports.
855
 However, the guide 
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excludes associated MNCs with less than 750 million EURs to provide country-by-
country reports.
856
  Arguably, the enhanced three tier approach might be beneficial 
for EAC countries but this is subject to improved tax revenue capacity. Accordingly, 
the threshold of 750 million EURs requirement to report country-by-country pattern 
is very high and creates potentials to leave out a significant number of associated 
MNCs to take advantage. 
 
Action seven requires countries to develop changes to the definition of permanent 
establishment to prevent artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status in 
relation to BEPS, including through use of commissionaire arrangements and the 
specific activity exemptions including related profit attribution issues.
857
 The 
measure taken by the OECD is developing a rule that a person is deemed to have PE 
in the contracting state if he is acting on behalf of enterprises and habitually 
concludes contract or plays a principal role leading to a conclusion of contracts in the 
name of the enterprises for transfer of ownership, granting of the right to use or 
provision of service without material modification by the enterprise.
858
 The guide 
also has clarified on activities that are not deemed to be PE. They include 
maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carrying on for the 
enterprise, any other activity, provided that such activity or overall activity is of 
preparatory or auxiliary nature.
859
 Accordingly, it developed anti-fragmentation rule 
to limit associated MNCs to establish and maintain several fixed places of business 
separated locally and organizations to be viewed as places of preparatory nature for 
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purpose of establishing existence of PE for tax purposes.
860
 However, Action 7 does 
not make any changes to existing international standards on allocation of taxing 
rights on international income. From the foregoing, measures and principle under 
BEPS Action Plan in aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation are still 
based on arm‘s length principle.  
 
5.7  An Alternative to Arms’ Length Principle 
Use of arm‘s length principle as the corner stone for regulating transfer pricing 
between associated MNCs has been, to a great extent, of benefits to MNCs more than 
host countries. Both developed and developing countries have been irked by this 
problem and therefore, thought has been brought to completely depart from such 
principle. Scholars have suggested that formulary apportionment methods should be 
applied as alternatives to arm‘s length principle.861 OECD member states also 
advocate for use of formulary apportioned within European Union.
862
  African 
countries also have called upon to adopt formulary apportionment method given 
weakness of arm‘s length and lack of comparables prevailing in Africa.863 The 
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argument in fovour of formulary apportionment method is that the arm‘s length 
principle is unfit for global economy because it is based on artificial distinct legal 
entities; it creates artificial tax incentives; very complex; and it does not ensure 
countries their right share of tax.
864
  Notably, to date, formulary apportioned method 
as an alternative to Arm‘s length principle has not been adopted as an international 
standard. However, the method has been widely used in USA MNCs operating with 
USA and Canada. Formulary apportionment is a method of allocating profit earned 
by associated MNCs to countries, which the company has tax presence.
865
 In this 
method, associated MNCs are considered to as one unit despite being operating in 
different countries. In ascertaining the income for tax purposes, the method requires 
deduction in their worldwide expenses based on global accounting system.  
 
The net income is then distributed among countries in which the MNC has tax 
presence based on agreed factors and formula. Thereafter, each country applies its 
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tax rate to the income apportioned to it and tax accordingly.
866
  The common factors, 
which ought to be taken into account for establishing a formula is proportion of 
sales, assets and payroll.
867
  However, sales-based formula is preferred because it 
takes into account complicated issues like intangible.  The information ought to be 
obtained from MNCs‘ country-by-country report. Advantages of formulary 
apportionment method include the following: first, the method can align countries‘ 
tax systems with global economy. Second, it eliminates tax incentive and possibility 
of shifting income to tax haven countries. Third, it is simple and easy to apply. 
Fourth, it provides potential for increase in revenue or enables a tax rate reduction.
868
  
Critic of formulary apportionment argues that it is vulnerable to double taxation in 
absence of a common formula. Secondly, it may lead to high compliance cost in 
absence of common tax accounting rules. Third, differences in currency exchange 
rates and rules of countries may distort the apportioned income. Fourth, the method 
does not reflect profit or loss of each entity.
869
  
 
From the foregoing, it is submitted that the approach suggested in applying 
formulary apportionment is too simple to deal with and basically it does not take into 
account difference of tax laws of countries. Accordingly, there is no clear guideline 
in applying formulary apportionment, which ought to be regulated by law. 
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Additionally, disadvantages of the method outweigh advantages.  This might be 
reasons formulary apportionment has not been adopted widely by countries as an 
international standard. Consequently, there is no global instrument that regulates the 
same. The fact that formulary apportionment is based on profit split, it is argued that 
profit split method can be used to obtain such objective.
870
  Likewise, other countries 
have also modified their transfer rules to suit their interest while based on arm‘s 
length principle. For example, Brazil modified its transfer pricing by doing away 
with comparability factors by using a fixed margin based on mathematical theory.
871
 
Despite weakness of arms length principle, if other factors remain constant, and 
available arm‘s length principle may remain a viable option for regulating transfer 
pricing across countries. World Bank study has shown that countries have increased 
their income by using transfer pricing law based on arms‘ length principle.872 
 
5.8  Conclusion 
The foregoing examination and analysis suggest that application of international 
transfer pricing standards as enshrined in various tax treaties and conventions are 
susceptible to manipulation of transfer prices by MNCs. The weakness of such 
standards, in particular, arm‘s length principle has given room for MNCs to take 
advantage and practice aggressive tax planning.  The interplay between transfer 
pricing standards and aggressive tax planning has caused enormous base erosion in 
countries where economic activities are taking place. Results are that both developed 
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and developing countries faced base erosion and profit shifting impact. International 
initiatives have been taken to rescue countries from base erosion and profit shifting 
through transfer pricing by supplementing existing standards.  The intention is to 
ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities generating such profits are 
performed and where value is created.  
 
However, the BEPS Action plan to a great extent is not taking in to account issues of 
concern for EAC countries. Notably, measures, rules and principles are still based on 
arm‘s length principle, which previously, seemed to fail in such areas. Furthermore, 
to a great extent, the whole process of arriving at arm‘s length price is still based on 
comparability and analysis of various issues. Although tax authorities have been 
availed with the tool for auditing, the whole procedure is very cumbersome. 
Accordingly, application of arm‘s length solutions provided in the guide sometimes, 
is inconclusive and contains probabilities, which to lead to uncertainty of the law.  A 
plea for use of formulary apportionment has not been well addressed. Countries, 
which have been embracing such method in their application is limited with 
countries because the law applicable to such transaction is the same. Absence of a 
thorough study in handling formulary apportionment as a viable solution to existing 
problem renders decision to opt for it difficult. Notwithstanding, the weakness of 
arm‘s length principle advantage of using it outweigh the disadvantage.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION IN TANZANIA 
6.1  Introduction 
Abolition of socialist ideology in Tanzania and adoption of a free market economy in 
which trade liberalization is enhanced, increased regional trade and economic links 
with other countries throughout the world. The result is an increase in MNCs‘ 
operations in the country whereby transfer pricing is practiced. However, like other 
countries of the world, Tanzania faces the problem in relation to the law regulating 
international transfer pricing in particular. Manipulation of prices by MNCs through 
transfer pricing causes income tax base erosion and profit shifting problems that have 
necessitated changes in tax laws governing transfer pricing in many countries.  
Arm‘s length principle as a corner stone for transfer pricing between MNCs, and 
other principles have been enshrined in various domestic tax legislation and DTAs in 
Tanzania.
873
 However, the application of arm‘s length principle remains largely 
untested or implemented. This chapter analyses an adequacy of transfer pricing 
legislation in curbing transfer pricing manipulation in Tanzania. 
 
6.2  An Overview of Social, Economic and Political Context 
Tanganyika, now Mainland Tanzania, attained its independence on 9
th
 December, 
1961. Economically, it inherited the colonial economy and remained an appendage 
of the metropolitan economy. The actual situation of the economy of Tanzania 
immediate after independence is well explained by Rweyemamu that, 
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“When Mainland Tanzania became independent on 9th December 
1961, it inherited its basic position within the international 
community from the colonial relationship. In economic terms, 
this means that a client „independent‟ state on the periphery of 
western capitalism was created. Political independence did not 
necessarily  mean economic independence namely control over 
economic decision making and the national economy, the 
establishment of a firm industrial structure leading to self 
generating and self sustain grown,…on the contrary the 
institution framework diligently erected by Britain during 
colonial period ensured Tanzania economic dependence on 
international capitalism in general and in Britain in particular… 
Investments, both public and private, were assumed to flow easily 
from Britain.”874 
 
Essentially, the economy of Tanganyika was export economy directly or indirectly 
integrated in the world of capitalist system via export sector.
875
As a consequence, the 
government of Tanganyika continued to depend on foreign source of income for 
development of the country. To solve the problem, the government of Tanzania spelt 
various laws aimed at attracting both local and foreign investors to participate fully 
in industrial development sector in the country.
876
 They included the Tanganyika 
Development Act,
877
 which established National Development Corporation (NDC). 
The function of the NDC encompassed to provide loans to African small scale 
business enterprises, to provide incentive to high risk investment in areas important 
for the country‘s development and to enter into joint ventures with foreign private 
investors.
878
 Foreign Investment Protection Act
879
 was also established. The 
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objective of the Act was to encourage foreign investors by providing statutory 
guarantee on their investments.
880
 To enable implementation of the Act, Foreign 
Investment (Protection) Regulation of 1964 was established.
881
 Consequently, 
dominant sectors were given to private investors as was reflected in the five years 
development plan.
882
 The plan also outlined various incentives for private sector like 
repatriation of capital and profits, provision of industrial estates, tariff protection for 
infant industries and investment allowances.
883
 
 
To supplement general guarantees provided in the legislation, the government also 
concluded bilateral agreements with foreign countries in its efforts to encourage and 
protect foreign investment. They included, for example, agreement between United 
States of America and Tanganyika on investment guarantee,
884
 the Agreement 
between Tanzania and Germany on encouragement and reciprocal protection of 
investment,
885
  and the agreement between Tanzania and Swiss Confederation 
concerning encouragement and reciprocal investment encouragement.
886
 From the 
foregoing, it is submitted that from the beginning of independence, political leaders 
believed that foreign investment and aid were important catalysts for development.
887
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It was clearly pointed out by the then president Nyerere that, ―the government wishes 
to work with private investors for the development of the Tanganyika.‖888 
Notwithstanding, efforts to encourage foreign investors, in 1967, there was dramatic 
change of laws of investment in Tanzania. In the same year, the country adopted 
socialism ideology whereby all major means of economy were placed under public 
ownership and control.
889
 Consequently, the law operated to restrict development of 
private sector while ensuring public sector investment.
890
 However, socialism 
ideology failed due to poor performance and inefficiency of public enterprises, 
among other things.  In 1986, Tanzania embarked on economic recovery programme 
and liberalized its economy. Implementation of economic reform was part of 
conditions for financial aid administered by World Bank and other donor community 
members. That was evidenced by expanded donor support, ranging from public 
infrastructure building to civil services and governance reforms.  For example, there 
was support of $200 million World Bank credit for Songo Songo natural gas field 
development project.
891
 
 
The most remarkable development was pronouncement of Zanzibar Resolution, 
which officially abandoned socialism ideology in Tanzania.
892
  The resolution 
necessitated formation of a new policy and law with a view of attracting foreign 
investments. That was followed by establishment of Investment and Protection Act 
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of 1995, which was repealed and replaced by Tanzania Investment Act.
893
 The Act 
establishes Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) as agency to coordinate, promote, 
encourage and facilitate investments in the country,
894
 among other things. In 
enhancing industrial activities, Tanzania also established Export Processing Zone
895
 
(EPZ) and special economic zone,
896
 which also attracted MNCs.  Results were an 
increase in foreign MNCs in the country whereby transfer pricing is practiced. Such 
MNCs‘ operations are ranging from mining, 897 manufacturing,898 
telecommunications,
899
 and finance undertakings.
900
  Others are shipping,
901
 tourism 
and promotion services. Accordingly, the recent discovery of huge gas reserves 
increased attraction of foreign MNCs in the country.
902
 In due regard, it is clear that 
most MNC investors are subsidiary companies from developed and tax haven 
countries. 
903
 In fact, Tanzania leads EAC region in investment inflow.
904
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The increase of MNCs‘ operations whereby transfer pricing is enhanced has brought 
about enormous challenges in curbing transfer pricing manipulations in the country. 
The problem has been caused by use of tax avoidance schemes by associated 
MNCs.
905
  As a result; profits arising from international transactions have been 
shifted outside the country where parent companies operate or to tax haven countries.  
For example, between 2001 and 2007, Tanzania lost US$830 million because of thin 
capitalization by Geita Gold Mine.
906
 This is from one company only. Between 2001 
and 2010, Tanzania also lost US$ 333 million due to manipulation of prices.
 907
  
 
Furthermore, other reports indicate that Tanzania is losing US$ 150 million each 
year due to trade mispricing.
908
  For example, recall, in 2008, Resolute Tanzania 
Limited was selling gold to sister a company USD 530 per ounce, the amount that 
was less than half of the market price by then.
909
  Such amount of money was 
eventually shifted outside Tanzania.  
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6.3  Transfer Pricing Laws in Tanzania 
The legal and regulatory framework of transfer pricing comprises the following 
major sources: the Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania, Tax legislation as 
well as their rules and tax treaties. 
 
6.3.1  Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania (CURT) 1977 
Any government requires finance to provide for public services and run the 
government. For that reason, governments depend on various taxes collected in their 
countries. Such taxes collected by government are governed by tax law by using 
special procedures. The fact that tax is the backbone of the country taxation becomes 
of quasi-constitution nature.
910
 Thus, the basic principles in exercising taxing powers 
must be clearly established in the constitution of the country.
911
  The Constitution of 
the United Republic of Tanzania (CURT) recognizes tax as the main source of 
finance for government and it provides a principle upon which tax is imposed. The 
provision provides that, ―no tax of any kind shall be imposed save in accordance 
with a law enacted by parliament or pursuant to a procedure lawfully prescribed and 
having the force of law by virtue of a law enacted by Parliament.‖912 If plainly 
construed, the CURT requires no person to be taxed except in accordance with the 
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law.
913
 Therefore, the CURT confers right to taxpayers to arrange their tax affairs 
and pay what is required by the law. Consequently, MNCs as part of large taxpayers 
who substantially contribute to finance of the country are obliged to pay according to 
the requirement of the law. The fact that tax is the main source of finance of the 
country, the Constitution empowers the government only to present bills related to 
financial matters.
914
 The bills include matters related to levy a tax or to alter taxation 
otherwise than by reduction.
915
 Although the CURT does not clearly provide for 
transfer pricing laws, the principle enshrines under the CURT are also applicable to 
taxation of MNCs.  
 
6.3.2  Income Tax Act, 2004  
Transfer pricing legislation regulating transfer pricing was introduced in Tanzania in 
2004. Prior to that, transfer pricing was largely untested and regulated through 
limited scattered provisions contained in anti-avoidance provisions of Income Tax 
Act.
916
 The arms‘ length concept was used as a test to measure situations where 
related parties to a transaction by visual of their relations arrange their affairs and 
pay less amount of tax.  The application of arms‘ length principle by then is well 
stated by Luoga that,  
“It is an underlying assumption of income tax law that profits or 
gains made by a taxpayer are achieved through the interplay of 
market forces which are independent of the taxpayer‟s control.  
This assumption often break down where parties to a transaction 
do not have opposing economic interests, but have, by virtue of 
the particular relationship between them, a common economic 
interest which enables them to arrange the terms of the 
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transaction to produce the least amount of tax.  Persons in such 
circumstances are said not to deal with each other “at arm‘s 
length‖ and transactions between them are referred to as 
―transactions not at arm‘s length.‖917   
 
To this extent, the Commissioner General of Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) 
was empowered to appropriately adjust any amount of transactions liable for tax if it 
was established that there was tax avoidance scheme.
918
 The arm‘s length concept 
was also used to ascertain profit of business carried out between related non-
residents.
919
 However, there was no clear indication whether or not the arm‘s length 
principle was used to comply requirement of DTA which existed by then.
920
 
 
The Income tax Act of 2004 (ITA), which came into force on 1
st
 July 2004 repealed 
and replaced the Income tax Act of 1973.  The main objective of ITA is to provide 
provisions ―for the charge, assessment and collection of income tax for the 
ascertainment of the income to be charged and for matters incidental thereto‖.921  The 
ITA has XI Parts: Part I provides for title, scope of application and interpretation. 
Part II provides for imposition of income tax. Part III income tax base in essence 
comprises calculation of the income base, rules governing calculation and assets and 
liability. Part IV provides for rules applicable to particular type of persons such as 
partnership, trust and cooperation. Party V deals with special industries such as 
insurance business, retirement savings and charitable organizations. Part VI deals 
with international taxation upon which source and resident principles are set, taxation 
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of PE, controlled foreign company and trusts including foreign tax relief. Part VII 
provides for special procedures, which include the taxpayers‘ obligation, withholding 
tax payment procedures, installment payment procedure and income payable on 
assessment. Part VIII deals with non-compliance upon which offences, penalties and 
interest are prescribed, recovery of tax, third party liability and proceedings.  Part IX 
is about remission, refunds and set-off. Part X provides for administration of tax by 
commissioner and other officers, audits together with information collection.  Part XI 
provides for transitional provisions. 
 Part III is of particular interest because it provides for income tax base upon which 
taxes are imposed.
922
 The ITA imposes tax on resident and nonresident on incomes 
from employment, business or investment having source in Tanzania while residents 
are taxed on their worldwide incomes.
923
 For purpose of this work, a corporation is 
resident of Tanzania for tax purposes if it is incorporated or formed under laws of the 
United Republic or at any time during the year of income the management and 
control of the affairs of the corporation are exercised in the United Republic.
924
  Two 
issues can be observed, firstly, the ITA does not provide clear difference between 
‗incorporation‘ or ‗formed.‘ Lack of clarity on these two words may provide 
potentials for MNCs to declare non-residents for tax purposes. In African Barrick 
Gold Plc v Commissioner General TRA,
925
 the appellant claimed that the Tax board 
erred in law and the fact in holding that appellant company is not resident for tax 
purposes because the words ‗incorporation and formed‘ meant the same thing and 
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therefore, activities done by the company did not amount to being resident. The 
Appeal Board stated that the said words are different because the word ‗formed‘ is a 
safe habour aim to accommodate all situations for which a company may be 
established under the law of Tanzania and acquire residence status for tax purposes. 
Secondly, there is no clear guideline under circumstances management and control of 
the affairs are said to be exercised in Tanzania for transfer pricing purposes, the 
situation that may bring difficulties in determination of residence of a 
taxpayer.
926
Apart from residence issue, the law is silent under what circumstances an 
income is said to have source in Tanzania for transfer pricing purposes.
927
 However, 
the law clearly state under which circumstances payments are regarded to have 
source in Tanzania.
928
 Thus, the amount to be charged is profit or gains from 
conducting business or investment for the year of income.
929
  
6.3.2.1 Application of Arms’ Length Principle in Tanzania 
Section 33(1) of Income Tax Act
930
 provides for the arms‘ length principle as basis 
for regulating transfer prices between associated parties. The provision provides that, 
“In any arrangement between persons who are associates, the 
persons shall quantify, apportion and allocate amounts to be included 
or deducted in calculating income between the persons as is 
necessary to reflect the total income or tax payable that would have 
                                                          
926
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arisen for them if the arrangement had been conducted at arm‟s 
length.”931  
 
The ITA is silent on meaning of arm‘s length, however, the TP Rules defines as a  
principle whereby commercial or financial transactions between associates is taking 
place on the same terms as if such transactions had taken place between independent 
persons under comparable conditions and circumstances.
932
 In context of this 
definition, the independent transaction is used as a test upon which transaction 
between associated parties is measured or tested. The policy underlies section 33 is 
to address tax avoidance schemes involving manipulation of prices of goods and 
services under international and domestic transactions between associated parties. 
Thus, the function of arm‘s length principle is to adjust prices of goods and services 
to reflect arm‘s length price that would have been charged had the transaction 
conducted on normal business grounds between unrelated parties. It is in this context 
that ITA gives the Commissioner General (Commissioner) power to adjust prices 
that are not at arm‘s length.933 However, adjustment in this context is only possible 
once the anomaly is noted as a result of transfer pricing audits.    
 
For arm‘s length to apply transactions between associated parties must be arranged 
because of their special relations existing between them. Notably, the transaction 
between associated parties does not necessarily mean that the price charged for such 
transaction is not at arm‘s length. The price must be affected by arrangement 
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between parties because of their relationship. However, neither the ITA nor Transfer 
Pricing Rules explain under what circumstances the transaction between associated 
parties is said to be arranged. In context of tax, arrangement is defined to mean 
action, agreement, arrangement course of conduct, dealing, promise, transaction, 
understanding or undertaking involving more than one person and it includes a part 
of arrangement.
934
 Arguably, the meaning of arrangement as provided does not 
directly correspond to context of transfer pricing because it does not show 
circumstances or elements that actually indicate presence of arrangement that affects 
the actual taxable amount. The words used are mere another meaning of 
arrangement
935
 thereby missing connection to transfer pricing. The notion 
‗arrangement‘ is the corner stone of dispute between associated MNCs and the tax 
authority. While the associated parties are alleged not to arrange their affairs because 
of special relation existing between them, the revenue authorities are required to 
prove such arrangement, which practically becomes difficult like it was in Unilever 
case.
936
 
 
6.3.2.2 Associated Parties  
In context of transfer pricing, there must be transactions between associated parties 
for arms‘ length principle to apply. Generally, the ITA does not provide specific 
definition of associated parties for transfer pricing purposes. However, in context of 
ITA, parties are regarded associated in relation to corporation if are direct or indirect 
controls or benefits fifty percent or more of the rights to income or capital or voting 
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power through one or more corporation.
937
 Arguably, the threshold control of fifty 
percent of the shareholding or voting power in the entity is very high. To this extent, 
it leaves important elements of connected shareholders having considerable 
percentage of rights to income, capital or voting power of the company.  
The problem with this is that associated parties may use such loophole to escape 
from arm‘s length.938 Although the law clearly states that in case the situation of 
associated parties is not covered by the ITA, one may reasonably be expected to act, 
other than as an employee, in accordance with the intentions of the other.
939
 
However, the requirement is subjective and does not give conclusive answers. Given 
intricacies of transfer pricing, it is not easy to measure the extent or reasonableness 
and intention of the parties to a transaction. Accordingly, the law does not provide 
any guideline in establishing the intention of the parties.
940
  
 Permanent establishment and its head office or other related branches are also 
associates for transfer pricing purposes
941
 Likewise, the ITA is silent on meaning of 
branch, but Transfer Pricing Rules describe branch as permanent establishment (PE) 
as defined by Tax treaty if the transfer pricing issue is originating from tax treaty.
942
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If the issue is originating from ITA, then the meaning of PE as defined in the ITA 
will prevail.
943
 In context of ITA, PE means, 
“a place where a person carries on business through an agent, 
other than a independent acting in the ordinary course of business, 
a place where a person has used or installed, or is using or 
installing substantial equipment or substantial machinery; and a 
place where a person is engaged in a construction, assembly or 
installation project for six months or more, including a place where 
a person is conducting supervisory activities in relation to such a 
project.”944  
 
In context of the tax treaty, permanent establishment means a fixed place of business 
through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on and it 
includes, especially a place of management a branch, an office, a factory, a 
workshop, a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of 
natural resources. It also encompasses a building site, a construction, an assembly or 
installation project or supervisory activities in connection therewith, but only where 
such site, project or activities continue for a period of six months or more,  
furnishing of services including consultancy services by an enterprise through 
employees or other personnel engaged by the enterprise for such purpose, but only 
where activities of that nature continue (for the same or connected project) within the 
country for a period or periods aggregating to six or more months within any twelve 
month period.
945
  The tax treaty also clearly provides for activities that cannot 
constitute a permanent establishment. The problem with this definition is that the 
meaning of PE in the treaty is wider than that of ITA. Yet, in applying arm‘s length 
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principle, the law requires transfer pricing regulations to be construed in consistency 
with OECD and UN models and their Guidelines.
946
 In case of inconstancy between 
domestic law and international instruments, the domestic law shall prevail.
947
 This 
requirement is perfect if ITA, as substantive law, is addressing the matter 
extensively. In such situation, if the ITA will prevail, the MNCs stand to benefit 
more because the Act does not sufficiently cover the matter. For example, a mine is 
not clearly stated to constitute permanent establishment under the ITA despite being 
leading in MNCs operations in Tanzania.  Accordingly, the ITA is silent on whether 
or not the existing definition of PE can be applicable on electronic commerce 
between associated parties. 
 
6.3.2.3 Ascertainment of Transfer Pricing Income 
Generally, associated MNCs are taxed on profit from business or investment derived 
from Tanzania. Yet, the law is silence under what circumstances the business is said 
to be conducted in Tanzania for transfer pricing purposes.
948
 However, ITA defines 
business to mean trade concerned in nature of trade, manufacture, professional or 
isolated arrangement with a business character.
949
 It includes past, present and 
prospective businesses. Accordingly, a mining and petroleum operations are treated 
as business activities for purpose of calculating taxable income.
950
 However, absence 
of a clear distinction may render MNCs to take advantage as recipients of business 
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income because of large scope of deductions for expenses in respect of incomes from 
businesses.
951
 In calculating taxable amount, the law requires any expenditure 
incurred by the person wholly and exclusively in production of income from the 
business or investment be deducted.
952
 In addition, in calculating the interest amount, 
the law requires debt obligation incurred by the person wholly and exclusively in 
production of income from business or investment to be deducted.
953
 Arguably, for 
deductions to be effected, they presuppose presence of actual cost spent on a 
particular aspect allowable for deductions. However, it is unclear if a taxpayer fails 
to produce actual cost on such expenditure. That may provide potentials for MNCs to 
claim deductions that are not actually spent as was in Bulyanhulu Gold Mine Ltd v 
Commissioner General TRA.
954
 In this case, the tribunal disallowed deduction for 
expenditure of capital nature because the taxpayer failed to produce evidence. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeal ordered the TRA to re-assess the value of the aircraft on 
basis of market value and deduct expenses according to accounting principles. 
 
Despite huge deductions available, the law clearly prohibits deductions from 
expenditure of capital nature.
955
 Accordingly, no deduction in interest is allowed in 
excess of 7.3 debts to equity ratio.
956
 In calculating taxable amount from mineral 
operations, annual charges and royalties incurred under Mining Act and mining 
development agreement, legally depreciated allowances, acquisition and 
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 Consolidated Civil Appeal No. 89& 90, 2015, p. 18. 
955
  Section 11 (3) of ITA Cap 332 RE 2008 as amended by Finance Act, 2012.  
956
 Ibid, section 12 (2) (a) as amended by section 22 of Finance Act, 2012. 
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rehabilitation expenses are deductable.
957
 This is in addition to other deductions. 
Likewise, in petroleum operations, royalties and annual fees incurred depreciation 
allowance and decommission funds are deductable.
958
 However, no deduction is 
allowed in agricultural development and environment, gifts, depreciation allowance 
for depreciable assets and long-term contracts in both mining and petroleum 
operations.
959
 In addition, unrelieved loss, bonus payment and excess expenses 
incurred are not deductable.
960
 
 
In calculating the taxable amount of permanent establishment, the law requires to be 
taxed separately from its owner and on amount attributable to it.
961
 For example, 
MultiChoice Tanzania Limited is a permanent establishment of MultiChoice Africa a 
South African company.  MultiChoice Tanzania Limited conducts business on behalf 
of MultiChoice Africa. For being a permanent establishment, MultiChoice Tanzania 
is taxed on amounts attributable to it, including amounts derived and payment 
received, liability owed, expenditure incurred and payment made.
962
  
 
In addition the following arrangements between permanent establishment and its 
owner are recognized for calculation of income: transfer of an asset or liability of 
tangible, intangible, and debt obligation arising out of borrowing money used 
exclusively in the business of PE.
963
 Moreover, sales of trading stock by the owner of 
the same permanent establishment and other business activities of the owner 
                                                          
957
 Section 65E (1) of ITA as amended by section 28 of Finance Act, 2016. 
958
 Ibid, section 65N (1).  
959
 Ibid, section 65E (2)(a).  
960
 Ibid, section 65E (2) and 65N (2). 
961
 Section 71(1) of ITA Cap 332 RE 2008. 
962
 Ibid, section 71 (2). 
963
 Ibid, section 71 (3) and (4).  
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conducted with residents of the country of the permanent establishment of the same 
or a similar kind as those effected through the PE are regarded as activities carried on 
by permanent establishment.
964
  Ascertainment of income under ITA reveals that 
there is no specific approach in ascertaining business profit for transfer pricing 
purposes and therefore, calculations are made just like any other income under ITA. 
Unlike Tanzania, Kenya Income Tax clearly provides ascertainment of taxable 
amount for transfer pricing purpose.
965
The problem with this is that a transaction 
between associated parties contains features that might not exist in independent 
transactions, which may substantially affect business profit for tax purposes. 
Nevertheless, in context of transfer pricing where associated parties‘ profit is not 
made just like an independent part could have been made, the Commissioner is 
empowered to make adjustment.   
 
6.3.2.4 Transfer Pricing Adjustment 
Transfer pricing adjustment is adjustment made by commissioner where it is 
established that price or interests of transactions between associated parties were not 
made at arm‘s length price.966 Accordingly, any adjustment in respect of assessment 
made on one of associated parties may be reflected by an offsetting adjustment on 
assessment of the other person up on request by the other part.
967
 This is achieved by 
re-characterizing the source and type of income, loss, amount of payment or 
apportionment and allocation of expenditure including income from a domestic or 
                                                          
964
 Ibid, section 71 (5). 
965
 See discussion chapter seven. 
966
 Section 33(2) of ITA Cap 332 RE 2008 and Rule 14 (1) of TP Rules 2014. See also TRA, Transfer 
Pricing Guideline para 11 (2) (f). 
967
 Ibid, Rule 14(2). 
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foreign permanent adjustment
968
 Prima facie, the re-characterized transaction will be 
taken by the TRA and compared with transactions between unrelated parties or 
between associated and third party. However, the re-characterized (hypothetical) 
transaction is not actual transaction of the associated parties, which faced 
commercial transactions that could not have been faced by unrelated parties in a 
similar situation. Under such circumstances, the Commissioner imputes a 
hypothetical transaction into actual transaction of the associated parties and may 
come out with an amount that was not actually incurred. It is unclear on the extent 
which the re-characterized transaction actually takes into account special 
circumstances that associated MNCs face when transacting with each other, a 
pattern, which cannot be found to unrelated parties.
969
 For example, associated 
MNCs, which distribute their activities in production, distribution and manufacturing 
centres have advantage in reduced transaction costs, increased information sharing, 
reduced risks and increased bargaining power. Such circumstances may potentially 
affect analysis of arm‘s length price. In context of ITA, special circumstances 
existing between associated parties are considered as basis for adjustment only.
970
 
Given the wide discretion of the Commissioner, there is a danger of the taxpayer 
being affected by such requirement.  
 
Accordingly, it is unclear whether or not adjustment for comparability purposes is 
based on actual transaction of associates or on the re-characterized transaction. The 
adjustment for comparability purposes and (adjusted) re-characterized transactions 
                                                          
968
 Ibid, section 33 (2) (a) and (b) as amended by section 23 of Finance Act, 2016; Rule 4 (2) 
969
 See TRA , Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2015 paras 8, 9 and 11respectively. 
970
 Ibid, para 11 (1) (e). 
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serves different purposes.
971
 Generally, transfer pricing adjustment may result in 
double taxation in international transactions. Consequently, the law also allows 
corresponding adjustment for purpose of avoiding double tax under the following 
conditions: First, if transfer pricing adjustment has been made in another country in 
which Tanzania has DTA and such transactions are subject to tax in Tanzania.
972
 
Secondly, if the adjustment results in taxation in another country of income or profit 
that is also taxable in Tanzania.
973
 
6.3.3  Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules 2014  
Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules (TP Rules) was established in 2014 and came 
in force on 2
nd
 February 2014,
974
 ten years after introduction of arm‘s length 
principle.   The objective of the TP Rules is to give effect to transfer pricing principle 
in determination of transfer pricing methods. The TP Rules applies to transaction 
between associated MNCs operating within and outside Tanzania.
975
 The TP Rules 
maintain meaning of associated parties as provided in the ITA. Accordingly, both 
ITA and TP Rules do not state clearly on transactions subject to arm‘s length 
principle for transfer pricing purposes.
976
  
 
However, if read between lines, transactions subject to arm‘s length principle include 
the following: first, income splitting arrangement.
977
 Under this category, the 
                                                          
971
 See discussion below on comparability factors. 
972
 However, Tanzania is having very limited number of DTAs. 
973
 Rule 13 (a) and (b) of TP Rules 2014. 
974
 Government Notice No. 27 of 2014. The decision in the case of Mbeya Cement company ltd v 
Commissioner General TRA, Civil Appeal No. 19 played an important role in establishment of TP 
Rules. 
975
 Rule 2. 
976
 In Kenya, the law clearly provides transactions subject to arm‘s length principle for transfer pricing 
purposes. See chapter seven para 7.3.3.2. 
977
 Section 34(1) and (4) respectively. 
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Commissioner is empowered to consider market value of any payment made.
978
 
Second, intercompany loan between associates by restricting interest on the debt to 
an equity ratio of 7:3.
979
 Third, services rendered between associates,
980
 financing,
981
 
sale and licensing of intangibles.
982
 However, services, intangibles and financing are 
not stated in ITA.
983
 The problem with this is that the TP Rules are subsidiary 
legislation and therefore, they may not override substantive statutory provisions. 
Fourth, transactions related to minerals and petroleum.
984
 Fifth, arrangement made 
between permanent establishment and the owner.
985
 However, ITA is silent on 
transaction related to sell or lease of tangible goods to residents because it only refers 
to PE and the owner. In addition, the ITA does not have any safe habour provision 
that may cover any other transactions between associated parties where it is not 
clearly stated in the statutes. Kenya clearly provides for safe habour provision to 
cover transactions that may be subject to transfer pricing.
986
 Clarification for type of 
transaction subject to arm‘s length principle is very important to cater for any profit 
or loss of particular associated parties involved for transfer pricing purposes. 
 
6.3.3.1 Determination of Arm’s Length Price  
The TP Rules prescribe methods to arrive at arm‘s length price. The methods are 
comparable uncontrolled price, resale price method and cost plus method commonly 
                                                          
978
 Ibid, section 34 (4). 
979
 Ibid, section 12. This rule is commonly known as thin capitalization.  
980
 Rule 10 (a) and (b) of TP Rules. 
981
 Ibid, Rule 10(3). 
982
 Ibid, Rule 11. 
983
  Section 33 of ITA  Cap 332 RE 2008.  
984
 Ibid, Section 65B (5) and (6), section 65K (5), (6) and (7) respectively as amended by section 28 of 
the Finance Act, 2016. 
985
 Ibid, section 71 (6) (a) and (b). 
986
 See chapter seven para 7.3.3.2. 
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known as traditional methods.
987
 Other methods include profit split method and 
transactional net margin method.
988
  The TP Rules essentially adopt transfer pricing 
methods as enshrined in OECD and UN models.
989
 Apart from these methods, the TP 
Rules empowers the Commissioner to prescribe for other methods provided that the 
results would be consistent with arms‘ length principle.990  However, neither ITA nor 
the TP Rules or the TRA Transfer pricing Guidelines provide any guideline on what 
constituted other methods. In determining arm‘s length price, the rules require a 
taxpayer to apply first, the traditional methods, where such methods do not give 
appropriate answers; and then resort can be made to the rest of methods.
991
  
Notwithstanding, this requirement a tax payer is required to apply the most 
appropriate methods depending on the nature of transactions and comparable 
circumstances. The method is said appropriate if it takes into account strength and 
weakness of the method, function performed by each party to a transaction, 
availability of information and degree of comparability with independent parties.
992
 
Accordingly, when transaction involves sale or licensing intangibles, CUP method 
should be employed and where the intangible is unique, profit split method may be 
                                                          
987
 Rule 3. 
988
 Ibid, Rule 5 (1).  For definition of each method see Rule 3. See also Para 10 of TRA Transfer 
pricing Guideline 2015. To arrive at arm‘s length price special procedure need to be followed as 
set in TRA guideline.  First, understanding associated parties‘ transaction in the context of their 
business. This is sought to be achieved by analyzing functions performed, risk assumed and asset 
used. This is followed by characterization of business based on the nature of activity and 
complexity of transaction. Identification of comparable transaction is performed with a view of 
setting level upon which transactions are compared. The determination of a controlled 
transactions leads to the determination of the tested party. As a general rule, the tested party is the 
one to which a transfer pricing method can be applied in the most reliable manner and for which 
the most reliable comparables can be found‖ This is then followed by selecting transfer pricing 
method by taking in to account profit level indicator which measures the relationship between 
profits and sales, costs incurred or assets employed. See Para 7 of TRA transfer Pricing Guideline 
2015.  
989
 See discussion chapter 3. 
990
 Rule 5(4) of TP Rules, 2014; See also TRA, Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2015 para 10(1). 
991
 Ibid, Rules 5 (2), (3) and (4) respectively. 
992
 Ibid, Rule 4(3). 
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used.
993
Additionally, the TP Rules prohibit a person to apply any other method, 
which is not listed or prescribed by the Commissioner.
994
 In verifying whether the 
transaction was consistent with arm‘s length principle, the rules require the 
Commissioner to base on the appropriate method used by the taxpayer. In practice, 
associated MNCs in Tanzania prefer transactional net margin method, which is 
comparatively more complicated than CUP. The method is preferred because it uses 
the net profit as a profit level indicator which makes it easier to obtain 
comparables.
995
Arguably, the law contradicts by imposing hierarchal application of 
methods, on one hand and on the other, requiring the most appropriate method to be 
employed. Yet, it clearly states CUP and split profit methods to be applied in certain 
transactions. This situation may bring problem(s) in practical terms like it was in 
Unilever case whereby the taxpayer claimed to use methods as enshrined in OECD 
regardless of their appropriateness
996
 
 
6.3.3.2 Transfer Pricing Comparability Factors 
Comparability of transactions between associated and independent part is corner 
stone in obtaining arm‘s length price of associates. In due regard, the TP Rules 
require characteristics of property or services transferred, function performed, risk 
assumed, asset used, contractual terms of the transaction, economic circumstances 
and business strategies pursued by associated parties to be compared.
997
 Transaction 
between independent parties is comparable if comparability factors are similar to that 
                                                          
993
 Ibid, Rule 11(2). 
994
 Ibid, Rule 5 (5). 
995
 KPMG  Dar es salaam. 
996
 See discussion in chapter seven para 7.3.3. 
997
  Rule 6 (1) (a) to (e) of TP Rules 2014. 
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of associated parties, or no differences between comparability factors or persons 
entering it to transaction are likely to materially affect the price, cost charged, paid, 
or profit.
998
 In addition, where adjustment can be made to any difference, which 
affects the price, then such transaction is comparable.
999
 The result of transactions 
between associates is then compared to results obtained in uncontrolled 
transactions.
1000
 If the price falls within the range of arm‘s length then, the price is 
said to be an arm‘s length.  
 
From comparability factors, a few issues may be raised. First, the TP rules limit 
comparables to sufficiently available information only. However, comparability 
factors presuppose to be obtained from various corporation documents. In context of 
transfer pricing, associated MNCs are required to furnish such documents based on 
their transfer pricing policy.
1001
  Such requirement does not exist to unrelated 
corporations. The only available information for such companies is related to 
performance of the corporations and not details on modalities of their operations. 
Such information is normally available in form of published or filed financial 
statements, with practical observance being highly consistently followed by public 
companies and financial institutions.
1002
  Consequently, use of Tanzanian 
comparable pattern may be a very limited possibility and may lead to absence of 
Tanzania comparables. For example, transfer pricing audit done by an extractive 
team of TRA found that one a company was selling a rare gemstone available in 
                                                          
998
 Ibid, Rule 6 (2) (a) and (b). 
999
 Ibid Rule 6 2(c). See also TRA, Transfer pricing Guideline 2014 para 8.3. 
1000
 Rule 6(3). 
1001
 Ibid, Rule 7. 
1002
 See for example section 32(3) of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 2006. 
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Tanzania only to a sister company at very low prices since 2004. However, price 
adjustment was done in 2011 such that it affected transactions from 2009 due to lack 
of comparables.
1003
 In due regard, a considerable amount of profit was shifted 
outside the country. In practice, the resort is made to foreign databases used 
elsewhere in the world, for example, in ascertaining the arm‘s length interest rate, 
appropriate indices such as London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or specific 
rates quoted by banks for comparable loans can be used as a reference point.
1004
 Yet, 
such data may be very expensive to obtain, for example, to subscribe Orbis data base 
it costs TRA Euro 45,000/= per year.
1005
   
 
Second, although the law requires a contractual term to be considered in 
comparability, the TP Rules are silent on situations where the contractual terms do 
not provide sufficient information for transfer pricing analysis.
1006
  For example, the 
agreement may not include logistic services in their procurement agreement. Such 
added services may form substantial component of procurement processes and may 
have tax implication. Such discrepancies may be used to affect required transfer 
price between associates. Third, while comparability is regarded as corner stone for 
arms‘ length principle to apply, the law does not provide clear guideline on what 
should be done in absence of comparables.
1007
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 Readhead, A., Transfer Pricing in Extractive sector Tanzania, 2015 p. 17. 
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 Para 15.4 of TRA Transfer Pricing Guideline, 2015. 
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 An interview with TRA ITU unit officials. 
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6.3.3.3 Application of Arms’ Length Principle to Intangibles 
Literally, intangibles are valuable assets that cannot be touched. Intangible assets for 
transfer prices purposes include a patent, an invention, secret formula or processes, 
design, a model, plan, trademark, know how or marketing intangibles.
1008
 From this 
definition, three categories of intangibles may be ascribed. First, manufacture of 
intangibles such as patent, design, processes or procedures, secret formula and 
invention. These intangibles are normally done within the corporation. Second, 
human competence, which entails knowledge held by various persons in the 
organization and their knowledge is valuable commonly known as knowhow. The 
third is marketing intangible, which includes marketing activities that aid in 
commercial exploitation of property or have an important promotional value for the 
property concerned.
1009
 These entail external activities that may include brands, 
trademarks, licenses, franchise, contractual rights as well as customer and supplier 
relationship.  
 
Where intangible is sold or licensed between associated parties, the owner of the 
intangible is required to charge the other associate at arm‘s length price at the value 
of which such intangible is expected to generate.
1010
 In context of transfer pricing, 
the person is regarded as owner of intangible if expenses and risks associated with 
                                                          
1008
 Rule 3 of TP Rules 2014. 
1009
 Ibid. 
1010
 Rule 11(1) (a) and (b).  Section 3 of ITA defines payment made by the lessee under a lease of an 
intangible asset as royalty.  Thus royalty is paid for use or right to use any copyright, patent, design 
or model, plan, secret formula or process, trademark, or the supply or acquisition of scientific, 
technical, industrial or commercial knowledge or information.  is interesting to note that royalties 
cover more aspects of intangibles than definition provided in Transfer Pricing guideline such as the 
use of, or right to use, a cinematography film, videotape, sound recording or any other like medium; 
the use of, or right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment; the supply of assistance 
ancillary to intangibles or a total or partial forbearance with intangibles.  It is not clear whether such 
right and use of the said intangibles are property or goods for transfer pricing purposes. 
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development of such intangible property are borne by that person.
1011
 However, if the 
owner of the intangible is not vested with the legal ownership then, the owner may 
receive arms‘ length consideration for the development of such intangible.1012 With 
regard to marketing intangibles, where an associate who is not owner of marketing 
intangible and incurs cost for marketing such intangibles, and such cost are in excess 
to those comparable independent persons, the owner will pay such associate arm‘s 
length price for undertaking such activities.
1013
 In arriving at arm‘s length price for 
intangibles, the law requires the taxpayer to use comparable uncontrolled price 
(CUP)
1014
 method in absence of highly valuable or unique intangible, where such 
peculiarly exists; the profit split method is employed.
1015
   
In addition, any other methods may be used as prescribed by the Commissioner 
provided that it has high degree of comparability between transactions.
1016
 Arguably, 
the CUP method entails presence of a direct comparison of prices charged between 
associates and independent parties in a comparable situation.
1017
 The apparent 
question is relevance of CUP method in arriving at arm‘s length price for intangibles. 
For example, PE is charged by its owner for use of patent for manufacturing a 
product. It is common knowledge that development of patent for a certain product 
normally is unique and may be developed solely for use of company.  
 
                                                          
1011
 Rule 11 (6) of TP Rules 2014. 
1012
 Ibid, Rule 11 (4). 
1013
 Ibid, Rule 11 (5). 
1014
 CUP means a method where the price charged in transaction between associated parties is 
compared with the price charged between independent parties in comparable situation. Rule 3 of TP 
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1015
 Rule 11 (2) of TP Rules 2014. 
1016
Ibid, Rule 11 (3). 
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 Ibid, Rule 3. 
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Accordingly, the company may need to keep its secrets for their own benefits. Under 
these circumstances, the independent corporation may not be ready to provide such 
information. Such situation may lead to absence of comparables and consequently, 
render CUP method less reliable than expected.  Even where comparables are 
available, re-characterization of intangible transaction for transfer pricing adjustment 
may pose serious challenges. Notably, TRA guideline is silent on this matter, instead 
is making reference to OECD Guidelines.
1018
 
Notwithstanding, requirement of using CUP method for intangibles, the TP Rules 
also require a taxpayer to apply first, the traditional methods and where these 
methods do not give an appropriate answer, then resort can be made to the rest of 
methods.
1019
 At the same time, the law obliges the tax taxpayer to select the most 
appropriate method, depending on nature of transaction and function performed. The 
problem with this requirement is that some traditional methods may not be 
appropriate for intangible transactions. For example, the resale price method relies 
on margins obtained from purchase and resale. It is unlikely that intangibles like 
patent and trademarks can be purchased as well as resold on a regular basis. 
Likewise, the cost plus method entails comparison of costs with added margins for 
production of the good. Royalties paid for the right to use of intangibles have little 
relations with cost. Royalties charged on use of rights of intangibles are not based on 
direct cost of production of such intangible but rather, on the right to use such 
intangible.
1020
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 TRA, Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2015, para 13 (2). 
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  Rules 5 (2), (3) and (4) respectively of TP Rules 2014. 
1020
 Canada v GlaxoSmithKline Inc., 2012 SCC 52. 
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6.3.3.4   Application of Arm’s Length Principle to Intra Group Services 
The TP Rules also require transfer of services and finances between associates to be 
made at arm‘s length price.1021 The ITA does not provide aspects that constitute 
services for transfer pricing purposes. However, TP Rules define intra-group services 
to mean ―services rendered between companies in the same group.‖1022 Such 
meaning is general and it does not give a clear indicator on scope of intra group 
services for transfer pricing purposes. To the contrary, TRA guideline provides a 
range of services that may be taken into account for transfer pricing purposes, for 
example, management and technical or commercial services.
1023
 From legal point of 
view, the guideline is not a law per see and therefore, the guideline and rules cannot 
prevail over substantive law.
1024
  Such discrepancy may provide potential to MNCs 
to manipulate transfer prices.  
For example, in Tanzania, one of the methods used by MNCs in manipulating prices 
is management fee.
1025
 The problem with intra-group services is that other charges 
may be paid directly to the other associate without implicating transfer prices in 
absence of proper agreement on payment of such services.  Such amount or rates 
may be substantial to the extent of affecting transfer prices between associated 
MNCs. This is possible because in calculating taxable profit of permanent 
establishment, such charges may be deducted.
1026
 In applying arms‘ length methods, 
the law requires associated parties to demonstrate that intra-group services was 
                                                          
1021
 Rule 10 (1) and (5) of TP Rules 2014. 
1022
 Ibid, Rule 3. 
1023
 TRA, Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2015 Para 14. 
1024
 ITC 1675 62 SATC 219. 
1025
  See for example Mbeya Company Ltd v Commissioner General TRA, Civil Appeal no 19, 2008. 
1026
 Section 71 of ITA Cap 332 RE 2008. 
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actually rendered and had substantial economic value to the business.
1027
 In 
ascertaining the amount for service rendered, the law excludes any charges made for 
shareholders or custodial activities, duplicative, incidental or on call services.
1028
  
Additionally, the TP Rules empower the Commissioner to declare certain service not 
sufficient for transfer pricing purposes.
1029
 There is a danger for abuse of such 
powers
1030
 because there is no clear guideline about services to be disregarded for 
transfer pricing purposes.
1031
 
 
6.3.3.5 Arms’ Length Aspect of Intra-Group Financing 
The law requires interest obtained out of intra-group financing to be charged at arm‘s 
length rate. The TP Rules recognize intra-group financing to include loan, security 
and guarantee, advance or debt and interest bearing trade credit.
1032
 To the contrary, 
the ITA clearly excludes debt obligation owed to residential financial institution and 
non-resident bank or financial institution, whose interest tax is withheld in 
Tanzania.
1033
 In financing transactions, the arms‘ length applies to the rate of interest 
paid on intra-group loan.
1034
 Generally, interest is deductible for income tax purposes 
before tax.
1035
 Hence, the only tax possibility is withholding amount of interest 
levied on the nonresident creditor by the source country. In due regard, it is likely for 
                                                          
1027
 Rule 10 (1) (a) TP Rules 2014. 
1028
 Ibid, Rule 10 (2)( a) and (b).  
1029
 Ibid, Rule 10 2(c). 
1030
 Ibid, Rule 10 (2) (c). The purpose of MNCs is to make profit, any loop hole in law gives chance to 
maximize profit. Given the financial capacity of MNCs, and given the prevalence of corruption in 
developing countries like Tanzania, the chances of abuse of power is high.  
1031
  See TRA, Transfer Pricing Guidelines 2015, para 14. 
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1033
 see note 87. 
1034
 Rule 10 (3) of TP Rules. Although it is not clearly stated, in Tanzania all types of intra group 
financing fall within definition of services. 
1035
  section 11 and 12, 7. 
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associated MNCs to fund their associates by way of debt instead of equity.
1036
 To 
avoid such practices, the law provides thin capitalization rules to limit the amount of 
debt funding in relation to equity. The law requires 7.3 as ratio of the debt to 
equity.
1037
 Where there is change of amount of debt or equity, the amount of either of 
them shall be the average of balances of amount of debt or equity at the end of the 
month or part of the month.
1038
  
 
In context of ITA and for the purpose of calculating taxable interest, ―debt means 
any debt obligation excluding a non interest bearing debt obligation, debt obligation 
owed to residential financial institution, debt obligation owed to a non-resident bank 
or financial institution whose interest tax is withheld in Tanzania.‖1039  Arguably 
these provisions may not work well in calculating taxable income or interest between 
associated parties.  In addition, financial institutions, banks and free loans may play a 
significant role in manipulating transfer prices.  
As noted before, most MNCs operating in EAC countries are essentially associates 
of large companies from developed and emerging economies. Such associates have 
been running their economic activities by using debt capital from parent MNCs. 
Accordingly, multinational transactions between associated MNCs are made in 
different currencies other than EAC currencies.
1040
 Most parent MNCs are from 
                                                          
1036
 See Chevron Australia Holding PTY Ltd (CAHPL) v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1092.  
In this case the Court held that CAHPL had not shown that the interest paid under the Credit 
Facility Agreement was equal to or less than arm‘s length. 
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 Section 12 of ITA Cap 332 RE 2008  as amended by Finance Act, 2012.  
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 It should be noted that to date, EAC member state still using different currencies. However, there 
are discussions going on in establishing single currency in EAC. 
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developed and emerging economies, where they have strong currencies.
1041
 Thus, 
there is potential for an intercompany loan, which is regarded as service to use 
differences on rules of conversion and interest payable on loan to shift profit from 
one country to another.  Notably, MNCs normally earn a fixed rate of income and are 
protected by contractual obligations with respect to their investments. The interest 
received by a foreign company granting the loan would normally be subject to an 
exemption in the country where the receiving company is situated.
1042
  However, the 
existing thin capitalization rules do not sufficiently address such concerns, 
particularly in natural resources.
1043
 Accordingly, the existing contractual obligation 
offered to investors does not necessarily make reference to transfer pricing. 
 
6.3.3.6 Advance Pricing Agreement  
The ITA does not provide for Advance pricing agreement (APA), but the TP Rules 
provide for APA.
1044
 The objective Advance Pricing Agreement is to ascertain, in 
advance, transfer prices of specified related parties‘ transactions over a specified 
period of time.
1045
 There are three types of APA in Tanzania, namely, unilateral, 
bilateral and multilateral APA.
1046
  Generally, the taxpayer is not obliged to enter 
into APA. However, when the taxpayer chooses to enter into APA, both the TRA 
and the taxpayer are bound by such agreement.
1047
 The power to reject or accept the 
                                                          
1041
 See Mnali J.M., Note 1, p. 11; TIC, Report on the study of Growth and Impact of investment in 
Tanzania,2008 p.21.  
1042
 See for example section 10 2
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 schedules of the Income Tax Act, 2004 where investment is 
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the interest as required section 12 as amended by Finance Act, 2012. 
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1044
 Rule 12 of TP Rules 2014. 
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APA is vested to the Commissioner alone.
1048
  However, according to TRA officials, 
to date, no APA has been concluded in Tanzania. The duration of APA once 
concluded is five years.
1049
 The law requires that once the APA is entered, Tanzania 
Revenue Authority (TRA) has to suspend transfer pricing adjustment for covered 
transaction where the transaction is consistent with the terms of agreement.
1050
 Such 
requirement presupposes   terms of agreement are implemented as required and no 
substantial changes of economic or comparables or characteristics of the goods 
transacted are capable to affect effected transaction.   
 
 Arguably, there is possibility of changes to economic circumstances that may affect 
concluded APA.  Accordingly, sometimes, there may be inconsistence between the 
actual transaction and results of applying confirmed transfer pricing methods after 
the closing date of the return. The TP Rules do not impose requirements for the 
taxpayer to make necessary adjustment(s) to reflect changes of economic 
circumstances or actual conduct of the taxpayer in final return for the year. The TP 
Rules allow only adjustment made by a competent revenue authority of another 
country, which is consistent with arm‘s length principle and correspondence 
adjustment is made.
1051
 
Although the law allows the Commissioner to cancel the APA in material breach of 
fundamental terms of the contract,
1052
 the Commissioner does not cancel APA where 
                                                          
1048
  Rule 12(4) of TP Rules 2014 
1049
 Ibid, Rule 12(9). 
1050
 Ibid, Rule 12 (7).  
1051
 Ibid, Rule13. 
1052
It is not clear whether the cancellation of APA will be based on ordinary terms of contract or on 
discretional power of TRA. This is important as it may bring contradictions as to which law should 
apply and may lead   to shift burden of proof to TRA to show breach of the taxpayer as was stated 
in Eaton Corporation v. Commissioner, T.C. No. 5576-12, 2012. See also Spencer K., and 
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there are substantial changes for economic circumstances. Notwithstanding 
exemption for audits and adjustment offered to confirm APA, the rules empowers the 
Commissioner to adjust any price or interest where he has the reason to believe such 
prices or interests are not at arm‘s length price. This requirement contradicts Rule 
12(7). The law gives, on one hand, and takes, on the other hand, and therefore, it may 
affect the taxpayer. Additionally, the law is silent on enforcement mechanisms of 
APA. Arguably, APAs are not well regulated this situation may render variation in 
its application.  
 
6.3.3.7 Transfer Pricing Documentation Requirement 
The ITA does not provide for mandatory transfer pricing documentation 
requirement. Yet, it is mandatory for any taxpayer to prepare and maintain hard or 
electronic documents necessary to explain tax returns at least for a period of five 
years.
1053
  To the contrary, the TP Rules make mandatory requirement for 
contemporaneous transfer pricing documents submitted prior to due date of filing 
income tax return.
1054
  The required information includes organizational structure, 
nature of business, transfer pricing analysis including function(s) performed, asset 
used, risk assumed, transfer pricing methods and application of such method 
including any other document considered relevant by the Commissioner.
1055
 Such 
document may be submitted to the Commissioner upon request within 30 days.
1056
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Kelleher M., An Advance Pricing Agreements Binding Commitments? International Transfer 
Pricing Journal, March/April 2013, p. 117-119. 
1053
Section 35(2) and 34 of the Tax Administration Act, Cap 147, 2015. The official language of 
document is Kiswahili or English. 
1054
 Rule 7 (1) and (3) TP Rules 2014. 
1055
 Ibid, Rule 7(2). 
1056
 Ibid, Rule 7 (4). This means the taxpayer is not obliged to produce transfer pricing to 
commissioner unless is requested to do so. 
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Where an associated party fails to maintain documents, the TP Rules impose penalty 
of fine not less than fifty million Tanzanian shillings or convicted to a prison for not 
less than six months or both.
1057
 To the contrary, the Tax Administration Act 
imposes penalty of 10 currency points for each month for which failure continues to 
maintain document.
1058
 To the contrary, ITA imposes penalty of difference between 
the income tax payable for each month and part of month for which failure continues 
as the higher 2.5 percent or fine of one hundred thousand shillings.
1059
  Apparently, 
there is conflicting transfer pricing documentation penalty and it is unclear about a 
provision that will prevail in case of conflict with the taxpayer.  
 
6.4  Administration and Enforcement of Transfer Pricing Rules 
6.4.1  Institutional Framework for Transfer Pricing  
In Tanzania, all matters related to assessment and collections of revenue are vested to 
Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA).
1060
 The TRA was established in 1995 as a body 
corporate with a perpetual common seal.
1061
 The TRA is vested with the following 
responsibilities:- administration and enforcement of laws related to revenues, 
                                                          
1057
Ibid, Rule 7(5). 
1058
 Section 77 (1) and (2) of the Tax Administration Act, 2015.  
1059
 Section 98(1) (a) (d) and (e) R.E 2008. It should be noted that section 80 referred in section 98(1) 
has been repealed by section 35 of Tax Administration Act, 2015. However, section (98 1) is not 
amended to reflect such changes. 
1060
 See preamble of the Tanzania Revenue Authority Act, Cap 399 Revised edition 2006. It is 
important to note that the TRA is operating under the Ministry of Finance. Tanzania has a three-
tier tax administration structure, namely; Central Government tax administration, Tax 
administration in Zanzibar, and Local Governments tax administration. The Tanzania Revenue 
Authority (TRA) administers the Central Government taxes, Zanzibar Revenue Board administers 
domestic consumption taxes in Zanzibar, and Local Authorities administer the various local 
imposed taxes. See ChatamaY. J., The impact of ICT on Taxation: the case of   Large Taxpayer 
Department of Tanzania Revenue Authority, Developing Country Studies, ISSN 2224-607X 
(Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) Vol.3, No.2, 2013, 92.  Available at www.iiste.org Accessed 
2016. 
1061
 Section 4(1) and (2) of Tanzania Revenue Authority Act, Cap 399 RE 2006. The TRA come in to 
operation on July 1996. 
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monitor and ensure collection of various specified revenues from government and 
private sector, promoting voluntary tax compliance and advising the government on 
matters pertaining to fiscal policy. In curbing any loss of tax, the TRA is responsible 
in determining steps to counteract fraud and any other form of tax including other 
fiscal evasion.
1062
 In discharging its functions, the TRA has the power to identify 
amendment or alteration of tax laws for purpose of improving administration and 
compliance, among other things.
1063
 In running its activities, the TRA is financed by 
the general government budget through an annual parliamentary budget. The 
structure of TRA is constituted by the Governing Board and Commissioner General.  
The board is responsible for formulation and implementation of TRA policy.
1064
 The 
Commissioner General, as Chief Executive, is responsible for executing daily 
operations of TRA under general supervision and control of the Board.
1065
  The 
responsibility of collecting tax is divided in to four departments, namely, large 
taxpayer (LTD), domestic revenue, tax investigation and Customs and Excise 
Department. The large taxpayer department was established in October 2001 to 
provide consistent and quality service to large taxpayers, to secure revenue, to 
improve audit programs, to improve collections and management of tax debts, and 
also to act as models or pilots for testing new processes, procedures, structures and 
systems‖1066 Most MNCs fall under large tax payer department and therefore, 
                                                          
1062
 Ibid, section 5(1). 
1063
 Ibid section 5(2) as amended by section 59 of Finance Act, 2016. 
1064
 Section 10 (1) and (2) and section 13 of Tanzania Revenue Authority R.E 2006. See also section 5 
of Tax Administration Act, 2015. 
1065
 Ibid, section 16(1) and (2) and section 17 respectively. 
1066
 Chatama Y. J., The impact of ICT on Taxation: the case of Large Taxpayer Department of 
Tanzania Revenue Authority, Developing Country Studies www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-607X 
(Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) Vol.3, No.2, 2013, p.92. 
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transfer pricing issues are handled under the same department at the unit called 
International Tax Unit (ITU). 
 
The ITU was officially established in 2011 and prior to that, transfer pricing issues 
were handled at large taxpayer or domestic department, depending on given 
circumstances. According to TRA officials the ITU is manned by less than fifteen 
officers composed of an economist, lawyers and accountants. The ITU also supports 
regional offices throughout the country. In running its activities, the ITU is entitled 
to its own budget of not more than three hundred million Tanzanian shillings per 
year.  Such amount is used for purchasing data bases and it covers administrative 
issues. There are two main responsibilities of ITU, preparation of business plan for 
the department and to conduct transfer pricing audit.
1067
 Such audit queries are 
extracted from business plan prepared by the ITU. Since its establishment, the ITU 
has undertaken a considerable number of transfer pricing audits in various sectors 
that resulted in tax adjustment of 232 billions of Tanzanian shillings that were under 
dispute by tax payers.
1068
 Accordingly, more transfer pricing audits are likely to 
increase and more cases are likely to be taken to tribunals or courts of law. Apart 
from ITU, the tax investigation department has other three separate independent 
audit auditing in manufacturing, extractive industry and services. All teams have 
been relatively trained on transfer pricing audits and occasionally, they have been 
handling transfer pricing cases within their teams.
1069
  
 
                                                          
1067
 Section 45 of the Tax Administration Act, Cap 147, 2015. 
1068
 An interview with TRA officials. 
1069
 an interview with TRA officials 
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Despite considerable good performance, ITU is facing challenges in implementing 
its works and renders efforts to curb transfer pricing manipulation be more 
complicated. Other challenges include lack of local comparables and an unclear 
approach in situations where there are insufficient comparables. However, practice 
has shown that resort has made foreign databases, which are very expensive and may 
not be very relevant though they form an important bench mark for analysis.  
According to ITU officials, ORBIS data have never been practically used since their 
subscription.   Tax incentives offered to MNCs is another challenge and even when 
there are sufficient indictors of transfer price manipulation, ITU may not be able to 
challenge or adjust. Apart from legal issues, there is overlapping of responsibilities 
between ITU and other audit teams at TRA.  The problem with this is that it may 
lead to inconsistency in application of transfer pricing laws. Shortage of staff and 
lack of experience in handling transfer pricing in minerals have seriously affected 
performance of ITU. For example, to date, no audit in mineral sector has been 
completed since its establishment.
1070
 Lack of information is also a problem because 
TRA relies on information prepared by taxpayers who are sometimes not done 
professionally.  Lack of transfer pricing policy by MNCs and sometimes they do not 
get cooperation from MNCs are additional drawbacks to ITU functions. Moreover, 
the whole process of gathering information is time consuming and expensive.   
 
6.4.2 Transfer Pricing Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
Both ITA and TP Rules are silent on enforcement of transfer pricing. To date, issues 
pertaining to transfer pricing compliance, enforcement and disputes are handled just 
                                                          
1070
 TRA interview and ibid, p. 9. 
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like any other income tax matters.
1071
  Consequently, ITA provisions related to fraud, 
failure to furnish returns and underpayment of tax apply to transfer price disputes. In 
due regard, there are three organs responsible for solving transfer pricing disputes.  
At the first instance, the Commissioner is empowered to make any tax decision in 
relation to dispute arising from assessment and other decisions or omissions that 
directly affect a taxpayer.
1072
 The most relevant aspect of transfer pricing disputes 
falls within category of assessment. Generally, the Commissioner has the power to 
issue an additional adjustment assessment based on the Commissioner‘s best 
judgment and information available.
1073
 A taxpayer who is aggrieved by the 
Commissioner‘s decision has the right to appeal to the  
 
Tax Revenue Appeal Board (TRAB) in accordance with Tax Revenue Appeal Act 
provisions.
1074
 In context of transfer pricing, where it is established that a taxpayer 
did not comply with arm‘s length principle is guilty of underpayment of tax and is 
liable to a penalty of one hundred percent of the underpayment of the tax.
1075
 
TRAB
1076
 is the second institution responsible for handling appeals on objected 
assessment decision by the Commissioner.
1077
 Appeals to TRAB are made pursuant 
to requirement provided in The Tax Revenue Appeal Act.
1078
 During the hearing, the 
onus of proving that the assessment or decision in respect of which an appeal is made 
                                                          
1071
 Interview with TRA officials at KRA offices Nairobi Kenya 2014 
1072
 Section 50 (1) and (3) of the Tax Administration Act, Cap 147, 2015.  
1073
 Ibid, section 48. 
1074
 Ibid, Section 53.  
1075
 Rule 4 (5) of TP Rules, 2014. 
1076
Established pursuance to section 4 of the Tax Revenue Appeal Act, RE 2006. 
1077
 Ibid, section 16, see also section 53 (1) of the Tax Administration Act, 2015. 
1078
 Ibid, section 14 and 15 respectively. 
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lies to the appellant.
1079
 Any person who is aggrieved by the decision of TRAB has 
the right to appeal to Revenue Appeal Tribunal (tribunal).
1080
  The proceedings of the 
TRAB and Tribunal are of judicial nature and that their decision is enforceable and 
executed just like degree or orders of the court of law.
1081
 
 
Any taxpayer who is aggrieved by the decision by TRAB or Tribunal has the right to 
appeal to the Court of Appeal on point of law only.
1082
 Accordingly, the provisions 
of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act
1083
 and rules made there under shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to appeals from the decision of the Tribunal.
1084
 The decision by Court of 
Appeal is final. The tax dispute resolution mechanism in Tanzania reveals that there 
is no special mechanism established for addressing transfer pricing disputes.  
The fact that, to date, no transfer pricing cases have been decided by TRAB, the 
Tribunal or Court of Appeal, it may be hard to say that transfer pricing will be 
handled in a very special way. It is likely that it will be handled just like any other 
tax dispute. However, at least four transfer pricing cases have been filed and are still 
at the TRAB. Due to the fact that transfer pricing disputes are complex in nature 
involving various disciplines, it remains to be seen the manner actors will handle 
transfer pricing disputes. 
                                                          
1079
 Ibid, section 18(2) (b). 
1080
Ibid, section 8 and section 11 respectively. The procedure for appeal and onus of proof are the 
same as those made under TRAB. 
1081
 Ibid, section   18 (1) and section 24 (3). 
1082
 It should be noted that the appeal from tribunal are not taken to the High court because both have 
concurrent jurisdiction on tax matter. 
1083
 Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1979   cap 141 of the laws of Tanzania. 
1084
  Section 25 of the Tax Revenue Appeal Act, RE 2006. 
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6.5  Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan in Tanzanian Context 
As noted before that the existing arm‘s length principle, to a great extent, has 
encountered serious challenges in curbing transfer pricing manipulation, Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan (BEPS Action Plan) was thought as a rescue.  
The rationale behind BEPS is to ensure that profit by MNCs is taxed where 
economic activities generating that profit are performed or where the value of 
intangible is created. Analysis of transfer pricing law reveals that, to a certain extent, 
BEPS Action Plan has been taken into account.  
 
For example, comparability factors and analysis, requirement and payment of 
ownership of intangibles and documentation requirement under TP Rules seem to be 
borrowed from BEPS guidelines on application of arm‘s length principle.  
Accordingly, the fact that the TP Rules are construed in manner consistency with 
OECD model and Guidelines as supplemented and updated from time to time,  BEPS 
Action Plan is applicable in Tanzania.  
 
6.6  Conclusion 
The presented analysis and examination of transfer pricing laws in Tanzania reveal 
inadequacy of law in curbing transfer pricing manipulations. The arm‘s length 
principle still remains as a sole solution in curbing transfer pricing manipulation. 
While the existing transfer pricing laws are premised on arm‘s length principle, they 
lack clarity and in some instances, they contradict each other. Accordingly, where 
clear provisions exist, they are not implementable, either because of lack of pre-
requisites, requirement such as comparables or lack of experience and knowledge of 
transfer pricing by tax officers. Although the arms‘ length is applicable to extractive 
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business there is no clear guideline on how such transactions should be handled in 
transfer pricing context. The absence of decided transfer pricing cases in courts and 
tribunals are indicators of such discrepancies. Although there are few cases, which 
have been filed, it remains to be seen whether or not decision of such cases by 
tribunal and court will reduce if not eliminate existing discrepancies. Such 
discrepancies are likely to hinder Tanzania desire to obtain right share of tax from 
MNCs investments for economic development.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION IN KENYA 
 
7.1  Introduction 
A favourable situation created by the government of Kenya has been a catalyst in 
attracting more MNCs in the country. Consequently, MNCs have been contributing 
more than seventy percent to government revenue. However, such revenue has been 
characterized by looming risk of losing the right share of tax from associated MNCs‘ 
operations in Kenya through transfer pricing. In an effort to protect its tax base, 
Kenya has enacted a transfer pricing law whereby arm‘s length principle is a corner 
stone. However, inadequacy of the law and complexities involved in arriving at 
arm‘s length price has remained a major obstacle. While more efforts are geared 
towards attracting MNCs, there is need to remove risks associated with MNCs‘ 
investment with a view of achieving the country‘s desire to fund its expenditure 
through tax revenue. This chapter analyses adequacy of transfer pricing legislation in 
curbing transfer pricing manipulation in Kenya.  
 
7.2  Overview of Social, Economic and Political Context  
Kenya gained its independence on 12
th
 December, 1963 from British. After 
independence, Kenya inherited colonial legal system and economy that reflected 
colonial interests.
1085
 The economy of Kenya was largely centered on agriculture 
with a limited range of secondary industries.
1086
 The history of foreign investment in 
                                                          
1085
 Ndege P.O., Colonialism and Its Legacy in Kenya, Lecture delivered during full bright Hays 
Group Project Abroad programme, Moi University Main Compus, 5
th
 July to 6
TH
 August 2009. p. 4-
6. 
1086
 Ibid, p. 6. 
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Kenya can be traced back prior to independence.  Kenya was a settler as well as 
crown colony and it was integrated by the British such that not only many British 
settlers settled but also they meant to stay forever. Consequently, Kenya received 
more investments.
1087
 British colonialists used the law as a tool for the purpose. 
Using their colonial legislature, the British colonialists made some laws that 
influenced the pattern of investment in East African countries. For example, the laws 
made granted long land holding rights to settlers in Kenya and dispossessed Africans 
off their lands and vested the same to settlers or investors. In due regard, it 
discouraged Africans from competing with British investors in cash crops 
production.  Such laws greatly attracted foreign investors to invest in Kenya.  
 
After independence, Kenya continued to be the most favoured destination of foreign 
investment in the EAC region. That was due to relatively high level of economic 
development, market size growth and openness of the foreign direct investments, 
while other neighbor countries such as Tanzania and Uganda had relatively closed 
regimes.
1088
 The large capital flow in Kenya was driven by expansion in the 
agriculture sector, fiscal and monetary policies such as overvalued exchange rates, 
import tariffs, quantitative restrictions including import licensing.
1089
 Thus, 
sustainable budget deficit and import substitution industrialization strategies also 
                                                          
1087
 Kahama C.G., et al., The Challenge for Tanzania‘s Economy.  Tanzania Publish House, Dar es 
Salaam, 1994, p. 17. 
1088
 Abala D.O., Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis of Kenyan 
Data, DBA African Management Review, Vol.4 No.1 2014, PP 62-83, P.64. This is because 
countries like Tanzania and Uganda opted for socialism policy while Kenya opted for market 
oriented policies in the garb of socialist principle. See Nellis J., The Evolution of Enterprise 
Reform in Africa: From State - owned Enterprises to Private Participation in Infrastructure – and 
Back? NOTA DI LAVORO 117.2005, p 3. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=828764. 
Accessed  January 20 2016. 
1089
 Ibid, p. 273. 
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contributed.
1090
  Whilst post-independence government of Kenya managed to attract 
foreign investment for economic development, the taxation system inherited from 
colonial powers remained quite substantially unaltered.
1091
  Such pattern informs 
narrow coverage of existing tax instrument, poor tax administration and tax 
collection efforts.
1092
 Notwithstanding, great inflow of foreign investment in Kenya 
between 1980s and 1990s the economy of the country deteriorated and level of 
foreign investments dropped. There are two reasons for such pattern: first, at that 
time, the country experienced bad governance, high corruption level, inconsistence 
in implementation of economic policies and structural reform that led to poor public 
services and infrastructure.
1093
 Second, economic policy reforms of Tanzania and 
Uganda in processes of implementing liberalization of their economy.
1094
 Despite 
backdrop of foreign investment in Kenya, various measures were taken by the 
government of Kenya to improve foreign investment in the country. They included 
establishment of Export Processing Zone (EPZ), manufacturing under bond (MUB) 
and accession to the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2001.
1095
 
Other measures included establishment of investment law geared to attract foreign 
investment.
1096
 The remarkable development made by the government of Kenya was 
establishment of Kenya Vision 2008 to 2030. The objective of the 2030 vision is to 
                                                          
1090
 Ibid.   
1091
 Warris A., Taxation without principles: A Historical Analysis of the Kenyan Taxation System, 
Kenya Law Review, Vol 1: 272, 2007, pp 272 – 304 p. 273;   See also Masoud B.S., Legal 
Challenges of Cross Border Insolvencies in Sub –Saharan Africa with Reference to Tanzania and 
Kenya: A Frame work for Legislation and Policies, PhD Thesis, Nottingham Trent University, 
United Kingdom, 2012, p.196. 
1092
 Ibid.  
1093
 Abala, Note 1088, p. 65. 
1094
 Ibid, see also chapter 6 and 3.  
1095
World Bank. Connecting to Compete: Trade Logistics in the Global Economy, Washington D.C. 
2012, p.   
1096
 See for example The Investment Promotion Act, 2004 cap 485Bas revised 2009.  An Act provide 
for promotion and facilitation of investment and other assistance and in obtaining tax incentives 
and for related purposes. See section 15(2) (iii). 
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transform Kenya in a newly industrialized global competitive and prosperous middle 
income country.
1097
 
 
Consequently, the government of Kenya continued to attract, maintain and retain 
foreign investments. The rationale behind was their contribution to economic 
development providing employment, technology, for example, in communication 
sector like introduction of mobile transactions such as M-Pesa money transfer, 
facilitating transfer of capital and investments together with increasing foreign 
exchange earnings and tax revenue.
1098
  It is estimated that Kenya is having more 
than 100 MNCs operating in the country.
1099
 Such MNCs are ranging from 
communication sectors, for example, Safaricom and Airtel, manufacturing such as 
British American tobacco, Bamburi cement and banking like Barclays, to mention a 
few. Such MNCs are part of the large tax payers in Kenya contributing 70 to 80 
percent of the revenue.  However, Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) has no specific 
data on the extent of contribution of MNCs alone operating in Kenya due to 
complications in identifying actual transactions between associated MNCs.
1100
 All 
these culminated in an increase in MNCs‘ operations in Kenya whereby transfer 
pricing is practiced. However, while foreign investments have been seen important 
for developing the country‘s economy, they are also sources of vulnerable to such 
                                                          
1097
Kenya Bureau of statistics, Foreign Investment Survey, Preliminary Report 2015, p.1 available at 
www.knbs.or.ke. 
1098
 Shihata I. F., Legal Treatment of foreign Investment, The World bank Guideline, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1993, p.9-12. See also Nyamori B., note 46 p.153; Kenya Bureau of statistics, Foreign 
Investment Survey, Preliminary Report  2015, p.1 available at www.knbs.or.ke. Accessed 2015. 
1099
 Interview with TRA officials Nairobi Kenya December 2014.  See also KRA: Large Taxpayers 
Office, available at <http://www.revenue.go.ke/index.php/domestic-taxes/large-taxpayersoffice/ 
about-lto/vision. 
1100
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economy. This is because transfer pricing manipulation has been eroding tax base of 
Kenya.  
 
For example, transfer pricing audit made by KRA discovered loss of 25 billion 
Kenya shillings (Kshs.) due to abuse of transfer pricing rules.
1101
 That is achieved by 
either under-pricing or overpricing of goods and services between associated MNCs 
or by declaring losses.
1102
  It is also established that for 10 years between 2004 and 
2013, Kenya lost Kshs.11. 5 billion transfer pricing related tax annually.
1103
 
Consequently, associated MNCs‘ transactions have become under serious 
investigation by the government in order to curb transfer pricing manipulation. This 
is sought to be achieved by sharpening transfer pricing laws.  
7.3  Transfer Pricing Laws in Kenya  
The legal and regulatory framework of transfer pricing comprises three major 
sources, namely, the Constitution of Kenya, legislation and their rules and tax 
treaties.  
7.3.1  The Constitution of Kenya 2010 
The Constitution of Kenya clearly empowers nation government to impose taxes and 
charges on income tax, value added tax (VAT), customs duties and other duties on 
                                                          
1101
 Andae G., Tax Evasion Sting recovers sh. 25 Billion from Multinationals, Business daily, July 14, 
2014. 
1102
 Ibid, The amount which is equivalent to half the budget Kenya has allocated to 47 counties in the 
in 2014 financial year to tackle unemployment, the broken health system and to revamp 
infrastructure. 
1103
 Global Financial integrity report 2014 and 2015 which reports that Sub –Saharan Africa is losing a 
lot of money mainly due to trade invoice mispricing. 2015 report p. 43. 
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import and export goods as well as excise tax.
1104
 It provides authority to collect 
revenue to support the economy‗s efforts towards generating, serving and investing 
adequate funds to sustain needs for the country as well as promote sustainable 
national development.
1105
 The fact that, to a great extent, the economy of Kenya 
depends on its internal revenue, the Constitution provides for principles of public 
finance.  It requires openness, accountability and public participation in financial 
matters.
1106
 It also requires public finance system to promote an equitable society by 
sharing the burden of taxation fairly.
1107
 Accordingly, the revenue raised should be 
nationally equally shared and expenditure should promote equitable development.
1108
 
 
The constitution declares that the primary source of revenue for national is taxation. 
The power to impose tax lies with parliament exercised through legislation.
1109
 
Accordingly, it prohibits any tax or licensing fee to be imposed or waived or varied 
except as provided under legislation.
1110
 However, where the relevant legislation 
provides for waiver or variation, proper record and reason for waiver or variation are 
recorded and reported to Auditor General.
1111
  Generally, the Constitution of Kenya 
adheres to principles of good taxation. 
                                                          
1104
 Article 209 (1) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
1105
Kenya National Development Civic Education, Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and 
Constitutional affairs, 2012 p.158. 
1106
 Article 201 (a) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. 
1107
 ibid, Article 201 (b) (1). 
1108
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7.3.2  The Income Tax Act 2010  
The Income Tax Act (ITA) of Kenya was passed on 2010.
1112
 It repealed and 
replaced the 1973 ITA. There are three objectives of the ITA, firstly, it provides for 
charges, assessment and collection of income. Secondly, it provides for 
ascertainment of income to be charged. Thirdly, it provides for administration of 
charge, collection and ascertainment of the same.
1113
 The ITA has xiv parts, part I 
provides for commencement and interpretation. Party II deals with imposition of 
income tax, part III is about exemption from tax, part iv is on ascertainment of total 
income, party v is geared towards personal reliefs and part vi is on rates, deductions 
and set-off and double taxation relief. Part vii provides for persons assessable, part 
viii is about returns and notices, part ix is for assessments, part x deals with 
objections, appeals relief and relief for mistakes, part xi provides for collection 
recovery and payment of tax, part xii is about offences and penalties, part xiii is on 
administration and part xiv deals with miscellaneous provisions.  
 
Generally, the ITA imposes tax on both residents and non-residents on income 
accrued from Kenya.
1114
  For the purpose of this work, a company is regarded a 
resident of Kenya if it is incorporated under the laws of Kenya or management and 
control of affairs of the body is exercised in Kenya for that particular year of 
income.
1115
 Accordingly, the company is resident of Kenya if it is declared by the 
                                                          
1112
 Cap 470 RE 2014. 
1113
 See preamble of the ITA R.E 2014. 
1114
 Ibid, Section 3 (1). 
1115Unlike OECD and UN model and their guidelines, the ITA deviated from the world ‗effective 
management‘ which normally brings confusion.  
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Minister in the government gazette for any year of income.
1116
  The income taxed is 
profit obtained from business carried out, service rendered, a right granted for use or 
occupation of who has, and habitually exercises, authority to conclude contracts in 
the name of that person and property in Kenya for whatever period.
1117
 In addition, 
interest, dividends
1118
 and natural resources are also taxed.
1119
 MNCs also can be 
taxed on net gain derived from an interest in a corporation if the interest derives 
twenty percent or more of its value directly or indirectly from immovable property in 
Kenya.
1120
  Therefore, any income arising out of stated activities are also taxable to 
associated MNCs. 
 
7.3.2.1 Application of Arm’s Length Principle in Kenya   
Part IV of the ITA is of particular interest because it provides for ascertainment of 
income and arm‘s length principle for transfer pricing between associated parties.  
Section 18(1) provides for ascertainment of business profit or gain in relation to a 
non-resident who carries on business in Kenya. A person is said to carry on business 
in Kenya for transfer pricing purposes if such business is carried on from land or 
water, a product or produce, sells or delivery outside Kenya, including contract of 
sale made outside Kenya and utilization of the product or produce outside Kenya.
1121
  
The profit or gain is also derived from Kenya where a bank, which is a permanent 
                                                          
1116
Section 2 of ITA, Cap 470  R.E 2014. However, the law is silence on criteria for the Minister to 
declare a company as a resident. 
1117
 Ibid, section 3 (2) (a). Business profit is deemed to be derived from Kenya even if the business 
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 Ibid, section 3 (2) (b). 
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 Ibid, section 3(h). 
1120
 Ibid, section 3(2) (g), 3 (3) (c) and section 5A.  
1121
 Ibid, section 18(1). 
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establishment of a nonresident person holds outside Kenya any deposits, assets or 
property acquired from its operations in Kenya.
1122
  
 
Section 18 (3), in particular, provides for the arm‘s length principle. The provision 
provides that, 
―Where a non-resident person carries on business with a related 
resident person or through its permanent establishment and the 
course of that business is such that it produces to the resident person 
or through its permanent establishment either no profits or less than 
the ordinary profits which might be expected to accrue from that 
business if there had been no such relationship, then the gains or 
profits of that resident person or through its permanent establishment 
or from that business shall be deemed to be the amount that might 
have been expected to accrue if the course of that business had been 
conducted by independent persons dealing at arm's length.”1123 
 
This section sets arms‘ length principle as the basis for associated MNCs to be taxed. 
From the wording of section 18(3), the rationale behind is to ascertain the business 
profit or gains of associated MNCs by using independent persons as a benchmark. 
The policy underlying arm‘s length principle, in particular, section 18(3) is the need 
to hinder cross-border transactions between associated parties that have undesirable 
effect of shifting taxable income from Kenya.
1124
 But neither the ITA nor Transfer 
Pricing Rules provide for meaning of arm‘s length principle. However, the TP Rules 
define arm‘s length price to mean the price payable in a transaction between 
independent enterprises.
1125
 For the purpose of regulating transfer pricing, the 
                                                          
1122
 Ibid, section 18(2). 
1123
 Ibid, section 18(3). .  
1124
 Nyamori  note 46 p. 155. See also, Mbiuki J.M., The Legal and Institution Frame work of 
Transfer Pricing in Kenya: A Case Study of Unilever Case and its Aftermath, A Thesis Submitted 
in  partial fulfillment of the requirements for a award of a Master of Laws (LL.M) Degree of the 
University of Nairobi, 2009, p. 29. 
1125
 Rule 3 of TP Rules 2006. 
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persons are associated
1126
 to each other if ―either person participates directly or 
indirectly in the management, control or capital of the business of the other; or   a 
third person participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital 
of the business or both.‖1127  Accordingly, any individual, who is associated by 
marriage, is a blood relative or has an affinity to an individual involved in the 
management, control or capital of the business of the other is considered to be an 
associated party.
1128
 The threshold for control is 25 percent of the shareholding or 
voting power in the entity.
1129
 Accordingly, it recognizes bank as a permanent 
establishment of the non- resident person established outside Kenya but deposits 
assets or property acquired from its operations in Kenya.
1130
 Permanent 
establishment is defined as a fixed place of business and includes a place of 
management, a branch, an office, a factory, a workshop, and a mine, an oil or gas 
well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural resources, a building site, or 
a construction or installation project that has existed for six months or more where 
that person wholly or partly carries on business.
1131
 However, the ITA is silent on 
aspects that do not constitute permanent establishment for transfer pricing purposes. 
 
In ascertaining business profit derived from Kenya for transfer pricing purposes, the 
law clearly prohibits any deductions for expenditure incurred outside Kenya in 
respect of remunerations for services rendered by non-resident directors of non- 
resident company in excessive of five percent or twenty five thousand Kenya 
                                                          
1126
 It is important to note that ITA has used the word ‗related‘ throughout , but for the purposes of 
consistence of this work, the word ‗associated ‗is used. 
1127
 Section 18 (6) (a) and (b) of ITA R.E 2014. 
1128
 Ibid, section 18 (6) (c). 
1129
 Ibid, paragraph 32(1) of part IV of the second schedule. 
1130
 Ibid, section 18(5). 
1131
 Ibid, section 2(a). The definition of permanent establishment is imparimateria with UN model. 
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shillings, whichever is high.
1132
 Accordingly, no deduction in excess of one hundred 
and fifty thousand Kenya shillings shall be allowed.
1133
 In addition, no deduction is 
allowed on executive and general administrative expenses except to the extent that 
the Commissioner may determine that expenditure to be just and reasonable.
1134
  
However, the ITA does not provide any guideline as to when the expenditure is 
deemed to be reasonable and just. The terms just and reasonable are vague and may 
be used inappropriate manner. The ITA also prohibits deductions in respect of non-
resident person carries business in Kenya through permanent establishment in 
interest or royalties or management or professional fee purported to be paid to the 
nonresident person.
1135
 In implementing requirement of arm‘s length principle as 
provided under section 18(3), the law empowers the Minister of Finance to issue 
guideline for determination of arm‘s length price of a transaction.1136  
 
In ascertaining taxable income of permanent establishment, the law requires be taxed 
on profit attributable to it only.  However, the KRA is of the opinion that permanent 
establishment as an independent entity may have an opportunity to make profit from 
transactions that its foreign related parties had undertaken in Kenya. The rationale 
behind is that by virtue of relationship between permanent establishment and its head 
office as well as other permanent establishments, it may pass off the opportunity to 
those associated while playing a key role in generating income. In this context, 
                                                          
1132
 Ibid, section 18(4) (a). 
1133
 Ibid. 
1134
 Ibid, section 18(4) (b). Unlike Kenya, the law does not clearly provide for ascertainment of 
business profit for transfer pricing purposes.  
1135
 Ibid, Section 18(5) as amended by section 9 (b) of the Finance bill 2014, provided that for the 
avoidance of doubt, the expression "non-resident person" shall include both the head office and 
other offices of the non-resident person. 
1136
 Ibid, Section 18 (8) (a), however, as of October 2016 no transfer pricing guideline has been 
issued.  
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where MNCs carry out business in Kenya through permanent establishment they are 
also taxed on profits that relate to the permanent establishment but arise from 
activities conducted outside Kenya.
1137
 Furthermore, where a permanent 
establishment situated in Kenya makes payment to any other person in management 
or professional or training fee, royalty, interest, and use of property, it is considered 
to be income derived or accrued from Kenya.
1138
   
 
In ascertaining total income for the year of income, no deduction is allowed for 
capital expenditure, or any loss, diminution or exhaustion of capital.
1139
  
Notwithstanding any deductions, no deduction expenditure incurred in production of 
income deemed under section 10 of ITA to have accrued in or to have been derived 
from Kenya where that expenditure was incurred by a nonresident person not having 
a permanent establishment in Kenya.
1140
 Accordingly, no deduction in respect of 
interest, royalties or management professional fees paid or purported to be paid by 
permanent establishment to nonresident persons including head office and other 
unrelated offices of such non- resident.
1141
 However, any exchange loss or gain in 
respect of foreign exchange loss and gain with respect of net assets including liability 
is disregarded.
1142
  
 
                                                          
1137
 Ernest and Young 2013, p.2. 
1138
 Section (10, a –f) of  ITACap 479 R.E 2014. 
1139
 Ibid, section16. 
1140
 Ibid, section 16 (2) (f). 
1141
 Ibid, section 18(5). 
1142
 Ibid. 
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7.3.2.2 Transfer Pricing Adjustment 
Where it is established that a transaction between associated MNCs produces no 
taxable income or less than what could have been expected to the parties dealing 
with each other independently, the Commissioner is empowered to adjust such 
income. However, section 18 is silent on modalities of transfer pricing 
adjustments.
1143
Consequently, general anti-avoidance provisions of the ITA become 
applicable.
1144
 The provision provides that, 
―Where the Commissioner is of the opinion that the main purpose 
or one of the main purposes for which a transaction was effected 
(whether before or after the passing of this Act) was the avoidance 
or reduction of liability to tax for a year of income or that the 
main benefit which might have been expected to accrue from the 
transaction in the three years immediately following the 
completion thereof was the avoidance or reduction of liability to 
tax, he may, if he determines it to be just and reasonable, direct 
that such adjustments shall be made as respects liability to tax as 
he considers appropriate to counteract the avoidance or reduction 
of liability to tax which could otherwise be effected by the 
transaction.” 
 
For the Commissioner to invoke this provision, two conditions must exist, firstly, the 
main purpose or one of the purposes of the transaction must be avoidance or 
reduction of liability to tax. Secondly, the exercise of the Commissioner‘s power 
must be just and reasonable.
1145
  The fact that there is no specific provision of 
transfer pricing adjustment, it is likely transfer pricing adjustments are done in 
context of general anti-avoidance tax. The problem with this approach is that transfer 
                                                          
1143
 Unlike Kenya, In Tanzania the law clearly provides for modalities for transfer pricing adjustment. 
See  chapter six para 6.3.2.4. 
1144
 Section 23 of Cap 470, ITA, R.E 2014. The policy underlies section 23 is that taxpayer ought not 
to pay less tax thanwhat could have expected for being induced by tax avoidance motive but rather 
should be in accordance with the intention of the law. 
1145
 Commissioner of Income Tax v C.W Armstrong, KE, CA, 1962. 
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pricing adjustment entails specific procedures that must be followed, unlike other 
ordinary adjustments. This can be substantiated by the fact that any additional tax 
arising out of transfer pricing adjustment is subject to additional penalties of twenty 
percent for late payment and two percent interest rate per month on tax amount 
remaining to be paid.
1146
 Yet, the taxpayer is also liable for tax avoidance penalty 
equal to double the amount that would have been avoided.
1147
  
 
The Tax Procedure Act also imposes tax avoidance penalty to any taxpayer who 
knowingly makes false or misleading statement or omits from statements any 
information made to an authorized person.
1148
 Seventy five percent of the tax 
shortfall for if the statement was made deliberately or twenty five percent in any 
other case.
1149
 Such penalty will be increased for ten percent if it is the second 
application and twenty five percent for the third application.
1150
However, it is 
unclear whether errors could be considered false declarations and criteria to 
determine if an act is deliberate.
1151
 Although the Tax Procedure Act is silent on 
transfer pricing, the Act is applicable by analogy to transfer pricing because the Act 
clearly states that in absence of specific procedure under tax law, the provision of 
TPA shall apply.
1152
 The law also is silent as to whether or not transfer pricing 
adjustments can be passed through financial statements or through income tax 
computation. However, a taxpayer is allowed to make self-adjustment if by reason of 
                                                          
1146
 Section 72D and 94 (1) of ITA R.E 2014 
1147
 Section 85 of the Tax Procedure Act, 2015. 
1148
 Section 84(1) and (8) of TPA, 2015. 
1149
Ibid, section 84 (2) (a) and (b). 
1150
 Ibid, section 84(3) (a) and (b). 
1151
 PWC, Kenya‘s New Tax Procedure Act seeks to harmonize and consolidate tax administration, 
Tax Insights from International Tax Services, March 2016. p.2. 
1152
 Section 2 (2) of  Tax Procedure Act, 2015. 
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some mistake of fact or errors leading to excessive assessment by applying to the 
Commissioner within seven years.
1153
 In addition, the law is silent on corresponding 
adjustment. 
7.3.3  Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules 2006 
Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules (TP Rules) were established in 2006 and came 
into force on 1
st
 July, 2006.
1154
 The TP Rules came out following decision in 
Unilever case whereby the court, in reaching its decision, relied on OECD rules 
because by then Kenya had no detailed transfer pricing rules. There are two 
objectives of TP Rules, first, to provide guidelines for associated enterprises in 
determining the arm‘s length price for transactions of goods and services between 
them.
1155
  Second, to provide administrative regulations for transfer pricing 
documents submitted to the Commissioner General (Commissioner).
1156
  The TP 
Rules applies between associated MNCs operating within and outside Kenya.
1157
   
 
Also applies between permanent establishment and its head office in which 
permanent establishment is treated as a distinct as well as separate from its head 
office or other related branches.
1158
 The TP Rules define associated parties for 
transfer pricing purposes to mean one or more or third person enterprises 
participating directly or indirectly in management, control or capital of the other 
                                                          
1153
 Section 90 of ITA R.E 2014. 
1154
 Legal Notice No. 67 of 2006. 
1155
 Rule 3(a) of the TP Rules 2006. 
1156
Ibid, Rule 3(b). 
1157
 Ibid, Rule 5(a). 
1158
 Ibid, Rule 5(b). 
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enterprise.
1159
 To the contrary, the ITA defines related parties to include an 
individual who participates in management, control or capital of the business is 
associated by marriage, consanguinity or affinity.
1160
 Arguably, even in absence of 
control, entities may still be deemed related because control is not the only 
criterion.
1161
 ITA widely defined related persons, a pattern, which ensures that 
transfer prices can be adjusted not only to MNCs related but also to individuals who 
are related in a particular business. To the contrary, the TP Rules clearly exclude 
individuals.
1162
 Accordingly, the TP Rules define associated enterprises and not 
associated persons for transfer pricing purposes as provided under enabling Act and 
the scope of application of TP Rules is limited to related enterprises.
1163
 Ordinarily, 
in case there is conflict between rules and enabling Act, the enabling Act will prevail 
over rules.  However, exclusion of related individual under the rules may bring 
problems in its implementation. 
 
TP Rules provide for transactions, which are subject to adjustment under arm‘s 
length principle. They include the sale or purchase of goods or lease of tangible 
assets, the transfer, purchase or use of intangible assets, provision of services; 
lending or borrowing of money and any other transactions, which may affect profit 
or loss of the enterprises involved.
1164
 The TP Rules provide a wide range of 
transactions that are subject to transfer pricing adjustment, in particular, it gives a 
wide room for KRA to adjust such transfer pricing. Although the TP Rules recognize 
                                                          
1159
Ibid, Rule 2. 
1160
 Section 18(6) of ITA. 
1161
 Deloitte, Global Transfer Pricing Country Guide 3, Kenya, 2015, p. 133. 
1162
 See definition of related enterprises  regulation 2. 
1163
 Rule 5 of the TP Rules 2006. 
1164
 Rule 6(a)–(f). 
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services, tangible and intangible assets including goods, neither the TP nor the ITA 
provides for definition of such terms for transfer pricing purposes like it is done by 
other countries.
1165
 The absence of proper definition of such terms may render 
uncertainty in application of arm‘s length principle to such transactions. 
7.3.3.1 Determination of Arm’s Length Price 
To arrive at arm‘s length price, the TP Rules provide methods to be applied. They 
include Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) resale price method; cost plus method 
profit split method and the transactional net margin method.
1166
 Essentially, these 
methods are replica of OECD methods.
1167
  In applying these methods, the taxpayer 
is free to choose any method it deemed fit for a particular transaction.
1168
 
Accordingly, no issued guidelines describe procedures to be followed while 
determining arm‘s length price. In this context, it is not an offence for the associated 
MNCs to select any method in determining arm‘s length price even if the most 
relevant method is available. Notwithstanding, this requirement, a tax payer is 
obliged to apply the most appropriate methods, depending on nature of transactions 
or class of transactions or related persons or function performed.
1169
 Arguably, the 
                                                          
1165
 See for example transfer Income tax (Transfer Pricing Rules) of Tanzania 2014. Definition means 
interpretation given by any written law to a word or expression. See section 3 of the Interpretation 
and General Provisions Act, Cap 2 of the laws of Kenya, Revised Edition 2014. See also, Kiunsi 
H.B., Money and Politics in Tanzania: An Evaluation of The Election Expenses Act in the 2010 
General Election, Elixir Criminal Law 51 (2012) pp 10841-10849,  p. 10845 stating the rationale 
behind defining word or expression is to provide certainty to its meaning, or to limit its ordinary 
meaning or to extend its ordinary meaning, and in some cases merely to avoid repetitions.  
1166
 Rule 7 (a) – (d) read together with Rule 8(1) of the TP Rules 2006.  
1167
According to KRA officials there are two reasons for this, first, at the time TP Rules were 
established only OECD model was available and it was viable option. Second, OECD Model 
provides for international standard of arm‘s length principle.  
1168
 Rule 4 of TP Rules 2006. 
1169
 Ibid, Rule 8(2). 
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law contradicts by imposing no hierarchal application of methods, on one hand, and 
on the other hand, requiring the most appropriate method to be employed. 
 
Generally, KRA prefer CUP method where comparables are available and in the 
absence of comparables, it renders determination of arm‘s length price via CUP 
difficult.
1170
 The problem is exacerbated by lack of local comparable data base 
although it subscribed pan-European data base like Amadeus.
1171
 To the contrary, 
associated MNCs in Kenya prefer spilt profit margin method, which is comparatively 
more complicated than CUP.  It is believed that MNCs take advantage of the law 
because it is silent on the range of profit margins.
1172
 The TP Rules deviates from 
OECD by allowing any other method prescribed by the Commissioner to be used in 
case the arm‘s length price cannot be determined by using methods prescribed in the 
TP Rules.
1173
 Yet, neither the TP rules nor the ITA provide what constitutes other 
methods. It is also unclear whether or not that other methods eventually will lead to 
arm‘s length price or will be something else more or equivalent to arm‘s length 
methods. However, according to KRA officials, the practice has shown that 
formulary apportioned method has been used in such cases. The problem with this 
method is that no law regulates the same. Therefore, there is risk of such methods to 
be applied arbitrarily as well as may affect both the taxpayer and KRA.  
 
                                                          
1170
 An interview with KRA officials.  
1171
 Ibid, 
1172
 Ibid. 
1173
 Rule 7(e) of TP Rules 2006. 
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7.3.3.2 Transfer Pricing Comparability Factors 
Application of any method in determining arm‘s length price depends on comparable 
available, but the TP Rules are silent on factors to be compared.
1174
 However, in 
context of TP Rules, a transaction is comparable if there are no material differences 
or reasonable accurate adjustment that can be made to eliminate material 
difference.
1175
 Comparability of transaction for transfer pricing purposes presupposes 
presence of local comparable data. Kenya, like any other developing countries, is 
lacking local comparables.
1176
 Consequently, use of Kenya comparables may be very 
limited and may lead to absence of comparables. In practice, MNCs in Kenya have 
been using commercial foreign databases such as Amadeus and Orbis as benchmark 
studies.
1177
 The problem with foreign comparables is that they may not be very 
relevant and they may be expensive.  
 
Accordingly, the TP Rules are silent on whether or not foreign data are accepted 
provided that no material differences or can reasonably be adjusted. Yet, in practice, 
KRA occasionally challenges use of foreign comparables on basis of non-inclusion 
of country adjustment.
1178
 However, no guideline on how adjustment can be made 
when foreign comparable is used.  
                                                          
1174
 Unlike Kenya, Tanzania clearly provides comparability factors . see Rule 6 of TP Rules 2014 of 
Tanzania. 
1175
 Rule 2 of TP Rules 2006. 
1176
 See discussion in chapter 6, para 6.4.3.2. 
1177
 Deloitte, note 71. See also KPMG, Global Transfer Pricing Review, Kenya, 2015, p.4. 
1178
 Ibid. 
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7.3.3.3 Application of Arm’s Length Principle to Intangibles, Services and 
Intercompany Financial Transactions 
The TP Rules require transfer of services, intangibles and finances between associate 
MNCs to be made at arm‘s length price.1179 In Kenya, there are no clear guidelines 
on application of arm‘s length principle to such transactions. To start with services, 
in practice, the KRA requires the tax payer to demonstrate that intra group services 
were actually rendered based on the agreement if any.  
 
However, there is no guideline as to when the services are said to be actually 
rendered.
1180
 In practice, the KRA requires taxpayer to show that service was needed 
and there is no duplication of activities and that the fee was properly charged.
1181
   
This is sought to be achieved by providing evidence of such transactions. While such 
requirements may be valid, if they are not regulated may not compel a taxpayer to 
comply. Likewise, the law does not provide any guideline on range of services to be 
taken into account for transfer pricing purposes. The problem with this is that it may 
render difficult to ascertain the amount of tax to be charged.  This is obvious despite 
prohibition of deduction on services rendered by the nonresident directors of the non-
resident company.
1182
 Yet, the law empowers the Commissioner to determine 
whether or not administrative expenses between associates are reasonable and 
just.
1183
 
                                                          
1179
 Ibid, section 10 and Rule 3 (a), and 6 (c), (d) and (e) of TP Rules, 2006. 
1180
 In Tanzania for example there is clear guideline showing circumstances that the service was 
actually rendered. See TRA, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, para 14. 
1181
 Omond, F., Transfer Pricing –An East African Perspective, A paper presented in IBFD 1st Africa 
Tax Symposium, June 2015 Livingstone Zambia, p. 16. 
1182
 Section 18 (4) (a) R.E 2014. 
1183
 Ibid, section 18 (4) (b). 
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With regard to intangible, in practice, the KRA requires the taxpayer to show the 
owner of the intangible and if it is registered in Kenya. Accordingly, it evaluates the 
value of intangible and contribution of Kenya to the value of intangible.
1184
 
Arguably, both ITA and TP Rules are silent under circumstances a person can be 
regarded as owner of intangible. Sometimes the owner of the intangible may not be 
vested with the legal ownership but contributed substantially in developing such 
intangible but no guideline on arm‘s length payment. Accordingly, the law is silent 
about aspects that constitute intangibles for transfer pricing purposes. Moreover, it 
does not provide guideline method to be applied in intangibles in absence of 
comparables or where intangible is of high value.
1185
This is necessary because of a 
variety of intangibles that may present different problems. 
 
With regard to intergroup financing, generally, the KRA has not been focusing much 
on this area. There are few explanations for this such that, to a great extent, the law 
in Kenya has restricted interest and deemed interest deduction in ascertaining taxable 
income. For example, the law does not allow deduction of interest to a company if 
the ratio of all liabilities in which the interest is charged exceeds three times the sum 
of revenue reserves and issued and paid up capital.
1186
 The 3:1 ratio applies to other 
companies except for extractive industries (mining, petroleum and geothermal) in 
which 2:1 ratio of debt to equity applies.
1187
 Accordingly, the law does not allow any 
deduction of interest paid by permanent establishment to non-resident person for 
                                                          
1184
 Omond, F., note 92. 
  
1185
 Unlike Kenya, in Tanzania, the law requires be transferred by using CUP method. see Rule 11(2) 
of TP Rules 2014 of Tanzania. 
1186
 Section 16(j) (i) commonly known as 3.1 ratio. 
1187
 Deloitte, International Tax, Kenya Highlights  2016 available at 
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transfer pricing purposes.
1188
 In context of ITA, debt means loans, overdrafts, 
ordinary trade debts, overdrawn current accounts or any other form of indebtedness 
for which a company is paying financial charge, interest and discount premium. 
However, there is no clear guideline on what constitutes intergroup financing for 
transfer pricing purposes.  Absence of a clear guidelines on such transactions may be 
potential for associated MNCs to manipulate prices and hence, jeopardize KRA 
efforts for collecting tax for viable development.  
 
7.3.3.4 Transfer Pricing Documentation Requirement 
Neither the ITA nor the TP rules make mandatory transfer pricing documentation 
requirement.  However, when person avers application of arm‘s length principle, the 
TP Rules require that the person should develop transfer pricing policy and provide 
documentation to evidence their analysis.
1189
 Required transfer pricing 
documentation includes those related to selection of transfer pricing method and their 
reasons for selection including their application, the global organizational structure 
of the MNC, details of transaction under consideration, assumptions, strategies and 
policies applied in selecting the method plus any other information as may be 
necessary for such transaction.
1190
 Notwithstanding such requirement, the tax payer 
is not under obligation to produce such document with other tax returns but rather, 
can produce upon the request by the Commissioner thirty days upon request.
1191
  
 
                                                          
1188
 Ibid, section 18 (5). 
1189
 Rule 10. 
1190
 Rule 9 (2)(a) to (f). 
1191
 Rule 10 (i). 
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Arguably, the existing TP Rules do not compel associated MNCs to produce transfer 
pricing documents but rather, maintain documents. The ITA requires the tax payers 
to maintain their records for ten years.
1192
 To the contrary, the Tax Procedure Act 
requires the tax payer to maintain any tax document as required by law in either 
English or Kiswahili for a period of five years.
1193
 Notwithstanding these 
requirements, the law requires corporate taxpayers to notify KRA any changes in 
their business structure, in particular, changes in shareholders, beneficial ownership 
as well as cession or sale of business within thirty days of such changes.
1194
  Despite 
existing conflicting requirements, there is no specific penalty for non-compliance 
with the documentation requirement.
1195
 Consequently, the general provisions of the 
ITA relating to fraud, failure to furnish returns, penalties and interest for late 
payment of tax are made applicable to TP issues as well.
1196
  
 
7.4  Administration and Enforcement of Transfer Pricing Rules in Kenya 
7.4.1  Institutional Framework for Transfer Pricing  
Generally, administration and enforcement of tax matters are vested with Kenya 
Revenue Authority (KRA). The KRA was established in 1995 and became effective 
on 1
st
 July, 1995.
1197
 Essentially, KRA is a body corporate with perpetual succession 
and common seal. The main function of the KRA under general supervision of the 
minister responsible for finance is to collect and receipt of all government 
                                                          
1192
 Section 55(2) of  ITA R.E 2014. 
1193
 Ibid, Section 23 (1) (a) and (c). 
1194
 Ibid, section 54B, (a) and (b) (i), (ii) (v). 
1195
 Unlike Kenya, Tanzania clearly provides penalty for non compliance of TP rules. see Rule 7(5) of 
TP Rules 2014 of Tanzania. 
1196
 Rule 11 and 12 of TP Rules 2006. It worth to note that, following establishment of the Tax 
procedure Act, this requirement might be affected as some of the provision have been repealed and 
other amended.  
1197
 Section 3 of Kenya Revenue Authority Act, RE 2016. 
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revenues.
1198
 In performing a given function, the KRA is also responsible in 
administering and enforcement of tax laws. Other responsibilities include advising 
government on administration and collection of revenue and to perform any other 
duties that may be assigned by the minister in revenue collection.
1199
 The KRA is 
manned by Board of Directors and KRA management under the Commissioner 
General.The Board, under chairman as presidential appointee, is responsible for 
approval and review of the policy and monitoring of performance of the KRA.
1200
 
The function of the Commissioner General is to oversee daily operations of the KRA 
in collection of government revenue.
1201
 In performing its responsibilities, the KRA 
is divided in to two main department, namely, domestic tax payer, which consists of 
domestic taxes and large tax payer office (LTO) and custom and excise. The LTO is 
of particular interest because it deals with taxpayers, whose annual turnover is from 
750 million and above.
1202
  As a result, most MNCs are within the LTO. The LTO 
was established in 2006 as full-fledged department with objective of administering 
domestic tax matters affecting large tax payers.  One of the responsibilities of LTO is 
administration of taxes to all companies with their subsidiaries falling under LTO.  It 
is in this context that KRA has established transfer pricing unit (TP Unit). The TP 
Unit was established in 2009. The TP Unit is manned by less than twenty staffs and 
is responsible for handling transfer pricing audits. Selection for transfer pricing audit 
is based on risk profile such as consecutive losses, use of tax haven countries, 
intercompany loan, management fee, large investment deductions and disclosure in 
                                                          
1198
 Ibid, section 5(1). 
1199
 Ibid, section 5(2). 
1200
 Ibid, section  6(1)  and 6(6). 
1201
 Ibid, Section 11(2) and Section 5 of Tax Administration Act, 2015.  
1202
 http://www.revenue.go.ke/lto/lto.html  
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tax return as well as financial statements.
1203
 The major focus area includes 
management fee, tangible goods, intangible and royalties and financial arrangement. 
Since its establishment, considerably, there is increase in transfer pricing audits that 
resulted into transfer pricing adjustment to Kenya billion shillings. Accordingly, 
more cases currently are under audit and some cases have been decided at tribunal 
level and a few at high court appeal stage.
1204
  
 
Despite considerable good performance, the TP Unit is facing challenges in 
implementing its works.  The existing TP Rules do not provide for a clear guidelines 
on transaction related to service, intangibles, royalties and intercompany financial 
arrangement. Such situation has led to less related transaction audits.  Apart from 
legal challenges, absence of reliable local comparables, poorly prepared documents 
and lack of information of foreign associated parties are other challenges.
1205
 In 
addition, the TP Unit has low number of transfer pricing experts compared to transfer 
pricing audits, which are likely to occur.  
 
7.4.2  Transfer Pricing Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
The existing transfer pricing laws do not provide for specific mechanisms for transfer 
pricing disputes. Such disputes have been handled just like any other tax matter.  In 
most cases, transfer pricing disputes arise from additional assessment by the 
Commissioner if he considers that the taxpayer under-declared his income.
1206
  If the 
tax payer is aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioner, he has the right to 
                                                          
1203
 www.kra.ke.go large tax payer office. 
1204
 Omond F., Transfer Pricing- An East African Perspective, a paper presented in Zambia, June 
2015. 
1205
 An interview with KRA officials. 
1206
 Section 73 and 77 of ITA R.E 2014,  and section 28 of Tax Procedures Act, 2015 
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appeal to Tax Appeal Tribunal (TAT)
1207
 within thirty days upon receipt of the 
decision by the Commissioner.
1208
 The function of TAT is to hear appeals filed 
against any decision of the Commissioner.
1209
   
 
The Tax Appeal Tribunal (TAT) is composed of the chairman and not less than 15 
but not more than 20 members. For a person to become TAT member she/he should 
be the holder of degree in law, business, finance, economics, insurance or related 
discipline from university or institution recognized in Kenya,
1210
 among other 
qualifications. This requirement is very useful when dealing with transfer pricing 
cases because such disputes are not premised on taxation only but rather, a 
combination of the said disciplines. Empirical evidence shows that absence of such 
qualifications may provide potentials for revenue authority to lose cases. For 
example, a study by European Commission revealed that before establishment of Tax 
Appeal Tribunal, local committee members were lacking specialist experience in tax 
and transfer pricing, a situation, which rendered difficult to come up with well 
reasoned, researched precedents.
1211
 Likewise, in Unilever case, the Judge was 
                                                          
1207
 Section 3 of the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, 2013 which came in to force on April 2015 by Legal 
Notice No. 32 of 20th March 2015. 
1208
 Ibid, Section 12 and 13 (1) (a) respectively. Prior to establishment of TAT, appeals on decision of 
commissioner including transfer pricing disputes were filed either to Local Committee or Tribunal. 
See Mbiuki note 1124, p 70; Ado, M., Transfer Pricing Disputes In Kenya: Advance Pricing 
Agreements the Way Forward? Master‘s programme in European and International Tax Law, Lund 
University, 2015, p.16. 
1209
  Section 3 of Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, 2013 and Rule 2 (a)–(f) of the Tax Appeals Tribunal 
(Procedure) Rules, 2015. 
1210
 Ibid, section 4 (3) (b) (ii). However, unlike repealed section 82 of ITA, the Tax Appeals Tribunal 
Procedure Rules does not include degree in Taxation as one of the qualification for the members. 
1211
 EU Commission Transfer pricing and Developing countries, Kenya (2011):, Appendix D: Country 
Study-Kenya, p. 16. 
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concerned with failure from local committee to include reasons for their 
decisions.
1212
  
 
The proceedings of the TAT is  of judicial nature and that it carries out its writs 
processes, orders and rules just like any ordinary court of law.
1213
  The burden of 
proof lies with appellant
1214
and it has the power to engage expert evidence.
1215
 The 
TAT also has power to grant parties to settle matters out of TAT at any stage during 
the proceedings.
1216
 The decision of TAT is made in writing and the law requires 
such decision to be reasoned.
1217
 It is interesting to note that the TAT clearly 
excludes application of the Civil Procedure Act.
1218
 This is very important because it 
may help to reduce technical issues used by lawyers in civil cases.  However, any 
part aggrieved by Tax Appeal Tribunal decision has the right to appeal to High Court 
of Kenya within thirty days after decision of the TAT under High Court rules.
1219
  
Where any part is aggrieved by the decision of High Court, he has the right to appeal 
to Court of Appeal.  
 
Although the Tax Appeal Tribunal has kept all tax disputes under one roof and taken 
in account significantly pertinent issues that might be potential in solving transfer 
disputes, it is likely to face some challenges from taxpayers.  There are two reasons 
for this, first, the Constitution confers on the High Court unlimited jurisdiction in all 
                                                          
1212
 Unilever case ,  In which the Judge stated, ―Unfortunately I do not have the benefit of the 
reasoning of the Local Committee and I am bound therefore to consider this appeal in terms of 
arguments advanced before me…‖ See also Ado, M., note 104. 
1213
 Section 24 of Tax Appeal Tribunal Act, 2013. 
1214
 Ibid, section 30. 
1215
 Ibid, section 23. 
1216
 Ibid, section 28. 
1217
 Ibid, section 29(5) and (7). 
1218
 Ibid, section 14. 
1219
 Ibid, Section 32.  
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civil and criminal matters.
1220
  For that reason, some taxpayers may directly institute 
tax cases to the High Court, seeking for prerogative orders before passing to ordinary 
tax disputes mechanism.
1221
  For example, in Keroche Industries v Kenya Revenue 
Authority & 5 others 
1222
 it was stated that, 
―The respondents‟ argument that the applicant came to court 
prematurely without exhausting the internal tax objection process 
as regards each category of tax, is a serious misdirection […] the 
issues raised were greater than any of the internal tribunals could 
handle. The task before the court is not, and has not been that of 
counting the shillings, it has been one of adjudicating on 
illegality, the doctrine of ultra vires, irrationality, procedural 
impropriety, Wednesbury unreasonableness (sic), oppression, 
malice, bias, discrimination and abuse of power.”1223 
 
Unfortunately, the Tax Appeal Tribunal does not pose any requirement that all tax 
disputes should first be filed to TAT before proceeding to High Court. Since the 
TAT is still new, it remains to be seen whether or not tax related cases will first be 
taken at TAT before the High Court. Secondly, tax including transfer pricing appeals 
from TAT lies to High Court and Court of Appeal. However, unlike TAT, the High 
Court is likely to lack specialist knowledge on transfer pricing issues. This is because 
there is no pre-requisite for bench of Judges to have prior knowledge in taxation, 
finance, marketing and economics, which are important aspects in determining 
transfer pricing cases. Accordingly, currently, under hierarchy of Kenyan court 
system, there is no high court tax division designed to handle such issues. The 
requirement for such division seems to be desirable by the court itself. In Republic v 
                                                          
1220
 Article165 and Article 2 respectively of the Constitution of Republic of Kenya 2010. 
1221
 Ado note 104, p16, Mbiuki, note 1124, p. 72, see also EU P.34. 
1222
 2007. 
1223
 Keroche‘s case   p.34 
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Kenya Revenue Authority Ex-Parte Abdalla Brek Said T/A Al Amri Distributors & 4 
others,
1224
 the court stated that, 
―The court avails itself of this opportunity to call for the 
establishment of a specialized Tax Division of the High Court 
which may give expeditious hearing of tax disputes in the 
interests, on the one hand, of a quick determination of the tax 
liability for the tax payers‟ benefit and, on the other hand, in the 
interests of the Public at large who eventually benefit for the 
proceeds of taxation.” 
 
In such circumstances, transfer pricing cases are likely to be handled just like any 
other civil cases in which Civil Procedure Act and other High Court Appeal rules are 
applicable. One issue is crystal clear. While TAT ousted application of Civil 
Procedure Act in its proceedings, such provisions are likely to be applied in High 
Court proceedings to the same dispute and therefore, it may represents the same 
problem, which TAT aimed to avoid.   
 
7.4.3  Court Interpretation and its Impact to Transfer Pricing Law  
Transfer pricing disputes poses serious challenges when determined by the court of 
law. This part focuses on decision of the High Court of Kenya and its influence on 
transfer pricing regime in Kenya.  To illustrate this point, the study uses the High 
Court‘s decision of Unilever Kenya Ltd v Commissioner of Income Tax.1225  
The facts of the case were as follows:- Unilever Kenya Limited (UKL) and Uganda 
Unilever Limited (UUL) are both subsidiaries of Unilever group of companies 
incorporated in United Kingdom (UK). Both subsidiaries are related companies 
under the laws of Kenya. In August 1995, UKL and UUL entered into a contract 
                                                          
1224
 2015
   
1225
 Income tax appeal no. 753, of 2003 KE: HC September 2005. 
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agreeing that UKL will manufacture and supply goods to UUL. However, UKL 
charged UUL lowered prices than it charged its domestic buyers and importers not 
related to UUL. The Commissioner of Income Tax raised assessment against UKL in 
respect of sales made by UKL to UUL and found that they were not made at arm‘s 
length price.  
As a result, such arrangements produced less tax than would have been produced if 
transactions had been carried out by an Independent Corporation. Hence, the 
Commissioner assessed UKL for additional tax. Two main issues were of concern. 
First, ―whether t the transaction between UKL and UUL was so arranged to produce 
less profit.‖1226 Second, ―whether in the absence of specific guidelines from the KRA 
on this issue, the OECD Guidelines and methods prescribed there under for 
calculation of an arm‘s length price are a proper, reasonable and objectively 
acceptable  bases for the determination of arm‘s length price as required by section 
18(3)‖.1227 In this case, the HC ruled in favour of the tax payer, the UKL.  
In reaching decision whether the OECD Guidelines was applicable in absence of 
Kenyan guidelines, the HC agreed with UKL that in absence of Kenyan guidelines to 
determine what constitutes arm‘s length price, the UKL was justified to resort to 
OECD Guidelines because they are internationally accepted principles of 
international business so long as they are not in conflict with Kenyan law.
1228
  In his 
words, the Judge stated that, 
                                                          
1226
 Ibid, p.3. 
1227
 Ibid, p. 4. 
1228
 Ibid, p.12 and 13. 
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           “We live in what is now referred to as a „global village.‟ We cannot 
overlook or sideline what has come out of the wisdom of tax payers 
and tax collectors in other countries. And especially because of the 
absence of any such guidelines in Kenya, we must look elsewhere. 
We must be prepared to innovate, and to apply creative solutions 
based on lessons and best practices available to us. That is indeed 
how our law will develop and our jurisprudence will be enhanced. 
And that is also how we shall encourage business to thrive in our 
country.”1229 
 
This decision offers an important insight in transfer pricing jurisprudence in Kenya. 
First, the court also had dilemma for fear from discouraging investors if they had to 
decide against MNCs. This can be inferred from the judge‘s statement that ―…and 
that is also how we shall encourage business to thrive in our country.‖ Second, the 
judgment influenced KRA to establish transfer pricing rules modeled in OECD one 
year after the judgment.
1230
 Arguably, the court interpreted Kenyan law in light of 
the OECD.  
However, the provisions of the OECD are standard-based (ex post) as opposed to 
rule-based (ex ante).
1231
 Eduardo posits that the full meaning of the OECD provision 
can be provided by case law only or something functionally equivalent to case 
law.
1232
  This shows that precise meaning of the OECD standard-based will be found 
in decentralized domestic court case laws with public good character.
1233
 In this 
context, courts normally have wide room to construe provision of tax treaty to take 
                                                          
1229
 Ibid. 
1230
 See Income Tax Act (Transfer Pricing Rules) 2006 of Kenya.  
1231
 For difference between rule based and standard based see  Baistrocchi, E., The use and 
interpretation of tax treaties in the emerging world: Theory and implications, in British Tax Review, 
2008  Issue 4 p. 386. 
1232
  Ibid. 
1233
 In other words case law is a public good character if it sets good precedent to be referred future 
cases when similar circumstances happen. See Baistrocchi, E., note 639 p.388 .  Stating that, case 
law is a public good (rather than a private good) if it allows a representative person to predict the 
probable outcome of a future court‘s decision. 
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into account strategic consideration.
1234
 In reaching decision of the two issues the 
court used standard-based rather than rule-based of Section 18(3).
1235
 The judge, 
whether knowingly or unknowingly, interpreted section 18 (3) as if he was 
interpreting OECD model provision. This was so because the judge specifically 
referred to OECD principle by stating that,  
―I have no doubt in my mind that OECD principle on income and 
capital and the relevant Guidelines such as „transfer pricing‟ 
principles, the CUP method adopted for calculation of what ought 
to be the income, the cost plus return method as well as resale 
minus method are not just there for relaxing reading … would be 
fool- hardy for any court to disregard any international accepted 
principles of business…..To do otherwise would be highly short-
sighted.”1236 
 
This statement implies that the OECD standards are stronger than domestic laws and 
judges are ready to opt for OECD rather than substantive laws of the country. 
Additionally, the OECD standards were made applicable even in absence of tax 
treaty to OECD non-members like Kenya. It is also true that section 18 (3) is a 
replica of Article 9 of the OECD model. Nevertheless, it was supposed to be 
construed in rule-based. As Bosire pointed out that while resort could have been 
made to foreign jurisprudence, ultimately, it is a substance of Kenyan law to be 
construed and applied.
1237
  The court‘s interpretation in favour of OECD makes 
existing domestic transfer pricing laws ineffective. The main implication of the 
judgment is that the court reaffirmed use of OECD and its transfer pricing Guidelines 
                                                          
1234
 Ibid, The good example of such kind of interpretation can be found in the Union of India and 
Azadi Bachao Andolan (2003) SC 56ITR INDIA in which the court interpreted the India-Mauritius 
tax treaty in light of the India-US tax treaty. 
1235
 ITA, RE 2014. 
1236
 Judge Alnashir Visram  in Unilever case p.13. 
1237
 Nyamori  B., An Analysis of Kenya‘s Transfer pricing Regime, International Transfer pricing 
Journal , March/ April 2012, p.157. 
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in Kenya. The biggest impact is that it influenced Kenya to establish transfer pricing 
rules, which replica of OECD transfer pricing Guidelines. This was partly to remedy 
concern by the KRA that the OECD model was not part of Kenyan law and partly to 
reaffirm desire for MNCs to apply OECD, which for a great part allows them to 
obtain more taxing rights than host countries.
1238
  
 
The Unilever case also has brought insight on difficulties involved by revenue 
authorities in proofing before the court of law an alleged manipulation of transfer 
prices. In this case, it was not disputed that UKL and UUL are related parties within 
the meaning of section 18(3) of Income Tax Act of Kenya. The argument by KRA 
was that transacted between them were arranged as to produce less profit. Produced 
evidence showed that UKL had designed a scheme to cheat on its incomes with the 
view of reducing its tax liability.
1239
 UKL sold its products to Tanzania and Somalia 
higher than those sold to UUL and that price to UUL was set without considering 
market force. In addition, transfer pricing policy of Unilever group of companies was 
offending Section 18(3).
1240
  Whether the transaction was so arranged, the court held 
that there was no such arrangement between UKL and UUL.
1241
 In reaching the 
decision, the judge stated that, ―the business so arranged must be such as to show 
less income to enable the tax authority to challenge it and that there was no evidence 
of tax cheating or tax fraud.‖1242 According to judge, only evidence tendered by 
KRA was with regard to method used for computation of arm‘s length price. Thus, 
                                                          
1238
 See discussion chapter five at para 5.3 
1239
 Unilever case p.11. 
1240
 Ibid. 
1241
 Ibid p.13. 
1242
 Ibid. 
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according to the judge, the method used by UKL was lawful and permissible so long 
as there was no fraudulent trading with a view to evade tax.
1243
 
 
The statement by the court shows that even where revenue authorities have strong 
indication or rather, evidence showing that actually in the course of business, the 
transaction was so arranged it is difficult to prove before the court of law. The 
difficult is inherited from the long and cumbersome procedure involved in arriving at 
arm‘s length price, which involves economic, accounting, marketing and law as well 
as information technology.  Accordingly, the whole process is done solely by the 
taxpayer and the revenue authority comes into play when there is suspicious that the 
arms‘ length was not adhered to. Given complexities involved in setting up arm‘s 
length price, sometimes judges may not easily understand such transaction and 
actually, they detect malice arrangement between associated MNCs.  Such situation 
may discourage revenue authorities to take transfer pricing cases to the court of law.  
This can be evidenced by the recent development in Kenya that established an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism in which transfer pricing disputes are 
channeled.
1244
 Accordingly, such kind of decision may pull away legislators from 
crafting transfer pricing laws commensurate with domestic tax demands.   One year 
after the decision, Income Tax (Transfer Pricing Rules) 2006 were officially 
established.  
                                                          
1243
 Ibid p.13. 
1244
 An interview with KRA officials, department of big tax payers held on November 2014, Nairobi. 
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7.5   Base Erosion Profit Shifting Action Plan in Kenyan Context 
As noted before that the existing arm‘s length principle, to a great extent, has 
encountered serious challenges in curbing transfer pricing manipulation, BEPS 
Action plan was thought as a rescue.  The rationale behind BEPS is to ensure that 
profit by MNCs is taxed where economic activities generating that profit are 
performed or where the value of intangible is created. On the basis of existing 
transfer pricing laws as examined in this chapter, there is no any inclusion or 
reference to Base Erosion Profit Shifting Action Plan 2013. Accordingly, the KRA 
has not stated its position on implementation or adoption of the plan.  
  
7.6  Conclusion 
The presented analysis and examination of transfer pricing laws in Kenya reveal 
inadequacy of law in curbing transfer pricing manipulations. The arm‘s length 
principle still remains as a sole solution in curbing transfer pricing manipulation. 
While existing transfer pricing laws are premised on arm‘s length principle, they lack 
clarity and in some instances, they contradict each other. Accordingly, where clear 
provisions exist, they are not implementable, either because of lack of pre-requisites, 
requirement in practice, such as comparables or lack of experience and knowledge of 
transfer pricing by tax officers. Nobly, the law is silent on transaction related to 
extractive sectors. The situation is exacerbated by lack of specific transfer pricing 
penalties and specific transfer pricing adjustment. In addition, lack of clear guidance 
on services, finance and intangibles, which provide high risk on manipulation, are 
likely to hinder Kenyan desire to finance its expenditure through local taxes.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents conclusion of the study which essentially sums up insights of 
the study, provide recommendations and suggestions for future research. 
 
8.2  Main Insights of the Study and Key Findings 
The study has carried out in depth examination and analysis on transfer pricing laws 
in particular legal challenges that EAC countries face in applying arms‘ length 
principle. The study sought to address potentials of losing revenue from international 
transactions between associated MNCs emerging from the increase of foreign 
investments in the regional. The main focus of the study was the examination of 
adequacy of EAC transfer pricing laws and international standards in curbing 
manipulation of transfer prices between associated MNCs operating in the region.  
The study was guided by the following research questions;- 
(i) Do existing transfer pricing rules and standards in EAC adequately curb 
transfer pricing manipulation?  
(ii) To what extent are the general principles and guidelines of OECD and UN 
Model  relevant in curbing transfer pricing manipulation in EAC countries?  
(iii) What strategies should be considered and employed in formulating an 
effective transfer pricing regime for EAC? 
 
The study has demonstrated that the existing transfer pricing laws are inadequate in 
curbing such malpractice. The traditional doctrinal legal research methodology were 
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mainly employed and supplemented by empirical and comparative methods.  
Tanzania and Kenya are used as case study for EAC countries. The literature review 
revealed that although substantive literature has been developed, such scholarly 
writing is missing from EAC perspective. The preoccupation of this study was to 
provide comprehensive transfer pricing literature from EAC perspective.  
 
The theoretical and concept of transfer pricing analysis and discussion made in 
chapter two reveals that transfer pricing theories  have been developed exclusively 
and addressed from profit maximization and minimization of tax point of view.  
Consequently, suggested transfer pricing methods reflects maximization of profit. It 
is further found that the existing transfer pricing manipulation originates from 
transfer pricing theories. And that the existing manipulation of prices between 
associates MNCs originates from managers of entities who are afraid to be evaluated 
on basis of their profit performance. To date same managers are still concealing 
relevant information not only for purpose of evaluation but rather for purpose of 
lessening tax liability. Furthermore it was found that manipulation of transfer pricing 
is not only done by infringing the purpose of the law, but rather the whole processes 
is done on bases of accounting, economic, marketing and taxation. Therefore to 
handle such situation it requires combination of such disciplines and lawyers.  
 
To counteract transfer pricing theories, the study reveals that market price under 
arm‘s length principle is viable option to regulate transfer prices from legal and 
economic point of view. The study found that arm‘s length is capable of 
counteracting transfer pricing theories with a view of allocating right share of income 
for both taxpayer and governments. This is because arms‘ length principle takes in to 
 
 
305 
account transfer prices comparability requirement, separate account evaluation and 
transfer pricing methods as advanced by such theories and counteract them. The 
Arms‘ length principle obliges related parties be evaluated as independent party and 
compare their transaction and prices to non related parties so as to arrive at market 
price which is real transfer price. A review of transfer pricing standards under 
international instrument in chapter three reveals that arms‘ length principle is a 
cornerstone for any taxation of profit between associated MNCs. Countries are 
required to craft their domestic laws based on this principle. However, transfer 
pricing instrument reveals that originally, the transfer pricing laws were established 
to avoid double taxation as primary concern and not to deter MNCs from 
manipulation of transfer prices.  
 
Accordingly such rules were developed all along based on experience and practice of 
developed countries and therefore not necessarily reflecting needs for developing 
countries like EAC. The experience was based on problems faced in exporting 
capital and their desire to maximize profit and minimization of tax. Such experience 
has never felt by EAC countries for a great extent because all along have been capital 
importers. Hence, the standards developed based on solving their problems by 
limiting source countries in which MNCs operates to tax.  Consequently, issues of 
concern for EAC and other developing countries were not taken in to account.  
 
For example transfer pricing standards all along have been silent in relation to 
natural resources such as minerals, gas and oil. This might be because at the time of 
establishment these were not material concerns. Additionally, international transfer 
pricing standards did not take in to account the difficulties involved in implementing 
 
 
306 
arm‘s length principle for developing countries like EAC. The rules also all along 
have been not sufficiently addressing changes brought by technology in electronic 
transaction between associated MNCs. Presentation and discussion of EAC transfer 
pricing regional instrument under chapter four  found that arm‘s length and other 
transfer pricing standards as enshrined in EAC regional instrument affirms use of 
such principle to regulate transaction between associated parties in EAC.  
 
The study further found that transfer pricing standards as enshrined in EAC 
instruments lack clarity and clear guideline on handling transfer pricing issues. Such 
discrepancies lead to non uniform application of the arms‘ length principle in the 
region giving advantage to MNCs.  The study observed that the increase of foreign 
investment in the regional in which EAC increasingly integrated in to world 
economy, influenced existing transfer pricing standards in the region. It was found 
that EAC countries have been caught in between desire to attract foreign investment 
and desire to obtain revenue out of MNCs transaction within the regional.   
 
However, the desire to attract more investors seems to outweigh desire to obtain 
revenue out of such investment. This is substantiate by the fact that all along EAC 
countries have been changing and improving policy and laws to attract foreign 
investments and less efforts  in tax laws to keep pace with such increase of 
investments. This demonstrates the extent to which EAC countries have bound 
themselves in obligation that potentially affect and shape their policy choices in tax 
law in particular transfer pricing.  This show that the existing transfer pricing laws of 
EAC are not adequately addressing transfer pricing manipulation.  
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The discussion and analysis of relationship between transfer pricing standards and 
manipulation of transfer prices through aggressive transfer pricing has found the 
following. First, Transfer pricing standards provides potentials for transfer pricing 
manipulation and therefore associated MNCs stand to benefit more than revenue 
authorities in absence of aggressive transfer pricing laws. Second, the arms‘ length 
principle and other standards is vulnerable to transfer pricing manipulation because 
associated MNCs have been using loopholes found in transfer pricing laws to 
manipulate prices. Third, manipulations of transfer prices are done under auspices of 
aggressive tax planning by using same transfer pricing standards.  Forth, the BEPS 
Action plan which brought to rescue the existing transfer pricing laws is still 
premised on arm‘s length reaffirms arm‘s length principle as an ideal in regulating 
transactions between associated parties. same principle has been employed over and 
over again with slightly modification within the ambit of arms‘ length principle.  
 
BEPS Action Plan came to capture tax which could be shifted to other countries 
through transfer pricing manipulation. The study further reveals that, to date arm‘s 
length principle remains as sole solution in curbing transfer pricing manipulation. It 
was further found that, currently there is no alternative to arm‘s length principle 
because formulary apportionment sought to be alternative to arms‘ length price, was 
found to be not sufficiently addressing transfer pricing manipulations.   
 
The analysis and discussion of transfer pricing laws in Tanzania under chapter six 
found that the existing transfer pricing laws lack coordination and clarity in some 
instances. Although arms‘ length principle is enshrined in various tax laws actual 
implementation of arm‘s length principle remains unimplemented to a great extent 
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on account of factors provided in respective chapters. The study found that the 
failure is due to limited provision of arm‘s length principle as provided under section 
33 of ITA. Although more requirements are provided under Transfer pricing rules, 
legally speaking rules cannot override enabling Act.   
 
Other factors include conflict of the provision of the law governing transfer pricing, 
lack of local comparables and lack of clear guideline in absence of comparables, lack 
of clear mechanism to handle transfer pricing disputes, lack of capacity and 
experience by revenue officials in handling transfer pricing issues and lack of clear 
mechanism in transfer pricing audits. In addition, lack of provisions for 
ascertainment of taxable income for transfer pricing purpose and lack of clear 
transactions subject to transfer pricing among others. These discrepancies leads to 
conclusion that the existing transfer pricing laws as enshrined in Tanzania is 
inadequate in curbing transfer pricing manipulation between associated MNCs. The 
analysis and discussion of transfer pricing laws in Kenya under chapter seven found 
that the existing transfer pricing laws lack coordination and clarity in some instances. 
Although arms‘ length principle is enshrined in various tax laws actual 
implementation of arm‘s length principle remains unimplemented to a great extent 
on account of factors provided in respective chapters.  
 
The study found that although section18 of ITA to a great extent covers arms‘ length 
principle, Kenya still faces challenges in curbing transfer pricing manipulations. 
Such challenges are caused by factors as conflicting provision of the transfer pricing 
law, inadequate of provision and clear transfer pricing rules governing intra company 
service, intangibles and finances. Other factors include lack of clear auditing 
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mechanism, lack of local comparables and clear guideline in absence of 
comparables, low number of transfer pricing experts in handling transfer pricing 
issues, lack of special transfer pricing disputes  mechanisms, lack of comparability 
factors, lack of specific transfer pricing penalties, lack of clear modalities of transfer 
pricing adjustment for arm‘s length price and failure of the law to clearly state and 
regulate other methods capable to arrive at arm‘s length price among other factors. 
These discrepancies leads to conclusion that the existing transfer pricing laws as 
enshrined in Kenya is inadequate in curbing transfer pricing manipulation between 
associated MNCs.  
 
8.3  Recommendations 
Basically, the EAC countries require comprehensive tax reforms that recognize 
special nature of transfer pricing between associated MNCs. Such countries need 
transfer pricing provisions that expedite determination of transfer pricing in 
capturing the right share of tax to both government and MNCs.  This approach is 
necessary because EAC countries still rely solely on arm‘s length principle in 
curbing transfer pricing manipulation. Consequently, such reforms must be based on 
arm‘s length principle as a bench mark without departing from international 
practices.  
 
Generally, the study recommends amendments of transfer pricing law in Tanzania 
and Kenya  countries. Such amendment should aim at capturing the right share of tax 
arising from business profit by associated MNCs. This is sought to be achieved by 
counteracting MNCs and transfer pricing theories while taking into account 
economic situation of EAC countries.  Understanding economic situation is 
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important in setting up transfer pricing law between associates. This is important 
because it will help to understand the competitive advantage potentially for 
maximizing profit and minimizing cost prompted to invest in such countries and 
counteract manipulation of them. Equally important, capacity of EAC countries 
outbound investment should be taken into account so as to establish any potential 
likely to minimize tax liability.  The suggested amendment of the transfer pricing law 
in Tanzania and Kenya should take in account the following aspects: 
 
Firstly, there is need for clear clarification on ambiguous concepts and phrases. The 
law should be amended to provide clear definition of transfer pricing concept and 
clarification of all ambiguous words as well as phrases. The definition of legal 
transfer pricing is important in explaining and identifying circumstances, which a 
taxpayer did or did not transact at arm‘s length price. The concept will also help in 
identifying special circumstances between associated parties, which are unavailable 
to unrelated parties. This is particularly necessary in making comparability for 
purpose of comparing comparables and characterization of transaction for adjustment 
purposes. Consequently, when the transfer pricing concept used will clearly 
eliminate possibility of providing two conflicting results and enhance certainty of 
law.  
Secondly, there is need for hierarchal application of transfer pricing methods. The 
law should clearly state certain types of transactions should not rely on traditional 
methods that are irrelevant.
1245
 Accordingly, there is a need to establish the best 
choice rule in selecting transfer pricing method. The best choice should guide 
                                                          
1245
 It should be noted that the study could not suggest specific method to a specific transaction 
because it involves calculations which require combination of accounting, mathematics, economist 
and taxation which is beyond this study.  
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taxpayers to choose one method that will provide the best arm‘s length results. The 
rule should take into account relevance of the method to be chosen to a particular 
transaction and advantage and disadvantage of the method chosen. Additionally, 
selection of the best method rule should not only depend on comparables available 
only but also should depend on nature of goods and services under transaction.  
Where the taxpayer is not complied with the rule, the law should clearly provide 
relevant penalty for non-compliance.  
 
The penalty should either compel the taxpayer to use the best method or fine, which 
will deter the taxpayer from committing such offence in future. An exception should 
be provided to peculiar goods and services under transactions that may require 
specific method(s) to be followed. For example, Tanzanite and other precious 
gemstone are available in Tanzania only. As a result, in order to obtain comparables, 
it may be difficult. In this context, specific method(s) should be clearly stated based 
on policy and reliable research by revenue authorities.   
 
Accordingly, the law should clearly state other methods that may be prescribed by 
the Commissioner where traditional transfer pricing methods fail to provide desired 
results. This is necessary because if there are other methods that can yield results 
equivalent to arm‘s length price, such method(s) ought to be regulated by the law so 
as to avoid arbitrary application and uncertainty of the law. Thirdly, in regard to 
comparability factors, the law should clearly provide requirements for use 
comparables from African continent before embarking on foreign comparables.  This 
is thought to be achieved by establishing domestic, regional and continental data 
bases. Such databases should be updated from time to time so as to keep pace with 
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any changes in business arena. The common denominator factor is that African 
economic situations are more or less the same and therefore, they are sharing 
common features. Notably, such commitments require resources, both human and 
financial.  
 
However, national bureau of statistics of countries in collaboration with revenue 
authorities can be utilized in developing data bases as benchmarking information. 
For that reason, foreign databases may be used as a last resort.   Where there is no 
possibility of comparables, revenue authorities may do away with comparability 
aspect and adopt a fixed margin. However, this is subject to serious research. In 
addition, the law should clearly state the modality to be followed where there is no 
comparable. Fourthly, elimination of tax incentive and tax holidays: the law should 
be amended to clearly limit the extent of tax incentive and tax holidays offered to 
foreign investors. This is necessary in eliminating any risks of transfer pricing 
manipulation during period of tax holidays. In related matters, the law should clearly 
provide for requirement of application of arm‘s length principle in any international 
agreement where one part to an agreement is expecting to transact with a related 
party for transfer pricing purposes.  
 
Fifth, the law should clearly empower transfer pricing units full mandate in handling 
transfer pricing issues. Thus, any other government institutional audits from any 
aspect of transactions including mining, gas and petroleum should be obliged to 
submit any transfer pricing audit query to TP Units. This requirement is important in 
providing consistency in application of the law. Sixth, the law should require tax 
advisers to be regulated by a board of authority. This is necessary in curbing tax 
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avoidance schemes aiming at manipulating transfer pricing between associated 
MNCs.  
 
Seventh, capacity building for tax officials: there is need for revenue authorities to 
build transfer pricing capacity both human resources, financial and working tools. In 
this context, transfer pricing unit officials should be well equipped by acquiring 
knowledge based on continuous processes of learning while taking into account new 
tactics of aggressive planning, technology changes, new products and business 
methods. This is thought to be achieved by using institutes of tax administration and 
higher learning institutions in respective countries. Accordingly, working tools and 
financial resources should be sufficiently made available to transfer pricing units. 
The TP Units should be composed of officials from various expertise such as tax, 
law, economics, accounting and marketing.  Capacity building should be extended to 
enforcement instruments such as tribunals and courts of law. This is envisaged to be 
achieved by conducting regular transfer pricing seminars, workshops and training, 
short-term and long-term courses. The invitation of transfer pricing experts in 
handling transfer pricing cases may also be used. In near future, it is important to 
consider establishment of a High Court Tax Division.   
 
Eighth, enhancing tax compliance: the government, through tax authorities, has to 
strengthen tax policy to promote tax compliance to taxpayers. Negative attitude 
towards MNCs in profit shifting should change and handle MNCs just like any other 
taxpayers. 
 
Ninth, building economies of EAC: the economies of countries under the study need 
to be improved, which, in turn, will enhance growth of domestic MNCs. In addition, 
 
 
314 
fair treatment should be considered to domestic MNCs so as to put both investors on 
equal footing. The enabled domestic MNCs may have outbound investment not 
necessarily to developed countries but at least at regional level and in Africa. 
Countries‘ desires to obtain foreign investment should not outweigh desire to obtain 
tax out of profit by associated MNCs. EAC countries should make diligent research 
and be aware of gains obtainable by agreeing on sharing resources and avoid any 
chances that will lead to lose their right share of tax.  
 
Accordingly, revenue authorities must be in a position to foresee future prices for 
goods and services between associated MNCs. In due regard, such authorities must 
not focus on transactions, which they believe are of high risk, but rather, the whole 
transactions should be thoroughly analyzed.  Tenth, Actions 8,9,10 and13 of Base 
Erosion and Profit shifting Action plan 2013 may be customized and adopted. 
Eleventh, there is need to adopt formulary apportionment for MNCs operating within 
countries. There is a need for revenue authority to conduct serous studies to see 
whether or not formulary apportionment should be used to domestic MNCs. 
However, any recommendation for use of such method should be well regulated by 
the law.   
 
Apart from general recommendations for Kenya and Tanzania, the following are 
specific recommendations for individual countries. In Tanzania, Section 33 of 
Income Tax Act, should be amended to include the following:- One,  meaning of 
business and under circumstances the business is said to be carried on by resident or 
nonresident for transfer pricing purposes should be clear. Two, relevant transfer 
pricing transactions that are subject to adjustment should be clearly stated. Three, 
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ascertainment of income for transfer pricing should clearly state inclusion and 
deduction allowed. Four, relevant intercompany financial services should be stated 
and ratio of interest deduction as enshrined in BEPS action plan may be customized 
and adopted. Five, relevant intercompany services for transfer pricing purposes 
should be stated and defined. Associated parties for transfer pricing purposes should 
be provided.  
 
Six, clear elements of transactions, which the Commissioner is empowered to 
disregard should be clearly stated so as to avoid irrational use of power. Seven, 
penalties and APA should be clearly provide in ITA rather than being in the TP 
Rules only. Accordingly, such APA should be regulated and guidelines should be 
issued to that effect. Eight, the TP Rules should be amended and clearly state 
interpretation of provisions of transfer pricing law to be construed in a manner 
consistent with enabling Act and not as per OECD and UN models. Such amendment 
will harmonize well with requirement that in case of conflict between regulation and, 
enabling Act and international instrument, the enabling Act shall prevail. Ten, the 
term meaning of permanent should be amended to take into account electronic 
commerce.  
 
In Kenya, the law should be amended to provide the following: first, clear guidelines 
on intercompany financial services for transfer pricing should be stated. Second, the 
relevant intercompany services for transfer pricing purposes should be stated and 
defined. Third, advance pricing agreement (APA) should be introduced and regulated 
well in Kenyan law. Fourth, the law should provide clear factors to be taken into 
account for comparability purposes. 
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8.4  Suggestions for Future Research 
Future research may be taken by considering the following: first, similar research can 
be conducted in the same countries by suggesting alternative to arm‘s length as 
means to curb transfer pricing manipulations within countries. Second, a similar 
research may be taken in other EAC countries other than Kenya and Tanzania. 
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